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Preface
Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield is a handbook on how
to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience in an era of emerging threats.
Every day malicious actors target new technologies and medical resilience
or seek to wreak havoc following disasters brought on by climate change,
energy insecurity, and supply-chain disruptions. At the same time,
NATO member states are making strides in innovation to protect critical
infrastructure. The counterterrorism research produced for this volume
aligns with NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept, which details how
NATO Allies can transform and maintain their advantage for the next
two decades despite new threats. The topics are rooted in NATO’s seven
baseline requirements, which set the standard for enhancing resilience
in every aspect of critical infrastructure and civil society.
The book is the product of a formal partnership between NATO’s
Centre of Excellence for the Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) and
the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. The first handbook
on critical infrastructure security resilience published by the US Army War
College Press in November 2022 detailed the kinetic, cyber, and hybrid threats
to critical infrastructure through diverse lifeline case studies and provided
important tools for policymakers and critical infrastructure owners and
operators to enhance resiliency. This second volume looks to the future and
what innovation is being developed, how terrorists and adversaries are using
emerging and disruptive technologies, and how they fill the power vacuum
left in the wake of emergencies (such as pandemics and natural disasters)
for malicious purposes. Both handbooks evolved from recommendations
on how to improve the Critical Infrastructure Protection against Terrorist
Attacks course taught at COE-DAT. As such, the handbooks are designed
to be used in the classroom to inform NATO allies, partners, policymakers,
and private-sector organizations.
This second handbook is divided into three subcategories: countering
the terrorist threat to technology; to medical resilience; and to climate change,
energy, and the supply chain. For each topic, readers are informed of NATO
policies, context and methods of resilience, and evolving terrorist threats and
tactics. Each chapter recommends new policies and tools to counter these
evolving tactics and poses questions on greater NATO collaboration and
interoperability in the fight against terrorism. NATO has new possibilities
to cooperate in the joint creation and operation of drone exercises, to cull
big-data analytics to stop terrorist attacks before they occur, or to track
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illnesses through early-warning technology that can help stop the spread
of illness before it becomes a pandemic.
We hope this collaboration of authors from the military, academic, and
private-sector communities and from across North America, Europe, and
Africa provides NATO and its partner nations with actionable information
and recommendations to prepare for the battlefield of the future.

Sarah J. Lohmann
Visiting Professor
Strategic Studies Institute
US Army War College
Acting Assistant Professor
University of Washington
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Executive Summary
What do election infrastructure, space, drones, and disinformation
have to do with each other? How can medical resilience be strengthened,
and how are terrorists using broken supply chains, energy security,
and climate change to sow chaos and destruction? Malicious actors are laying
the groundwork for victory on tomorrow’s battlef ield by using the same
innovation and critical infrastructure democracies are using to save lives.
Terrorists, however, are using new technologies to extinguish lives.

Ensuring the resilience of NATO member states is vital to the success
of NATO missions and the integrity of the Alliance itself. Without resilience,
the Alliance and its member states’ critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable
to various threats, including terrorist attacks, hybrid attacks, and asymmetrical
warfare. While technological innovation and infrastructure interdependencies
heighten the risks of cascading effects, the systems providing resilience
against these threats are becoming obsolete. If NATO does not create new
defenses, it will be possible for a NATO adversary, whether a terrorist
organization or a nation-state, to strike a single decisive blow.

Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield assesses new technologies,
civil-military cooperation, interoperability, and a whole-of-government
approach as ways to strengthen NATO’s resilience. It also examines where
innovation needs to be hardened to ensure Alliance security. The same
big-data analytics the US military has used to hunt terrorists are being used
by the Taliban to target innocents. Space systems provide critical capabilities
to enable NATO’s core missions of deterrence and defense, including secure
communications (SATCOM), positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT),
early warning, environmental assessment, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR). However, the proliferation of counter-space technologies
renders these systems vulnerable to interference and attack by state and
non-state actors. Terrorists and adversaries with lower defense budgets and
less training are making gains on battlefields due to drones, even as NATO
is increasing its counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capacities.
The story does not end there. NATO member states are working together
to strengthen UAV prowess through joint exercises. Disinformation and hacked
election infrastructure are being countered through targeted information
campaigns and updated cybersecurity protections. Medical resilience is being
strengthened through new pandemic tracking and early-warning systems.
Energy security requires a unified political, economic, and military approach
of member states that will bring long-term energy independence. In addition,
NATO is creating healthier supply chains within the Alliance rather than
ix
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turning to unreliable outside partners. The impacts of climate change
on military preparedness are forcing new methods of preparedness
and equipment.

This second handbook on critical infrastructure security and resilience
for NATO’s Centre of Excellence in the Defence Against Terrorism analyzes
today’s emerging threats, their trajectory, and how equipped NATO
is to handle them. It provides recommendations and suggests new tools
for foresight, preparedness, and response to these threats. We hope this
research serves as a foundation to strengthen Alliance defenses today—
and for decades to come.

x
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the Terrorist Threat
to Technology
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Mission-dependent Critical Infrastructure
Lucas M. Cox and Trevor P. Helmy
©2022 Lucas M. Cox and Trevor P. Helmy

Chris Chomyszak, Samuel Jacobson, Sam Lavey,
Martha Lewis, Katherine Lin, Sam Mabe, Alex Olsen, Isobel Williamson,
Sydney Winstead, Abraham Wu
Student Researchers

ABSTR ACT: This chapter discusses the vulnerabilities facing NATO
critical infrastructure and proposes ways to promote critical infrastructure
resilience. After def ining key terms, the chapter explores how critical
infrastructure has been tested in NATO partner states and out-of-area.
Member states’ critical infrastructure has inherent vulnerabilities to external
threats and internal failure. The authors explore these weaknesses as well
as describe areas of civil-military cooperation and partnerships that can
promote critical infrastructure security and resilience.
Keywords: critical infrastructure, mission-dependent infrastructure,
K azak hstan, European Union, energ y securit y, cybersecurit y,
civil-military cooperation

Introduction
This chapter first summarizes NATO’s definitions of critical infrastructure
categories. Next, it discusses resilience, detailing NATO’s seven baseline
requirements, explores the January 2022 riots in the wake of gas price hikes
in Kazakhstan as a case study to illustrate the importance of energy
infrastructure, and describes existing resilience-testing procedures in the
United States. Third, the chapter outlines the inherent vulnerabilities and
external threats facing NATO critical infrastructure. Fourth, the chapter explains
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the evolution of civil-military cooperation in the operation and protection
of critical infrastructure. Finally, the chapter discusses partnerships to
promote resilience, focusing on collaborations between the United States
and European Union.

Defining Critical Infrastructure
NATO def ines critical infrastructure as “a general term describing
a nation’s infrastructure assets, facilities, systems, net works, and
processes that support the military, economic, political and/or social life
on which a nation and /or NATO depends.” 1 Put differently,
critical infrastructure refers to systems that would cause severe disruptions
if destroyed, including power generation, water supply, communications
assets, transportation, and energy distribution.
The Alliance subdivides critical infrastructure into three categories:
critical national infrastructure, mission-vital infrastructure, and
key infrastructure. These categories are not mutually exclusive.
For example, some assets could be both critical national infrastructure and
mission-vital infrastructure.
NATO defines critical national infrastructure as “infrastructure identified
by the Territorial Host Nation that are integral to the continued delivery and
integrity of the essential services upon which the nation relies; the destruction
or compromise of which would lead to severe military, economic, political,
or social consequences to the nation.” 2 Typically, territorial host nations create
a national homeland defense plan that identifies critical national infrastructure,
which the country then shares with NATO. If a territorial host nation has not
created a plan, NATO can identify critical national infrastructure to ensure
essential assets are adequately protected. 3
NATO defines mission-vital infrastructure as “infrastructure within the
[Joint-Operations Area] which Host Nation and/or NATO/Troop Contributing
Nation forces rely on for fielded capability,” the destruction of which would create
a decisive disadvantage to the NATO mission, likely rendering the entire mission
Note: This chapter appeared in altered form in Sarah Lohmann et al., Navigating New Threats:
NATO’s Posture on Emerging Technologies (Seattle: University of Washington Henry M. Jackson School
of International Studies, March 2022), 3–22, https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content
/uploads/2022/04/22_TF_JSIS-495H_Lohmann.pdf.
1. NATO, Infrastructure Assessment, ACO Directive 084-002, October 17, 2019.
2. NATO, Infrastructure Assessment.
3.

NATO, Infrastructure Assessment.
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a failure.4 Meanwhile, key infrastructure is defined as infrastructure forces rely
on for fielded capacity, the destruction of which would bring “a significant
challenge to the NATO mission while not precipitating the mission’s complete
failure.” 5 For example, if NATO were operating in a foreign country and were
primarily supplying its forces via a maritime port, the port would be considered
mission-vital infrastructure. If the port were destroyed, the entire logistics
chain would collapse, putting the mission in jeopardy. A railroad linking
the port to inland areas, however, would be considered key infrastructure
in this scenario since would still be possible to truck in supplies via roads if
the railroad were destroyed. While the destruction of the railroad would put
NATO forces at a disadvantage, it would not jeopardize the entire mission.
By its definition, critical infrastructure is present in every country on Earth,
so understanding it is key to building resilience for NATO operations and
undermining NATO adversaries.

Resilience
NATO defines resilience as the “collective and continuous effort of all
member states to be prepared for and possess the f lexibility to overcome any
future threat to national security.”6 Today, NATO faces a changing geopolitical
landscape, new technologies, and increasingly sophisticated terrorist networks.
Russia threatens NATO’s eastern f lank, challenging NATO’s territorial
reach, and adversaries can use hypersonic missiles to launch a devastating
first strike. There have been examples of national critical infrastructure
being unexpectedly degraded or taken off line at the hands of state actors.
Alternatively, a lesser adversary might affect some national critical
infrastructure and raise doubts about the allies’ ability to defend themselves.
Attacks can come from anywhere at any time, and there is no guarantee they
will be detected quickly enough for prevention efforts to succeed. Given this
environment, it is important that NATO increase its resilience to ensure one
blow cannot cripple its infrastructure.
NATO has created seven baseline requirements of resilience for its allies:
government continuity, energy, uncontrolled movement of people, food and
water, mass casualties, telecommunications, and transportation.7 High levels
4.

NATO, Infrastructure Assessment.

5.

NATO, Infrastructure Assessment.

6. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” NATO (website), March 23, 2021, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/topics_49158.htm.
7. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3.”
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of resilience in these areas secure the continuity of government functions and
essential services during and after a crisis. Each area faces different challenges,
and many are dependent on resilience in other areas. Additionally, the military,
civilian, and commercial sectors are all dependent on the successful functioning
of these areas during a crisis. The NATO baseline requirements serve
as a starting point to resilience and a framework to foster innovation
against new emerging threats.
NATO and its member states can strengthen resilience through four
primary means: building persistence, capacity consideration, education, and
training. 8 Building persistence requires a critical, continuous assessment
of areas in which member states’ baseline resilience plans can be more efficient
and integrated. There must be a collective public effort to build persistence,
achievable if the public is well-informed. Capacity consideration refers
to recognizing that increasing resilience requires a holistic approach in which
resources are dedicated to innovation and collaboration.9 Education is another
critical component of strengthening resilience, as a well-informed public will
encourage innovation. Furthermore, education provides a pathway to training
by conducting model simulations that test resilience.10 Training to strengthen
resilience requires total comprehension of possible risks, the realities of the
complex environment, and how systems behave when exercised to the point
of failure. NATO furthers resilience education by publishing resources like
its Counter-terrorism Reference Curriculum.11

Kazakhstan Riots and the Importance of Energy Sector Resilience
Many examples of critical infrastructure failures have led to a deteriorated
security situation. For NATO, monitoring and preventing terrorist
attacks and malicious attacks by state actors is of the utmost importance.
It is vital to understand that critical infrastructure failure can occur due to
systemic policy failures, which in turn can deteriorate into adverse security
situations relevant to NATO. Although not in the NATO Joint area of
operations, this task force found it important to analyze recent developments
in Kazakhstan to show how disruptions in civil energy infrastructure led
8. NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) and City of Norfolk, Building
Resilience: Collaborative Proposals to Help Nations and Partners (Norfolk, VA: SACT and City of Norfolk,
June 2017), 2, https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2017/resilience/resilience-wp.pdf.
9.

SACT and City of Norfolk, Building Resilience.

10. Jan Hodicky et al., “Dynamic Modeling for Resilience Measurement: NATO Resilience Decision
Support Model,” Applied Sciences 10, no. 8 (2020): 2639, https://doi.org/10.3390/app10082639.
11. Sajjan M. Gohel and Peter K. Forster, eds., Counter-terrorism Reference Curriculum (Brussels:
NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme, May 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014
/assets/pdf/2020/6/pdf/200612-DEEP-CTRC.pdf.
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to military intervention by a NATO adversary. This is relevant to NATO
as a case study because if it were to occur in-area, NATO would have
an important role to play in securing critical infrastructure and deterring
adversaries from using civil instability to debilitate partner nations.
This example also displays how the Russian Federation leverages critical
infrastructure vulnerabilities and civil unrest to exert greater geopolitical
inf luence in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. This trend is of increasing
concern to NATO in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The January 2022 protests and riots in Kazakhstan resulted from a critical
infrastructure failure. On January 1, the government of Kazakhstan lifted
price caps on the cost of gasoline, causing the price of fuel to skyrocket.12
Since fuel is essential to the functioning of modern society, the rapid price
increase triggered protests against these adverse economic conditions
attributed to the government. After days of riots and unrest, the government
reimplemented the gas cap to calm the situation.13 The Kazakh state also called
on the Collective Security Treaty Organization forces to improve the security,
leading to the deployment of Russian and other forces into the country.14
Increases in fuel prices and negative energy supply shocks in NATO
member states adversely affect geopolitical stability and the Alliance’s ability
to supply its operations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended global energy
markets, caused energy shortages in Europe, and threatened the efficiency
of NATO military forces.15 The Kazakh example illustrates the multifaceted
nature of critical infrastructure and how its nonmilitary impacts could
affect NATO member states. Unrest from critical infrastructure failure
in NATO member states could allow an adversary to strike when the Alliance
is vulnerable. Additionally, unrest in other regions can spiral into civil wars
that could draw in troops from NATO member states.
12. Valerie Hopkins, “Kazakhstan Declares State of Emergency as Protests over Fuel Prices
Spread,” New York Times (website), January 4, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/world
/europe/kazakhstan-emergency-protests-fuel.html.
13. “Kazakhstan Unrest: Government Restores Fuel Price Cap after Bloodshed,” BBC (website),
January 6, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59896471.
14. Mary Ilyushina, “Russia Sends Troops into Kazakhstan as Clashes between Security Forces
and Anti-government Protesters Turn Deadly,” CBS News (website), January 6, 2022, https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/russia-sends-troops-into-kazakhstan-as-protests-turn-deadly.
15. Herbert Lash and Marc Jones, “Oil Surges above $100 a Barrel, Stocks Slide on Ukraine Conflict,”
Reuters (website), March 1, 2022, https://w w w.reuters.com/markets/europe/global-markets
-w rapup-1-2 022- 03- 01 /; a nd K r ist ia n K nus L a r sen, Unfolding Green Defense:
Linking Green Technologies and Strategies to Current Security Challenges in NATO and the NATO
Member States (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Centre for Military Studies, December 2015),
https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/unfolding-green-defense/Undfolding_Green_Defense_CMS
-rapport.pdf, 3–5.
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Testing Resilience
Testing Alliance states’ resilience is critical in identifying weaknesses
and avenues for improvement. The following exercises conducted by the
United States can serve as a template for other NATO member states
to identify shortcomings in their operations and develop testing regimes.
These exercises represent a cross-governmental approach to infrastructure
resilience testing, assessing resilience across various sectors, and promoting
resilience before and after crises.
The United States government, cooperating with civil and private-sector
partners, regularly assesses the resilience of national energy infrastructure.
For example, the US Department of Energy, in conjunction with regulatory
authorities like the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC),
has orchestrated energy resilience readiness exercises in which it cut power
to military bases to test energy resilience in the continental United States.
As of April 2020, five bases had undergone these assessments to test the
“performance of the infrastructure, the efficiency of emergency generators,
and impact on residents to the unannounced power outage.” 16 In the coming
years, the United States will also complete Installation Energy and Water
Plans to assess shortcomings in its current ability to provide energy and water
during a crisis.17
In 2010, the US Department of Homeland Security began collaborating
with the private sector to promote and test cybersecurity.18 The US Army
War College Center for Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD)
has led war games, workshops, and training for Army leaders to model the
best policy responses and illuminate vulnerabilities during a cyberattack.
The CSLD has also worked extensively with congresspeople, legislators,
academics, and scientists to develop military and civilian resilience and
maintain vital services during a crisis.19 The Air Force has also collaborated
with academic institutions to host cybersecurity and resilience workshops,

16. Alex Beehler and J. E. Jack Surash, “Cutting the Cord to Test Energy Resilience,” US Army (website),
April 13, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/234514/cutting_the_cord_to_test_energy_resilience.
17.

Beehler and Surash, “Cutting the Cord.”

18. “Science and Technology: First Responder/Disaster Resilience,” US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) (website), last updated on June 8, 2022, accessed on January 20, 2022, https://www.dhs.gov
/science-and-technology/first-responder-disaster-resilience.
19. Cynthia E. Ayers and Kenneth D. Chrosniak, Terminal Blackout: Critical Electric Infrastructure
Vulnerabilities and Civil-Military Resiliency (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Center for Strategic
Leadership and Development, October 2013), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2983.pdf.
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examining vulnerabilities within current infrastructure and creating more
sophisticated disaster preparedness models. 20
Additional US government agencies test infrastructure resilience in the
United States. The DHS has a diverse array of procedures to run preventative
tests and assess infrastructure capabilities in the aftermath of a crisis.
The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
for example, has created several platforms that can assess the resilience
of services vital to the military. The infrastructure visualization platform
and the security assessment at f irst entry are such tools. The CISA’s
information-sharing with civil authorities and private owners of critical
infrastructure through its National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
(NICC) displays best practices that could be replicated cross-nationally
by NATO authorities. 21 Another CISA program, Emergency Support
Platform #14, emphasizes services to the military and civilians that would be
cut off during a crisis. 22
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate has also expanded the
means of testing critical infrastructure resilience, including collaboration
with the private sector to test new technologies that could serve as back-ups
to current infrastructure or help maintain supply chains. 23 This directorate
created a strategic plan for artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning
that analyzes the risks of these technologies and how they can be incorporated
into disaster resilience plans. 24 Additionally, the f irst responder/disaster
resilience research assists the DHS with testing for vulnerabilities immediately
following a critical infrastructure failure and maintaining functionality
during a crisis. 25 This extensive DHS resilience testing regime embodies the
United States’ forward-looking approach to resilience testing. If member
20. Kylie Foy, “Improving Resiliency in Military Systems Will Require Organizational and Cultural
Shifts,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory (website), November 6, 2019, https://www.ll.mit.edu/news/improving
-resiliency-military-systems-will-require-organizational-and-cultural-shifts.
21. Chris Anderson, Privacy Impact Assessment for the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
INSight Application (Washington, DC: DHS, November 23, 2007), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/privacy_pia_nppd_nicc.pdf, 2–7.
22. “Emergency Support Function #14 – Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure” (Washington, DC:
US Federal Emergency Management Agency, October 2019), 1, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default
/files/2020-07/fema_ESF_14_Business-Infrastructure.pdf.
23. William N. Bryan, “The Power of Testing Critical Infrastructure in Operational Settings,” DHS
Science and Technology (blog), November 19, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/blog/2018/11
/19/power-testing-critical-infrastructure-operational-settings.
24. “Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments,” US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) (website), n.d., accessed January 20, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure
-vulnerability-assessments.
25.

DHS, “First Responder/Disaster Resilience.”
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states’ infrastructure systems were synchronized, NATO could adopt a similar
framework for assessing critical infrastructure resilience.

Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure
To maintain the resilience of their critical infrastructure systems,
states must recognize the external threats to critical infrastructure and these
systems’ inherent vulnerabilities. External threats include cyberattacks,
climate change, and public health crises. The Alliance and its members’
societies must be prepared for any threat and hazard that might arise,
whether from a nation-state, a non-state actor, or the environment.
For example, increased disinformation campaigns delivered through cyberspace
and traditional media have added to the spread of disinformation and damaged
election integrity. 26 These attacks disturb the continuity of government
by sowing distrust in the validity of these elections. Energy resilience allows
energy infrastructure to recover quickly from cyberattacks, climate change, and
other challenges. 27 Climate change or supply-chain issues can diminish food
and water supplies in times of crisis and threaten access to these vital resources.
The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting mass casualties overextended many
states’ health-care systems to the point of near collapse. 28
NATO critical infrastructure systems also have multiple inherent
vulnerabilities that leave dependent populations at risk. One danger is
the interconnectedness of different types of infrastructure. For example,
over 7,000 power plants in the United States are dependent on the
functionality of other critical infrastructure facilities and outside supply
chains. 29 Additionally, transport-system failures can debilitate supply chains

26. Jamie Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” NATO Review (website),
March 30, 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element
-of-collective-defence/index.html.
27. “Energy Security,” NATO (website), September 28, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/topics_49208.htm.
28. US National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), Insider Threat Mitigation
for U.S. Critical Infrastructure Entities: Guidelines from an Intelligence Perspective (Washington, DC:
NCSC, March 2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20210319-Insider-Threat-Mitigation
-for-US-Critical-Infrastru-March-2021.pdf.
29. Brian E. Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R45809 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 8, 2019), 1,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45809.html.
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during emergencies. 30 As such, NATO has identified that stable critical
infrastructure requires self-reliant facilities. 31
The current American system has additional interdependencies that
leave facilities at risk. Current government efforts to prevent these mass
shutdowns often require voluntary participation from the private-sector owners
of critical infrastructure facilities, but that participation is difficult to ensure. 32
This lack of voluntary preparedness is another inherent vulnerability of
critical infrastructure systems. Currently, governments offer information
and education about possible hazards to incentivize the private sector to
prepare privately owned critical infrastructure systems for potential disasters. 33
The United States’ 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan identified
that this method varies in effectiveness, especially when owners are asked
to prepare for high-risk and low-probability disasters, including terrorist
attacks. 34 This inaction is dangerous because the US Department of Defense
(DoD) relies on privately owned companies to produce their technology. 35
In combination with the interconnectedness of critical infrastructure facilities,
this dynamic results in system-wide vulnerabilities.
In some instances, the protocols used to analyze critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities are not standardized, demonstrating another inherent
vulnerability of Alliance critical infrastructure. In 2013, in the United
States, the Government Accountability Office found some states purposely
ignored phone calls from the Department of Homeland Security.
They stated they could not comply with the DHS security standards because
of existing burdens, poor technology, and their own cost-benefit calculations.
Some states also noted they lacked the expertise to create disaster scenarios
and prepare as the Department of Homeland Security wanted. 36
Given the high degree of infrastructural interdependence, a critical
infrastructure failure in one state can lead to cascading cross-border
30. NCSC, “Insider Threat Mitigation.”
31.

SACT and City of Norfolk, Building Resilience, 2.

32. Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure, 20.
33. DHS and Department of State (DOS) CISA, A Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
(Washington, DC: DHS and DOS CISA, November 2019), 12, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/Guide-Critical-Infrastructure-Security-Resilience-110819-508v2.pdf.
34.

Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure, 20.

35. Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress,
CRS Report RL32115 (Washington, DC: CRS, January 29, 2008), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports
/RL32114.html.
36.

Humphreys, Critical Infrastructure, 7.
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failures. 37 The risk of cascading failures increases as technologies and critical
infrastructure systems become more interdependent. Should one piece
of critical infrastructure fail—due to terrorist attacks, biohazards, or the
effects of climate change—infrastructure interdependencies will put other
connected systems at risk of collapse.

Civil-Military Cooperation
Building resilience and civil preparedness requires persistent
interconnectedness between the civil, private, and military sectors. 38
Civil-militar y cooperation inf luences many aspects of securit y.
These general areas of civil-military cooperation include counterterrorism,
cybersecurity, natural disasters, biohazards, technological hazards, energy,
supply-chain challenges, and research and development in hypersonic and
other emerging technologies. NATO faces a critical point in its existence,
needing to determine the extent to which, if any, it desires to coordinate
the development of A llies’ mission-vital and key infrastructure.
Whether NATO commits to civil-military cooperation impacts the future
international security environment and, by extension, the future security
of critical infrastructure systems.
NATO has become increasingly dependent on civilian infrastructure
since the end of the Cold War. Falling defense budgets have intensified the
reliance on civil and commercial assets and capabilities. 39 Today, military
forces, especially those deployed during crises and war, heavily rely on the
civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, and basic
supplies such as food and water. Around 90 percent of military transport
for large military operations is chartered or requisitioned from the
commercial sector. On average, the commercial sector provides over 30 percent
of satellite communications used for defense purposes. Some 75 percent
of host nation support to NATO operations is sourced from local commercial
infrastructure and services.40 Moreover, military medical systems depend
on civilian medical infrastructure. Finally, military operations use local civilian
expertise and human resources such as translators to function successfully.41
Each of these assets is highly vulnerable, and the prevalence of civilian
37.

Gohel and Forster, Counter-terrorism Reference Curriculum, 95.

38.

SACT and City of Norfolk, Building Resilience, 1.

39. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3.”
40. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3.”
41. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3.”
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and commercial assets in military operations reveals a general vulnerability
in key- and mission-vital infrastructure.

Significance of Civil-Military Cooperation
Partnerships between the military and civilian sectors can promote
infrastructure resilience in two ways. First, civil-military cooperation
can increase the mobilit y and eff iciency of militar y operations.
Whenever civilian infrastructure is required to execute a military task,
the private and military sectors share the responsibility to address and mitigate
the risk.42 Furthermore, as warfare shifts onto the hybrid digital-social
landscape, cooperation between military and private sectors will be integral
in defending against cognitive and misinformation attacks.43 As private
companies own platforms on which these attacks occur, civil-military
collaboration will be critical in creating response protocols and improved
algorithms to detect false information. These partnerships reduce public
distrust and social division by countering misinformation, ultimately
promoting political stability. These platforms are therefore critical social and
political infrastructure.44
Second, civil-military cooperation in the construction of nongovernmentowned infrastructure “can accelerate the technological process” by which
new technologies are researched, developed, and put into use.45 For example,
the United States is “supporting an integrated model that leverages government,
industry and university resources” to advance the nation’s missile capabilities.
NATO needs to invest more into cooperation among the civilian and military
sectors within certain parameters.46 There are three specific means by which
civil-military cooperation promotes innovation: technology road mapping,
talent recruitment, and cost efficiency. Technological road mapping allows
companies to address gaps in technology by “pointing to specific university
42. Henrik Beckvard and Phillipe Zotz, Cyber Considerations for Military Mobility (Tallinn, EE:
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2021), 3, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2021/05
/Releasable_Cyber-Considerations-for-Military-Mobility_Beckvard_Zotz.pdf.
43. Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, “Countering Cognitive Warfare:
Awareness and Resilience,” NATO Review (website), May 20, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review
/articles/2021/05/20/countering-cognitive-warfare-awareness-and-resilience/index.html.
44. Johns Hopkins University, Imperial College London, and Georgia Institute of Technology,
“Countering Disinformation: Improving the Alliance’s Digital Resilience,” NATO Review (website),
August 12, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/08/12/countering-disinformation-improving
-the-alliances-digital-resilience/index.html.
45. “The Hypersonics Force Multiplier: University Engagement,” Lockheed Martin (website),
January 28, 2021, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2021/the-hypersonics-force
-multiplier--university-engagement.html.
46.

“Hypersonics Force Multiplier.”
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research that will contribute to closing those gaps.”47 Talent recruitment
allows industry employees to work directly with university students who want
to work in specific industries, allowing them easier transitions into their
careers. Cost efficiency allows for government-funded projects to address
challenges within industries. In sum, more cooperation among civilian and
military sectors can enable “impactful research that will transition directly
to the industry.”48
Research and development of hypersonic technologies highlights the
innovative pressure of civil-military cooperation. In the United States,
most weapons research currently takes place inside the Department of Defense
and with industry partners, including nontraditional military partners.
In an important example of civil-military cooperation, the Department
of Defense has provided $25.5 million over three years for 18 projects
at 29 universities to conduct advanced research on hypersonics to develop
the next generation of hypersonic weapons.49
By contrast, limited cooperation between the public and private sectors
can leave civilian assets vulnerable. Privatization incentivizes eff iciency
and profit, not redundancy and resilience, in times of crisis. Some states
have also begun voicing their discontent over European cooperation
with Russian- and China-owned companies, arguing that some countries
are putting “economic benef its above the objectives of the European
Union and broader geopolitical concerns.” 50 This dynamic is evident in the
European energy market. Germany, for example, partnered with Gazprom,
a Russian “state-owned entity,” to construct the controversial Nord Stream
2 pipeline. 51 Other European investors such as Engie from France, Shell,
a British and Dutch company, and OMW of Austria f inancially
supported the pipeline. 52 If the pipeline had become operational, Russia,
through Gazprom, would have become a more dominant supplier of European
47. “Hypersonics Force Multiplier.”
48.

“Hypersonics Force Multiplier.”

49. “Defense Department Awards $25.5 Million over Three Years for Applied Hypersonics Research,”
US Department of Defense (DoD) (website), October 5, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News
/Releases/Release/Article/2800008/defense-department-awards-255-million-over-three-years-for
-applied-hypersonics/.
50. Moniek de Jong and Thijs Van de Graaf, “Lost in Regulation: Nord Stream 2 and the Limits
of the European Commission’s Geo-economic Power,” Journal of European Integration 43, no. 4
(August 2021): 495–510, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1800680.
51. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3”; and Andrew A. Michta, “The Three Seas Initiative
Will Reorder NATO’s Eastern Flank,” 1945 (website), November 2, 2021, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021
/11/the-three-seas-initiative-will-reorder-natos-eastern-flank/.
52.

Michta, “Three Seas Initiative.”
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energy. Analysts in the United States and other NATO member states feared
the pipeline would give Russia significant geopolitical leverage and dangerous
control over Europe’s energy market.53 Until Olaf Scholz’s government canceled
the pipeline’s certification after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many feared
Germany’s hands-off, pro-commerce attitude on the pipeline was creating
vulnerabilities in European critical infrastructure. 54 Indeed, much of the
damage had already been done.

NATO’s Role in Facilitating Civil-Military Cooperation
NATO has already worked to promote civil-military cooperation
to defend against adversaries. For example, NATO developed guidelines
for enhancing civil-military cooperation in response to a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident. NATO guidance also
advises national authorities on warning the public and alerting emergency
responders. Moreover, after 2001, the use of civilian aircraft as a weapon in the
September 11 attacks facilitated NATO’s efforts in improving civil-military
coordination of air traffic control. 55
As the world becomes more connected and the impacts of climate
change worsen, critical infrastructure faces environmental threats, including
biohazards and natural disasters. War, natural disasters, and biohazards
also have secondary impacts on energy infrastructure and supply chains.
For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine caused dramatic
shifts in oil prices. 56
NATO can facilitate responses to these emerging crises. For instance,
NATO partner countries’ militaries supported the civilian medical supply
during the COVID-19 pandemic by reducing the cost of aircraft transportation.
Additionally, the military and civilian sectors are pursuing research and
development in renewable energy for households, commercial consumption,
and military defense. 57 Military sectors can rely on advanced equipment
53. de Jong and Van de Graaf, “Lost in Regulation.”
54. Melissa Eddy, “Germany Puts a Stop to Nord Stream 2, a Key Russian Natural Gas Pipeline,”
New York Times (website), February 22, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/business/nord
-stream-pipeline-germany-russia.html?smid=url-share.
55. “Countering Terrorism,” NATO (website), September 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/topics_77646.htm.
56. Kevin M. Camp et al., “Monthly Labor Review: From the Barrel to the Pump: The Impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic on Prices for Petroleum Products,” US Bureau of Labor Statistics (website),
October 2020, https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2020.24.
57. Constantine Samaras, William J. Nuttall, and Morgan Bazilian, “Energy and the Military:
Convergence of Security, Economic, and Environmental Decision-making,” Energy Strategy Reviews,
no. 26 (November 2019): 8, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100409.
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to assess the destruction rapidly and send out response teams when
responding to natural disasters. 58 For example, partnership between NATO
members through the NATO Innovation Fund can foster close research
relationships between the government and private firms. 59 Nations can use
their NATO connections to strengthen a member states’ critical infrastructure
through creation and innovation. Moreover, this funding relationship
establishes the basis for closer working relationships that expedite responses
to security failures.

Promoting Resilience through Partnerships
NATO’s greatest strength lies in its ability to ensure the security
of its members through partnerships. This is especially important
when it comes to mission-critical infrastructure. Foreign acquisition by
NATO adversaries of such critical infrastructure can make it vulnerable to
lower security standards or open to direct hacking threats. As NATO moves
toward a near-limitless technological frontier of opportunities and threats,
NATO members can leverage this advantage and collaborate to enhance their
cybersecurity and technological security standards and resilience and civil
preparedness. The next generation of technologies will present a wide range
of new security and defense applications and vulnerabilities.
Partnership between the EU and NATO is a natural relationship due
to a shared interest in maintaining Euro-Atlantic security. There is significant
potential to meet mutual needs and increase resilience between these two
organizations. There have already been significant security partnerships
between the EU and NATO, for example, the European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE), which became operational
in April 2017. Since this program’s inception, the EU and NATO staff have
participated in joint workshops on how hybrid threats can disrupt security. 60
Furthermore, coordination in critical infrastructure and defense capabilities
of the EU and NATO will limit unnecessary duplications of infrastructure
and contingencies, which will increase resilience in the Euro-Atlantic region. 61
Joint training operations between the EU and NATO, the United States
58.

NATO, “Resilience and Article 3.”

59. “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,” NATO (website), October 22, 2021, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm.
60. Sonia Krimi, 2020 – Report – The NATO-EU Partnership in a Changing Global Context (Brussels:
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 2020), 6, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2020-revised
-draft-report-nato-eu-partnership-changing-global-context-krimi-037-pcnp-20-e.
61. “Brussels Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 14 June 2021,” NATO (website), last updated
July 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
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and NATO, and the EU and the United States—particularly those relating
to hybrid warfare and emerging technologies—will foster further cooperation
and increase the Alliance’s counterterrorism capacity and collective security. 62
NATO can play an important role in ensuring the security of privately
owned critical infrastructure, specif ically in the foreign acquisition
process. Certain EU or NATO members have, through structural and legal
loopholes, acquired infrastructure technology contracts from countries like
China that may compromise critical infrastructure security. The current
European Union Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regime allows individual
member states to develop their own regulations and does not have authority
to block foreign acquisitions of critical infrastructure. 63 For example,
Italy has given conditional approval for Huawei, a corporation with links
to Chinese security services, to develop 5G infrastructure across the
country. 64 As a security organization that works closely with EU regulators,
NATO can provide a supervisory and coordination role for the protection
of critical infrastructure that requires foreign investment.
The EU and NATO also encourage civil-military cooperation on emerging
technologies to promote critical infrastructure resilience. For example,
34 NATO and EU members and more than 30 private-sector
partners attended the “Interdependency in Resilience” conference
in May 2017. The conference was held to “improve understanding and visibility
of what resilience means across these sectors; establish knowledge transfer
between key stakeholders; and develop actionable proposals to improve
mutual collaborations with partner nations.”65 The 2016 Joint Declaration
further promotes NATO-EU cooperation on technological resilience:
“As each organization has made EDT advances, staff-level coordination
and broad information sharing have helped to better align their efforts.”66

62. Michael Rühle and Clare Roberts, “Enlarging NATO’s Toolbox to Counter Hybrid Threats,”
NATO (website), March 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/03/19/enlarging
-natos-toolbox-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html.
63. Sarah Erickson, “Recent Developments in EU Foreign Investment Screening,” CSIS Strategic
Technologies Blog, April 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/recent
-developments-eu-foreign-investment-screening.
64. Elvira Pollina and Giuseppe Fonte, “Italy Gives Vodafone 5G Deal with Huawei Conditional
Approval – Sources,” Reuters (website), May 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/italy-gives-vodafone
-5g-deal-with-huawei-conditional-approval-sources-2021-05-31/.
65.

SACT and City of Norfolk, Building Resilience.

66. Karlijn Jans and Lauren M. Speranza, “Bridging the Gap: Time for an EU-NATO Strategic Dialogue
on Defensive Tech,” University of Leiden Blog Post, March 23, 2021, https://www.universiteitleiden.nl
/en/wiisnl/news/2021/blog-post--bridging-the-gap-time-for-an-eu-nato-strategic-dialogue-on-defense-tech.
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In the future, standardizing technological procedures across NATO and the
EU will be essential to minimize redundancy between allies. 67
The strategic alignment of NATO and the EU is on full display as
Russia invades Ukraine. Mutual concerns about the crisis in Ukraine have
prompted further unity between the two organizations, with the EU financing
500 million euros’ worth of emergency weapons shipments to Ukraine. This aid
package is a “watershed moment” for the EU, according to European Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen. 68 The EU is also responding to the crisis’s
humanitarian consequences by granting temporary residency to Ukrainian
refugees. 69 These developments highlight the EU’s complementary role
in European security. The fast-tracking of Ukraine’s request for EU accession
indicates that Ukraine and the EU are fully aware of this role.70
There are still impediments to NATO-EU cooperation, including
the global rise of isolationist movements.71 Furthermore, only 55 percent
of European citizens “totally” or “somewhat” support the creation
of a “European army.” 72 Nevertheless, as the response to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine shows, partnership between the EU and NATO is essential
to transatlantic securit y and the resilience of member states’
critical infrastructure.

Conclusion
NATO bears the responsibility of protecting its members against all threats.
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty expresses this requirement in service
of the allied goal of developing “individual and collective capacity to resist
67. Giovanna De Maio, Opportunities to Deepen NATO-EU Cooperation (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, December 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12
/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf.
68. John Chalmers, “Dramatic Zelenskiy Call Prompted EU Move to Provide Arms,” Reuters (website),
March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dramatic-call-with-ukraine-leader-prompted
-historic-eu-move-provide-arms-2022-03-02/.
69. Philip Blenkinsop and Gergely Szakacs, “EU Backs Move to Give Ukraine Refugees Temporary
Residency,” Reuters (website), March 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-prepares
-millions-refugees-ukraine-2022-03-03/.
70. Humeyra Pamuk, “EU Chief Says Bloc Wants Ukraine as Member,” Reuters (website),
February 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-chief-says-bloc-wants-ukraine-member
-they-are-one-us-2022-02-28/.
71. Tad A. Schnaufer II, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure
on Allies,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (website), January 15, 2021, https://gjia.georgetown
.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/.
72.
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armed attack.” 73 In an age of interconnectedness and cross-border technologies,
one ally’s vulnerability is a vulnerability of the entire Alliance. Energy and
communications networks rely on interwoven, often automated patchworks
of infrastructure that involve private corporations, civil administration,
and military support. This critical infrastructure can fail if not resilient,
causing irreparable harm to NATO readiness, allied defense, and human life.
By settling for a posture of deterrence absent of a posture of resilience,
NATO diminishes its deterrence potential and decreases the security of its
members’ critical infrastructure. Deterrence, which NATO defines as the
“threat of force in order to discourage” actors from harming one another,
no longer adequately protects the Alliance. 74 Facing unpredictable,
unanticipated, and inevitable threats, NATO can ensure the resilience of its
members’ critical infrastructure.
Understanding threats to critical infrastructure and NATO’s seven
baseline requirements for resilience is essential to effective policymaking.
NATO and its member states can work to meet the baseline requirements
for resilience through persistence, a holistic approach to capacity consideration,
and informing policymakers and the public of the importance of resilience.
Infrastructure systems must be resilient to external threats and inherent
vulnerabilities. As the Alliance faces the impacts of climate change,
future public health catastrophes, and adversaries with increased technological
capabilities, prioritizing critical infrastructure resilience at the national and
transnational levels is more important than ever.
It is important that a comprehensive strategy to ensure resilience
promotes civil-military cooperation and collaboration between member states.
This cooperation is essential for research and development and operational
purposes. Privatization of critical infrastructure systems without significant
military involvement exposes these systems to harm due to deliberate
attacks and environmental happenstance. Strong NATO partnerships
will provide stability in a rapidly changing critical infrastructure
environment. Intentional partnerships and coordinated cybersecurity
projects will demonstrate the Alliance’s strength to a global audience.
Existing NATO-EU partnerships, particularly those that weave civil-military
cooperation and emerging technologies, exemplify the cross-disciplinary
partnerships of the future. The NATO-EU relationship also shows the fragility
of security partnerships in the face of domestic politics.
73. “North Atlantic Treaty,” International Journal 4, no. 2 (1949): 156–58, https://doi.org
/10.1177/002070204900400206.
74. Michael Rühle, “Deterrence: What It Can (and Cannot) Do,” NATO (website), April 20, 2015,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/04/20/deterrence-what-it-can-and-cannot-do/.
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Ensuring the resilience of NATO member states is vital to the success
of NATO missions and the integrity of the Alliance. Without resilience,
the Alliance and its member states’ critical infrastructure systems are
vulnerable to various threats, including terrorist attacks, hybrid attacks,
asymmetrical warfare, and CBRN strikes. While technological innovation
and compounding infrastructure interdependencies heighten the risks
of cascading effects, the systems providing resilience against these
threats are becoming obsolete. If NATO does not create new defenses,
it will be possible for a NATO adversary, whether a terrorist organization
or a nation-state, to strike a single decisive blow. Therefore, NATO and its
member states must work together to strengthen their collective resilience
against known and emerging threats, building a future of robust security
for the transatlantic region.
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ABSTRACT: NATO has prioritized areas of cooperation for innovation
and defense as it pertains to emerging and disruptive technologies
(EDTs). This chapter looks at three of them: autonomous weapons such
as drones, technologies using big data, and hypersonic weapons. There will
be analysis of how each technology has been used by terrorists or state
actors to threaten security and leave critical infrastructure vulnerable.
The text will analyze how NATO is repositioning itself to create
a coordinated response to these threats and what remains to be done.
Keywords: drones, big-data analytics, counterterrorism, hypersonic
weapons, critical infrastructure, NATO, future of war, emerging and
disruptive technologies

Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and
bombs, but also with bytes and big data. We see authoritarian
regimes racing to develop new technologies, from artificial
intelligence to autonomous systems. So we are taking further
steps to future-proof the alliance.1
—NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,
October 20, 2021
1. Florian Eder and Laurenz Gehrke, “German Defense Minister Warns Europeans: Don’t Detach
from NATO,” Politico (website), October 21, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-defense-minister
-annegret-kramp-karrenbauer-eu-nato/.
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Introduction
NATO’s defense methods are being drastically changed by the emerging
technologies used to threaten its member states and allies across the globe.
For the first time, hypersonics has been used as a weapon of war on the
battlefield in Ukraine. Drones have given a once-small terrorist resistance
force in Yemen firepower, and the Taliban have harnessed big data intended
for counterterrorism purposes to carry out their terror. At the same time,
critical infrastructure connected to emerging technology is creating new
vulnerabilities and national security concerns.
NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme defines emerging and
disruptive technologies (EDTs) as “technologies that undergo rapid development
and can be disruptive to existing systems such as critical infrastructure,
supply chains, data networks.” 2 NATO has identified seven key areas for
cooperation on innovation and defense within the Alliance regarding
EDTs: artificial intelligence, data and computing, autonomous weapons,
quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancements,
hypersonic technologies, and space. 3 This study will examine three of these
technologies and how they are being used or have been used to counter
terrorism: autonomous weapons such as drones, technologies using big data,
and hypersonic weapons. Likewise, there will be an analysis of how terrorists
or state actors have used each technology to threaten security and often leave
critical infrastructure vulnerable.
The autonomous weapons section will examine the danger posed by drones
used by terrorists, nation-states, and non-state actors and analyze current
counter-UAV efforts within NATO nations. How drones are changing the
battlefield will be analyzed in case studies such as the Houthi attack on the
United Arab Emirates critical infrastructure in 2022 and Azerbaijan’s use
of drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
The real-time big-data analytics section will discuss big-data technology’s
value in counterterrorism missions. Here, there will be a discussion of how
the Taliban captured US biometric devices and ways to secure the technology
so it cannot be used if it falls into the hands of bad actors.

2. “NATO News: Changing Lives and the Security Landscape – How NATO and Partner Countries Are
Cooperating on Advanced Technologies,” NATO (website), June 11, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/news_184899.htm?selectedLocale=en.
3. “NATO News: Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,” NATO (website), last updated on December 8,
2022, accessed on October 22, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm.
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Finally, the hypersonics section will examine NATO’s changing posture as
it faces gains made by China, Russia, and North Korea and how it harnesses
hypersonic technology for deterrence in this adversarial environment.

NATO Context
In December 2019, NATO leaders agreed on an Emerging and Disruptive
Technology Implementation Roadmap, which helped the Alliance coordinate
its work around emerging technology in defense, deterrence, and capabilities.4
Emerging technologies were increasingly impacting NATO’s task of defending
its member states while also creating new challenges from adversaries.
By July 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had created
an Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies of a dozen
private-sector and academic experts who provided NATO with advice
on adopting EDT in its mission. By September 2020, these experts had
provided NATO with recommendations for technologies on which to focus,
and by March 2021, their first annual report.
In February 2021, Defense Ministers endorsed a strategy focusing
on military and civilian dual-use technology that can improve NATO’s defense
advantage while creating a forum for best practices. These goals were made
tangible through the establishment of a NATO Innovation Fund at the
2021 Brussels Summit in June to support the development of and guidance
on such technology. Real-time data analytics and autonomous weapons have
a history of dual use. 5 This capability can create greater competition for the
creation of quality defense products and greater risk when the technology
is available to adversaries of democratic states. As the example of the capture
of biometric devices in Afghanistan shows, the technology used by the military
must be hardened to ensure that dual-use technology vital to the mission does
not become compromised.
Thus, this chapter will explore how member states future-proof the
way they develop emerging technology used for NATO missions. Using the
NATO Science and Technology Organization’s “Science and Technology
Trends: 2020–2040” as a framework, reports of technical developments and
4.

“Emerging and Disruptive Technologies.”

5. Jayshree Pandya, “The Dual-use Dilemma of Artif icial Intelligence,” Forbes (website),
January 7, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/01/07/the-dual-use-dilemma
-of-artificial-intelligence/?sh=60031226cf02; and Peter Novitzky, Ben Kokkeler, and Peter-Paul Verbeek,
“The Dual-use of Drones,” Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid 17, no. 1-2 (July 2018): 79–95, https://www.researchgate.net
/profile/Peter-Novitzky/publication/326591084_The_Dual-use_of_Drones/links/5bbf2bb692851c4efd569d38
/The-Dual-use-of-Drones.pdf.
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challenges will be assessed. NATO’s guidelines on emerging and disruptive
technologies and dual-use EDTs and military and academic literature
will support this assessment. As critical national infrastructure is shaped
or challenged by innovators or malicious actors using emerging technology,
NATO is repositioning itself to create a coordinated response. The analysis
will document this journey and identify areas under development.

Autonomous Weapons
Nation-states and terrorists use autonomous weapons (such as drones)
in warfare and armed combat. NATO defines autonomy as: “A system’s ability
to function, within parameters established by programming and without
outside intervention, in accordance with desired goals, based on acquired
knowledge and an evolving situational awareness.”6 An unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), often referred to as a drone, is an aircraft without a pilot
or human life onboard, remotely piloted by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS),
including the controller, support equipment, data links, weapons systems
platform, display, payload, and the communications system.7
While international law prevents the use of fully autonomous drones,
NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO) predicts that
“semi-autonomous systems will have more impact on operations” for the Alliance
in the near term. 8 There, the warfighter remains the final decisionmaker,
while artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies allow the drone
to respond to numbers of adversaries or new obstacles autonomously while
seeking out preprogrammed targets.9 Autonomous systems are changing
how war is conducted on NATO’s doorstep. Ukraine has publicized its
possession of drones that are playing a key role on the battlefield in the conf lict

6. NATO, NAT O Glossary of Terms and Def initions, A A P-06 (Br ussels: NATO
Sta nda rd iz at ion Of f ice, 2 019), ht t ps: //w w w.jcs.m i l / Por ta ls/36/ Doc u ments/ Doc t r ine
/Other_Pubs/aap6.pdf.
7. Junyan Hu and Alexander Lanzon, “An Innovative Tri-rotor Drone and Associated Distributed Aerial
Drone Swarm Control,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems 103 (January 2018): 162–74, https://www.researchgate
.net/profile/Junyan-Hu-3/publication/324868897_An_innovative_tri-rotor_drone_and_associated_distributed
_aerial_drone_swarm_control/links/5fb6365f458515b79750f6a8/An-innovative-tri-rotor-drone-and-associated
-distributed-aerial-drone-swarm-control.pdf; and see also US Army, U.S. Army Roadmap for UAS 2010–2035:
Eyes of the Army (Fort Rucker, AL: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence, 2010),
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA518437.pdf.
8. D. F. Reding and J. Eaton, NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040: Exploring the S&T Edge
(Brussels: NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014
/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf.
9.

Reding and Eaton, NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040.
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with Russia.10 Azerbaijan used drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh war
in 2020 to carry laser-guided missiles, successfully attacking Armenian tanks.11
Russia’s swarming drone capacity has strategic and tactical implications
for how NATO defends its backyard going forward.12
Drones are changing warfare, causing destabilizing effects across regions,
escalating conf licts, and putting increased killing capacity in the hands
of terrorists and non-state actors. Take the Houthis, for example.
In what they dubbed “Operation Hurricane Yemen,” the Houthis used drones
and f ive ballistic missiles to target civilians and critical infrastructure,
including the Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports and the Musaffah oil refinery,
exploding three petroleum tankers near the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
fuel facilities.13
The Houthis took responsibility for the drone attacks that killed at least
three people and caused explosions across Abu Dhabi on January 18, 2022.
The Houthis had previously been designated a terrorist organization, and
following the attacks, the United Arab Emirates asked the United States
to designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization again.14 The Saudiled coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, responded immediately
with airstrikes against the Yemeni capital, Sana’a.15 These drone attacks
were the most recent in a multiyear war the Houthis have been waging in the
region against challengers to their power. Their use of unmanned technology
against Saudi Arabia contributed significantly to a doubling of Houthi-led
attacks against Saudi Arabia in 2021.16
10. Aaron Stein, “From Ankara with Implications: Turkish Drones and Alliance Entrapment,”
War on the Rocks (website), December 15, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/from-ankara-with
-implications-turkish-drones-and-alliance-entrapment/.
11. Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh, “The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh:
Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
(website), December 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-war-nagorno-karabakh
-lessons-future-strike-and-defense.
12. Samuel Bendett, “Strength in Numbers: Russia and the Future of Drone Swarms,” Modern War
Institute at West Point (website), April 20, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/strength-in-numbers-russia-and
-the-future-of-drone-swarms/.
13. Charbel Mallo et al., “Saudi-led Coalition Launches Airstrikes on Yemeni Capital after Deadly
Houthi Drone Strike in Abu Dhabi,” CNN (website), January 18, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/17
/middleeast/uae-abu-dhabi-explosion-drone-houthi-intl/index.html.
14. Lucy van der Kroft, “Yemen’s Houthis and the Terrorist Designation System,” International Centre
for Counter-terrorism – The Hague (website), June 10, 2021, https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/06/Houthi
-Terrorist-Designation-Policy-Brief.pdf.
15. van der Kroft, “Yemen’s Houthis.”
16. Seth G. Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia,” CSIS (website),
December 21, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia.
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While not in NATO’s usual battleground, the Houthi attrition of their
Saudi Arabian–led coalition capacities using unmanned aerial vehicles and
unmanned vehicle attacks can provide lessons learned as NATO considers
the changing nature of warfare and threats from non-state actors.17
When the rebel group stormed Yemen’s capital in September 2014,
most would not have predicted that they would have kept the
Saudi Arabian–led coalition—backed by the United Arab Emirates,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—at bay and involved
in a drawn-out war since Saudi Arabia began armed interventions
in March 2015. Drone warfare has contributed significantly to the rebels’
success; access and the number of troops were not obstacles as in traditional
warfare.18 In addition, the rebels did not use internationally recognized norms
of limiting targets to military assets but targeted critical infrastructure and
civilian targets. This use highlights the need for investing in counter-UAV
technology since terrorists and non-state actors increasingly use drones
to compensate for the lack of manpower and authorized use of airspace
or critical infrastructure.
Closer to NATO’s backyard, the air and missile war in Nagorno-Karabakh
has provided lessons to be learned on the strengths and weaknesses of using
drones in warfare and the changing nature of war. In the conf lict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
region, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles were used. While Azerbaijan
modernized its armed forces through new drones from foreign nation-states,
Armenia relied on Russian and indigenously produced UAVs for reconnaissance.
Azerbaijan took a strategic advantage by using UAVs with light munitions
and long endurance (capable of f lying for up to 24 hours). It also had a robust
f leet of loitering munitions, also called suicide drones, which can hover
in an area for a period of time looking for a target.19
Ultimately, all sides considered Azerbaijan to have “won” the war due
to the strategic advantage provided by drones that had better tracking,
targeting, and neutralizing power far beyond the front lines. 20 The diversity
of Azerbaijan’s air defense shows how crucial having sophisticated UAVs has
become in conf lict. Passive defense was shown to be a challenge on both
sides, as soldiers did not adequately hide their digital or thermal presence and
17.

van der Kroft, “Yemen’s Houthis.”

18.

van der Kroft, “Yemen’s Houthis.”

19. Shaikh and Rumbaugh, “War in Nagorno-Karabakh”; and see also Stefano D’Urso, “Let’s Talk
about the Israel Air Industries Loitering Munitions and What They’re Capable of,” Aviationist (website),
January 7, 2022, https://theaviationist.com/2022/01/07/iai-loitering-munitions/.
20. Shaikh and Rumbaugh, “War in Nagorno-Karabakh.”
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could thus be tracked for targeting. 21 This war offers insight for NATO and
its partners to train their forces to camouf lage digitally for longer periods and
diversify and synchronize a broad array of UAV capabilities during an attack.
Russian takeaways from the 44-day war ref lected in Russian military
venues such as the Army Standard or Military Review are slightly more nuanced.
While praising the technological strides made by Azerbaijan, they were
not convinced the success was due to technology only. Their analyses shed
light on a young, inexperienced, and primarily volunteer Armenian army
compared to an older, experienced force in Azerbaijan. In addition, they gave
credit to the focus and funding of Azerbaijan, which was singularly dedicated
to reclaiming the Nagorno-Karabakh region with popular national support. 22
Their lessons learned call for taking into account the whole battlef ield,
training the force, and looking for one’s vulnerabilities or tendency to believe
exaggerated nationalist propaganda. Their perspectives may provide NATO
with helpful insights into Russia’s tactics and motivations as it engages in the
conf lict with Ukraine.
So far, Ukrainian drones have f lown close to Russian vehicles without
the expected counter-drone or electronic warfare. 23 Ukrainians have been
able to destroy almost half of Russia’s surface-to-air missiles with drones,
which have aided in information operations and reconnaissance.
More recently, field reports have indicated that China has provided Russia
with the means to track some of the Chinese-made DJI drones Ukraine has
used through Auroscope tracking software and has started to attack the drones
and their operators. 24
It is not yet clear how crucial autonomous weapons have been in helping
Ukraine overall in its battleground advances. What is clear is that drones
have provided Ukraine with low-cost defense and intelligence, have been
intensively used, and, due to a number of factors, a country that ranks 40th
in defense spending has been able to have initial successes against a country
that ranks fourth. 25
21.

Shaikh and Rumbaugh, “War in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

22. Alexander Stronell, “Learning the Lesson of Nagorno-Karabakh the Russian Way,” International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Analysis (blog), March 10, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs
/analysis/2021/03/lessons-of-nagorno-karabakh.
23. Zachary Kallenborn, “Seven (Initial) Drone Warfare Lessons from Ukraine,” Modern War Institute
at West Point (website), May 12, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/seven-initial-drone-warfare-lessons-from-ukraine/.
24. “ ‘Young Nerds’: Ukrainians Use Drones to Kill Russian Soldiers,” CNN (website), May 13, 2022,
https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/05/13/ukrainian-drones-combat-russian-forces-burnett-dnt
-ebof-vpx.cnn.
25.

“Ukrainians Use Drones.”
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Moving forward, NATO STO predicts that the use of autonomous
systems will be critical for operational success in the land, air, and space
domain, particularly when it comes to swarming systems. 26 Nuclear powers
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia all have
a drone-swarming capacity that they can use in combat for a number
of purposes—from precision-guided weapons to remote communications
jamming capabilities. 27 Drone swarms are small UAVs that can self-organize
and work together to complete multiple tasks. 28 They are often the weapon
of choice because their low-cost use translates into fewer soldier casualties,
shorter training times, increased targeting eff iciency, and durability
of expensive weapons systems. 29 Future warfare could escalate quickly
as nuclear-armed powers use drone-swarming tactics. With UAVs using
artificial intelligence to increase the element of surprise as their capabilities
advance in speed, range, and accuracy, escalation of conf lict between nuclear
powers looms large. 30 So too, do the dangers of using UAVs if employed
by non-state actors and terrorists.
So, what can be done? NATO has several goals in its counter-UAS
strategy. First, it aims to: integrate multiple solutions technically into a larger
defense context; second, to create systems that counter drone threats without
collateral damage; third, to integrate counter-UAS across multiple operations;
and fourth, to have the same standards across diverse government ministries
and public agencies. 31 To make these goals more practical, NATO has created
a counter-UAS working group since 2019 with experts from across NATO.
The group of experts collaborates on operational and technical interoperability
of counter-UAS systems NATO can use and performs trials and exercises
together (most recently in September 2022). 32
26.

Reding and Eaton, NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040, 61–63.

27. Cholpon Abdyraeva, “Drone Swarms – A Future Threat to Armed Forces?,” Finabel – European
Army Interoperability Centre (website), December 2, 2020, https://finabel.org/drone-swarms-a-future-threat
-to-armed-forces/.
28. Keirin Joyce, “Swarm Robotics: What Will It Look Like?,” Defense Info (website), May 20, 2020,
https://defense.info/williams-foundation/2020/05/swarm-robotics-what-will-it-look-like/.
29. Abdyraeva, “Drone Swarms.”
30. James Johnson, “Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare,”
RUSI Journal 165, no. 2 (2020): 26–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026.
31. Claudio Palestini, “Countering Drones: Looking for the Silver Bullet,” NATO Review: Opinion,
Analysis, and Debate on Security Issues (website), December 16, 2020, https://www.nato.int/docu/review
/articles/2020/12/16/countering-drones-looking-for-the-silver-bullet/index.html.
32. Rojoef Manuel, “NATO, Netherlands Conduct Counter-Drone Live-testing Exercise,”
Defense Post (website), October 3, 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/10/03/nato-counter-drone
-exercise-netherlands/.
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The graph in figure 2-1, developed by Lieutenant Colonel Andre Haider
of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre, illustrates the comprehensive,
multi-domain effort NATO is aiming for as it considers countermeasures
it should use depending on the spatial distance between the UAS component
and NATO forces. Here, one can view in one graph all the factors that
must be considered in counter-UAS measures. In the yellow box,
force protection (FP) is vital because it is easy for terrorists and non-state
actors to possess and modify commercial off-the-shelf low, slow,
and small (LSS) unmanned aerial systems for malicious purposes. Notice that
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the first step in the
defense of critical infrastructure here. 33

33. Andre Haider, “A Comprehensive Approach to Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
And Why Current Initiatives Fall Short,” Joint Air Power Competence Centre (website), August 2019,
https://www.japcc.org/flyers/a-comprehensive-approach-to-countering-unmanned-aircraft-systems/.
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Figure 2-1. A multi-domain effort
(Image used with permission of Lieutenant Colonel Andre Haider)

Moving further away in distance (pink box), the ground control station
is crucial for the launch and recovery element (LRE) of larger UAS.
As such, the LRE is a critical infrastructure that must be protected through
air interdiction (AI) in real time. If the LRE is destroyed, UAS will no longer
be able to function. 34 Air defense (AD) in the blue box is likewise important
for protection against swarming drones via short-wave air defense and
anti-aircraft artillery. Cybersecurity is a crucial layer. Without it, swarming
drones’ control stations can be knocked off line. The dark blue box shows
countermeasures against space-based communications via satellites or position,
navigation, and timing signals that can be used against adversary’s swarming
drones. 35 This comprehensive approach, offered by interoperability operations
and defense systems from different NATO members, provides a practical
application of NATO’s countermeasures.

34.

Haider, “Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”

35.

Haider, “Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”
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Real-time Big-data Analytics
Real-time big-data analytics can be used for predicting terrorist incidents.
However, terrorists can also employ this information to target innocents. 36
The Taliban captured US military biometric devices in August 2021
to track and kill those who cooperated with US forces. Biometric systems are
big-data systems that work with large volumes of data and analytics to verify
and identify a person based on physiological or behavioral characteristics. 37
US forces used these systems in Afghanistan to track terrorists and vet
local Afghans assisting US forces in diplomatic talks, defending embassies,
serving as translators, or providing other support activities. There is concern
that the Taliban could use these biometric systems to target US-friendly
Afghans, putting lives at risk.
In addition, the Taliban has taken over the Afghan Interior Ministry’s
automated biometric identification system and the country’s voting record
digital identity systems and biometric ID card system, putting additional
populations (like women, journalists, and human rights defenders) at risk. 38
Tech companies and nongovernmental organizations are being warned
to secure any databases storing this information.
US forces initiated the biometric program in 2007 to track the true
identities of persons in Afghanistan regardless of alias, as aliases in the
country were common. At the time of the system’s creation, there was
no single reliable system for national IDs. Over time, however, the Afghan
government adopted the system for use in courts or passport applications.
By 2011, the Department of Defense had 4.8 million biometric records
of people in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once the democratically elected
government of Afghanistan fell, the data housed in the biometric device
servers became the property of the Taliban. 39 Reports of the Taliban conducting
door-to-door searches with biometric devices targeting those with connections
36. Ibrahim Toure and Aryya Gangopadhyay, “Real Time Big Data Analytics for Predicting Terrorist
Incidents,” in Proceedings of 2016 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Symposium on Technologies
for Homeland Security (Walham, MA: IEEE, May 2016), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7568906.
37. Ken Klippenstein and Sara Sirota, “The Taliban Have Seized U.S. Military Biometrics Devices,” Intercept
(website), August 17, 2021, https://theintercept.com/2021/08/17/afghanistan-taliban-military-biometrics/.
38. “New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans: Taliban Now Control Systems
with Sensitive Personal Information,” Human Rights Watch (website), March 30, 2022, https://www.hrw.org
/news/2022/03/30/new-evidence-biometric-data-systems-imperil-afghans.
39. Margaret Hu, “The Taliban Reportedly Have Control of US Biometric Devices – A Lesson
in Life-and-Death Consequences of Data Privacy,” Conversation (website), August 31, 2021,
https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-reportedly-have-control-of-us-biometric-devices-a-lesson-in-life
-and-death-consequences-of-data-privacy-166465.
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to the former Afghan government, journalists, and foreign nonprofits highlight
the quandary created by not correctly storing this sensitive big data.40
There were three problems with how the United States accessed and stored
biometric data. First, the server was built in Afghanistan and fell under its
jurisdiction. This issue caused a legal quandary, as the United States would
need to enter negotiations with the Taliban—which is holding the data and
many of the people connected to it captive—to shut down or limit access
to the data.
Second, the United States now had an access issue. When the server
became the property of the Taliban, they denied the United States access.
The United States could no longer exfiltrate anyone in the system who worked
with US forces unless they were documented separately somewhere else.41
Thus, the United States could not verify whether a person was a former
contractor who still needed airlifting out of Afghanistan or if they were
in the system due to their terrorist crimes.
Third, US-built federal-use data sources are subject to federal law
even when overseas. Ultimately, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) standards should have been applied to the US biometric
system. What began as sensitive personally identifiable information (PII)
for US military use only was disseminated to the Afghan government
without a backup plan if the Afghan government could not be trusted
to protect the sensitive data.42
There are several solutions NATO can use to save big-data storage and
ensure the sensitive data it collects is not compromised.
 NIST-compliant cloud storage for government use. 43
The access nation-states have to the data for each
perspective country would need to be clarified in advance but
is technically possible.

40. Rina Chandran, “Afghans Scramble to Delete Digital History, Evade Biometrics,” Reuters (website),
August 17, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-tech-conflict-idUSL8N2PO1FH.
41. Hu, “Taliban Control of US Biometric Device.”
42.

Author interviews with a biometric system creator and law enforcement agent.

43. John R. Hoehn, Joint All-domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R46725 (Washington, DC: CRS, March 18, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46725/2.
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 Layered security architecture. Instead of having one employee
or login that can provide access to all data, credentials locked
in various forms of encryption can hide different elements
of critical infrastructure.44
Beyond ensuring secure big-data storage, NATO can use big-data
analytics to prepare for potential challenges to NATO operations—
from terrorism to armed conf lict to cyberattacks. 45 In March 2022,
the Allied Command Transformation Innovation Hub delivered the Resilience
Data Analytics Tool. With Baseline Requirements of Resilience topics and
a key words dashboard, the tool can search through massive amounts
of open-source and media reports in 44 languages. The tool incorporates
big-data analytics with machine learning to establish patterns and then
provides end users with data visualization on where threats to resilience exist
across NATO nations.46
As a proof of concept, the tool has already assessed the Baltic States
and Poland for how they meet the seven baseline requirements of resilience.
NATO used the tool in its September 2022 Dynamic Messenger exercise,
a large-scale test to demonstrate unmanned systems capabilities in the
maritime environment. 47 NATO has the potential to predict future
crises and strengthen resilience by ref ining this big-data analytics tool,
feeding it with real-time data, and allowing it to be used more frequently
throughout NATO commands to build accuracy. Such collaborative,
open-source tools also foster information sharing among allies in the
unclassified realm and security within member states.
With the proper national security f irewalls, NATO members can
combine big data from national databases to track terrorist operations

44. Jeff Pracht, “A Layered Security Architecture Offers the Strongest Protection from Cyber Threats,”
Mainstream Technologies (website), November 30, 2021, https://www.mainstream-tech.com/layered-security
-architecture/.
45. Sarah Lohmann and Tim Tepel, “Will the Real Security Foresight Expert Please Stand Up?,” European
Journal of Futures Research 2, no. 37 (March 2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-014-0037-6; and see also
Sarah Lohmann, “Weiterentwicklung der Methoden der Zukunftsanalyse,” Institut für Politikwissenschaft/
Universität der Bundeswehr, 2014, https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-ip
/projekte/weiterentwicklung-der-methoden-der-zukunftsanalyse.
46. “A New Resilience Data Analytics Tool.” NATO Allied Command Transformation (website),
March 24, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/new-resilience-data-analytics-tool.
47. “New Resilience Data Analytics Tool”; and see also 12th NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational
Training Centre (NMIOTC) Annual Conference Speakers’ Inputs (Crete: NMIOTC, June 1, 2021),
https://nmiotc.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/12th-Annual-Conference-FFT.pdf.
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better across borders.48 While NATO is already using big data and data sharing
to respond to terrorist attacks, it can also exploit advanced data analytics
with big-data sources (like social media feeds and sensor and log information)
to warn of terrorist attacks down to the neighborhood level and provide foresight
into the timing and placement of malicious intrusions on critical infrastructure.49
While access and coordination would need to be handled delicately,
this big-data innovation would take cooperative NATO counterterrorism
and promotion of critical infrastructure resilience to the next level.

Hypersonic Technologies
In 2018, Michael Griff in, the Pentagon’s new undersecretary for
defense for research and engineering, made his first public statements at a
Credit Suisse conference about his highest research priority:
I’m sorry for everybody out there who champions some other
high priority, some technical thing; it’s not that I disagree
with those. But there has to be a first, and hypersonics
is my first. . . . When the Chinese can deploy [a] tactical
or regional hypersonic system, they hold at risk our carrier
battle groups. They hold our entire surface fleet at risk.
They hold at risk our forward-deployed forces and land-based
forces. Without our ability to defend and without at least
an equal response capability on the offensive side, then what
we have done is we have allowed a situation to exist where our
deployed forces are held at risk, and we cannot do the same
for them.50
In the three years since then, the public message has been that hypersonic
research and development continues to focus on defensive and space purposes.
However, current technical developments from NATO adversaries have forced
the Alliance to rethink its posture. The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2022 budget

48. Sarah Lohmann et al., Navigating New Threats: NATO’s Posture on Emerging Technologies
(Seattle: University of Washington Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, March 2022), 23,
https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/22_TF_JSIS-495H_Lohmann.pdf.
49. Reding and Eaton, NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040, 46; and see also
Lohmann et al., Navigating New Threats, 23.
50. Aaron Mehta, “Hypersonics ‘Highest Technical Priority’ for Pentagon R&D Head,” Defense News
(website), March 16, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/03/06/hypersonics-highest-technical
-priority-for-pentagon-rd-head/.
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request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion—up from $3.2 billion last year. 51
The Department of Defense is prioritizing offensive programs, requesting
$3.8 billion for hypersonic weapons programs and $247.9 million for hypersonic
defense programs for fiscal year 2022. 52 Principal Director for Hypersonics
Mike White explained that the United States was still trying to f ind
“the path forward to get a robust defensive strategy” and focusing
on offensive programs. 53
Hypersonic capabilities—which allow propulsion at Mach 5 or above—
have been applied to advanced defense systems and can provide access
to space. 54 After the September 11 attacks, the counterterrorism value
of hypersonic long-range conventional capabilities (to interrupt a meeting
of terrorist leaders, for example) was considered. 55 However, over the last
decade, hypersonic defense technology has changed focus from counterterrorism
uses to interstate warfare. 56 Until now, the United States and NATO
have not considered developing hypersonic weapons for use with nuclear
warheads but have focused on the technology for short- and intermediaterange conventional precision strikes. 57 Now, technological developments from
Russia and China have caused the Alliance to start considering otherwise
since the summer of 2021.
Russia’s Tsirkon missile system is operational, and the anti-ship hypersonic
cruise missile has been reported to have a speed of Mach 9, or roughly 11,000
kilometers per hour.58 Russia tested the missile system in July 2021, reportedly
for the 10th time, launching the Tsirkon missile from the Admiral Groshkov
51. Kelley M. Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report R45811
(Washington, DC: CRS, October 19, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45811/22.
52.

Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons, 19.

53. Aaron Mehta, “Is the Pentagon Moving Quickly Enough on Hypersonic Defense?,” Defense News
(website), March 21, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/03/21/is-the-pentagon-moving
-quickly-enough-on-hypersonic-defense/.
54. “Aeronautics Research: Hypersonic Technology (HT) Project,” NASA (website), April 22, 2021,
https://www.nasa.gov/aeroresearch/programs/aavp/ht.
55. James M. Acton, “Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global
Strike,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), 2013, https://carnegieendowment
.org/2013/09/03/silver-bullet-asking-right-questions-about-conventional-prompt-global-strike-pub-52778.
56. Acton, “Silver Bullet?”
57. Susan Davis, “Hypersonic Weapons – A Technological Challenge for Allied Nations and NATO?”
(Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee, 2020), https://www.nato-pa
.int /dow n load-f i le?f i lename=sites/defau lt /f i les/2020 - 07/039 %20STC%2020 %20E%20 -%20
HYPERSONIC%20WEAPONS.pdf.
58. Mark Episkopos, “Bad News, NATO: Russia’s Tsirkon Hypersonic Cruise Missile Is Operational,”
National Interest (blog), August 16, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/bad-news-nato
-russia%E2%80%99s-tsirkon-hypersonic-cruise-missile-operational-191751.
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frigate in the White Sea at Mach 7 and hitting a target on the coast of the
Barents Sea 350 kilometers away. 59 While NATO responded with a statement
that the “hypersonic missiles are highly destabilizing and pose significant
risks to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area,” it vowed
to “maintain credible deterrence and defense, to protect our nations.”60
Since then, the US Air Force, in partnership with DARPA, successfully
tested its own Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), f lying
at a speed greater than Mach 5, on September 27, 2021. 61 It also successfully
tested the boost-glide AGM-183A Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)
on May 14, 2022. 62 Russia responded to the fall 2021 test with more hypersonic
weapons tests. Furthermore, in a move that surprised US intelligence agencies,
China tested its hypersonic missile in August 2021. 63
As hypersonic missiles’ speed does not allow reaction time for defense
and provides near-assured destruction of its target, NATO is rethinking its
posture, especially considering the danger hypersonic missiles pose to Europe.
In fact, for the first time in history, hypersonic weapons are being used
in combat by Russia against Ukraine, according to US Joint Chiefs
Chairman General Mark Milley. Between 10 and 12 hypersonic weapons
(all without nuclear warheads) have been launched against Ukraine at the time
of this writing. 64 Three Kinzhal hypersonic missiles hit “tourist infrastructure,”
with a barrage of Russian missiles striking a shopping mall and two hotels
in Odesa, causing civilian casualties. 65 Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles

59. Hercules Reyes, “Russia’s Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile Completes Ship Tests,” Defense Post (website),
September 29, 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/09/29/tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-tests/.
60. “Russia Tests Hypersonic Tsirkon Missile, Leaving NATO Concerned about Potential Escalation,”
ABC News (website), July 20, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-07-20/russia-conducts-missile-test
-hypersonic-euro-atlantic-tsirkon/100308688.
61. “DARPA’s Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept Achieves Successful Flight,” DARPA,
Seapower Magazine (website), September 27, 2021, https://seapowermagazine.org/darpas-hypersonic-air
-breathing-weapon-concept-achieves-successful-flight/.
62. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Air Force Conducts Successful Hypersonic Weapon Test,”
Air Force (website), May 16, 2022, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3033416/air-force
-conducts-successful-hypersonic-weapon-test/.
63. Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “China Tests New Space Capability with Hypersonic
Missile,” Financial Times (website), October 16, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040
-93cb-a486e1f843f b.
64. Michael Conte, “Russian Use of Hypersonic Weapons in Ukraine Is Not ‘Game-changing,’
Top US General Says,” CNN (website), May 11, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia
-ukraine-war-news-05-11-22/h_72ad8e80af76a73251fa61f b6ff61efc.
65. Paul P. Murphy, “Ukraine Says Second Hotel, Shopping Mall Hit as Russia Fires Hypersonic
Missiles at Odesa,” CNN (website), May 9, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine
-war-news-05-09-22/h_30902995486238c6d046d1186d9979c5.

38

Chapter 2

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Used in Counterterrorism

against civilian targets underscores a pattern of attacking civilians, resulting
in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly deeming Russia a “terrorist state.”66
Considering those new threats, this section will examine the Alliance’s
changing posture and how NATO is considering using hypersonic technology
for deterrence in this adversarial environment.

The Players
China, the United States, and Russia have had hypersonic capabilities
since the early 2000s. While these superpowers use the weapons as a form
of deterrence and to shift the global balance of power, less predictable
regional players, such as North Korea, have had them for years.
West Coast air traffic was stopped at several airports on January 11, 2022,
during North Korea’s hypersonic weapon test. While early-warning systems
provided initial telemetry readings that indicated the launched North Korean
missile could hit the Aleutian Islands or the California coast, US Northern
Command quickly determined the hypersonic weapon could not harm the
United States, and air traffic was restarted within 15 minutes. 67
North Korea’s test also used an HGV, though one with a more limited
range of maneuverability than the one used by China. North Korea’s test
of two hypersonic weapons and 15 other ballistic missiles in 2022—
violate United Nations Security Council resolutions banning the use
of ballistic missiles. 68 Two successful tests were of missiles to be used
with tactical nuclear weapons. 69 The hypersonic tests were alarming because
North Korea’s hypersonic missile is hard to track. It can change course
mid-f light, leaving South Korea vulnerable. Because South Korea lacks the
necessary defenses against this maneuverability, it is concerned its only defense
could be a preemptive strike, which could cause a quick escalation of conf lict.70

66. Sarthak Gupta, “NATO Deems Russia as a ‘Terrorist State,’ Calls for Support for Ukraine,”
Jurist (website), November 21, 2022, https://www.jurist.org/news/2022/11/nato-deems-russia-as-terrorist
-state-calls-for-support-for-ukraine/.
67. Katie Bo Lillis, Barbara Starr, and Oren Liebermann, “Early Warning Systems First Suggested
North Korean Missile Could Hit US, Causing Temporary Scramble,” CNN (website), January 13, 2022,
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/13/politics/north-korean-missile-faa-grounded-planes/index.html.
68. Lillis, Starr, and Liebermann, “Early Warning Systems.”
69. “North Korea Fires 3 Suspected Ballistic Missiles as U.S. Pushes U.N. for More Sanctions
against Kim Regime” CBS News (website), May 12, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/north-korea-ballistic
-missile-test-launch-covid-cases-us-sanctions-un/.
70. Sungwon Baik and Cristy Lee, “Analysis: Why North Korea’s Hypersonic Missile Test Is Troubling,”
Voice of America (website), January 19, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/analysis-why-north-korea
-s-hypersonic-missile-test-is-troubling/6404637.html.
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Once perfected, the Chinese hypersonic capability could send its nuclear
warheads over the South Pole and get around the US defense system.71
In the August 2021 test, China’s nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle
circled the globe and missed its target by just 24 miles. This capability
is new because other hypersonic capabilities from NATO’s adversaries
can be defended against if they f ly in a high arc over the North Pole
as conventional ballistic missiles do. This fractional orbital bombardment
system f lies in a low orbit over the Earth and can get around the north-facing
defense system.72 The United States is considering using directed-energy
systems to disrupt the missile f light paths.73 Those developments will take
time to develop.

The Objective
The technolog y is being developed to use against high-value
or high-threat targets where time is vital. Because of the high speed and vast
distance that hypersonic weapons can cover, they can be launched outside
of conf lict areas. For the United States and other NATO members,
territory that has been difficult to reach due to China’s and Russia’s increased
anti-access and area denial capabilities—which deny freedom of action and
access in areas under friendly control—could be penetrated from a safe,
distant perimeter if successfully developed.74 However, Russia and China
already possess these high-speed, long-distance capabilities, and the extreme
speed of hypersonic weapons makes interception difficult.
Russia’s current goal is assured destruction of its targets in Ukraine and
deterrence of NATO and the West. China’s objective is neutralizing the
United States and maintaining control of the Pacific. The US Naval Institute
released photos in May 2022—ranging from US warships in the Pacific
to naval bases in Korea and Guam—that provide insight into China’s
hypersonic missile targets.75
71. Aleks Phillips, “China’s Orbiting Hypersonic Missile Could ‘Neutralize US Defenses,’ ” Express (website),
October 19, 2021, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1508211/china-missile-orbiting-hypersonic
-weapon-us-defences-concerns.
72. Reuters Staff, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Test Takes US by Surprise,” Reuters (website),
October 17, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/asia-and-australia/2021-10-17/ty-article
/chinas-hypersonic-missile-test-takes-u-s-by-surprise/0000017f-f734-d460-afff-ff767e0b0000.
73. Jack Detsch, “The Pentagon Wants to Ruin China’s ‘Sputnik Moment,’ ” Foreign Policy (website),
February 7, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/07/us-china-russia-biden-hypersonic-missile
-defense-pentagon/.
74. Reding and Eaton, NATO Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040, 90.
75. Gabriel Honrada, “US, China Locked in a Hypersonic Tit for Tat,” Asia Times (website), May 13, 2022,
https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/us-china-locked-in-a-hypersonic-tit-for-tat/.
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The Problem
Until now, NATO has focused on protecting mainland Europe
from an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strike from Russia. A defense
posture focused on only one kind of hypersonic weapon and adversary has left
NATO at a disadvantage. As successful tests from the summer of 2021 show,
China and Russia have pulled ahead of the United States in their hypersonic
capabilities. Part of the main problem is the quicker-than-expected successful
development of the hypersonic glide vehicle as the delivery mechanism.
The difference between hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic ICBMs,
which the US has focused on in the past, is that hypersonic ICBMs are powered
by rockets, arc high above the Earth, and then return to Earth to strike targets
on a preplanned path. The hypersonic glide vehicle uses its momentum,
f lies low in the Earth’s orbit, and upon return to Earth can maneuver
off a charted path without being tracked.76 While eyes were focused on Russia’s
anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile and its potential impact on Europe in the
summer of 2021, China launched a hypersonic missile with the potential
for far more devastating damage to the Alliance.
In March 2018, China conducted 20 times as many hypersonic
tests as the United States.77 When the Chinese military tested its
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) in August 2021, US defense and intelligence
off icials were alarmed for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned,
the hypersonic missile cannot be stopped by NATO’s north-facing
defenses in Europe, as China’s missiles can avoid them by f lying over the
South Pole. Second, China’s hypersonic capability can be much more devastating
to the Alliance because its maneuverability makes it extremely hard to track.
Unlike a US hypersonic ICBM that f lies in a high arc above the North Pole
on a fixed path, China’s hypersonic glide vehicle f lew through low-orbit
space propelled by its momentum before it maneuvered toward its target.78
The United States will not have defensive capabilities against this new
weapon until the mid-2020s (at the earliest), leaving a three-year gap
with no protection.79
76. Andrew Thornebrooke, “Explainer: What Are Hypersonic Weapons and Why Do They Matter?,”
October 19, 2021, https://www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_breakingnews/explainer-what-are-hypersonic-weapons
-and-why-do-they-matter_4056767.html.
77.

Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons, 16.

78.

Sevastopulo and Hille, “China Tests New Space Capability.”

79. “Transcript: Media Availability with Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense
Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics Senior Executive Series,” US Department of Defense (website),
December 13, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1713396/media-availability
-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/.
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The United States had not been using or developing hypersonic technology
for nuclear weapons due to its New START Treaty with Russia, which bans
offensive arms. Russia, however, found a loophole. The treaty does not cover
weapons that f ly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50 percent of the f light,
as with hypersonic glide and hypersonic cruise missiles.
In concert with NATO, the United States must decide whether
to respond by developing its offensive weapons or amping up its defense
of the new hypersonic weapons. In the interim, the United States has activated
its deterrence initiative to protect NATO member states. In November 2021,
it reactivated a nuclear unit at the 56th Artillery Command in Mainz-Kastel,
Germany, with the “Dark Eagle,” a long-range hypersonic missile that
could be in service next year, travel at Mach 17, and reach Moscow in just
over 21 minutes. 80
A third option is the renegotiation of the New Start Treaty, set to expire
in 2026 “when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm
is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such
a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.” 81 As the treaty has not contained Russia’s development in the
past, a US priority should be the Mach-speed development of immediate
and long-term defenses and early-warning systems for adversary HGVs—
whether through laser weapons, radio-frequency jammers, or microwave
weapons—to counter the hypersonic missiles. 82

Conclusion and Final Recommendations
As NATO prepares for the emerging technology challenges to critical
infrastructure resilience for the next two decades, its member states must
be prepared to counter EDTs on two fronts. While traditional adversaries
are making strides in their development, terrorists are also gaining ground
in using EDTs in peer-to-peer conf licts.
While NATO has made initial strides in expanding innovation and
joint defense in this rapidly changing environment, there is much room
for improvement. In the area of autonomous weapons, NATO is already
80. Niamh Cavanagh, “Dark Eagle Has Landed: US to Arm Nuclear Unit in Germany with 4,000 mph
‘Dark Eagle’ Hypersonic Missiles to ‘Blitz Moscow in 21 Mins,’ ” Sun (website), November 11, 2021,
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/16695568/us-nuclear-germany-eagle-hypersonic-missiles-moscow/.
81.

Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons, 22.

82. Honrada, “US, China Locked.”
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developing countermeasures and innovation in a coordinated way
by incorporating exercises, a whole-of-government approach, and
interoperability to operations and technology across the Alliance to hold
terrorists and rogue actors at bay. As NATO nations continue to work
together to develop and improve the performance of autonomous weapons
and counter-UAV technology for the battlefield, they will be able to protect
better the critical infrastructure and national security of member states.
The collection of big data and the process that makes it useful—
big-data analytics—is changing NATO’s preparedness and the way it protects
critical infrastructure. Analytics helps to target terrorists and receive early
warning of armed conf lict, transportation or communication vulnerabilities,
nuclear threats, or pandemics more accurately. NATO is in the nascent stages
of fully harnessing the advantages of this data and exploring how to share
it with nation-states within the Alliance in a secure manner that does not
harm national security or civil liberties. While proposals exist for more
effective implementation, creating common standards across the Alliance
for secure storage, jurisdiction, access, and cybersecurity will remain
an important strategic task for nation-states in the future. In addition,
NATO nation-states should continue to develop and invest in early-warning
systems and use big-data analytics and machine learning to receive foresight
on where and when terrorists and malicious actors could escalate
armed violence or threaten critical infrastructure.
Finally, as NATO considers its new posture in the hypersonic arms race,
it will need to make a strategic decision about the most effective deterrence
methods. NATO must determine whether its nation-states should invest
in offensive or defensive weapons and identify how to best counter
an adversary’s new hypersonic technology. Nuclear powers must use
a coordinated approach and ensure civil-military cooperation on hypersonic
development and countermeasures. This approach will ensure NATO can
defend its nation-states in a way that maximizes innovation while considering
escalation impacts.
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ABSTR ACT: Space systems provide critical capabilities to enable
NATO’s core missions of deterrence and defense, including secure satellite
communications (SATCOM), positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT),
early warning, environmental assessment, and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR). However, the proliferation of counter-space
technologies renders these systems vulnerable to interference and attack.
NATO Members must harden their space systems from attacks by state
and non-state actors to ensure the resilience of NATO operations in the
era of strategic competition.
Keywords: satellites, space, ASAT, ISR, cyber

In December 2019, NATO declared space as the f ifth operational
domain—alongside land, maritime, air, and cyber—and adopted a space policy
recognizing the domain’s importance to Alliance operations.1 Jens Stoltenberg,
the NATO Secretary General, remarked “space is extremely important for
all civilian and military activities . . . so of course, space and satellites are
of great importance for all NATO Allies.” 2
Space technologies and orbital platforms (such as satellites) provide
core capabilities to enable NATO’s core missions of deterrence and defense.
The f ive core capabilities include secure communications, positioning,
navigation, timing (PNT), and velocity; integrated tactical warning and threat
1. “NATO’s Approach to Space,” NATO (website), last updated October 6, 2022,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm.
2. Jens Stoltenberg, “Doorstep Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” NATO (website), November 20, 2019, http://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171016.htm.
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assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 3
Space capabilities enable command and control of NATO forces,
provide early warning of potential threats, indicate whether threats
are terrorist or nation-based, and improve the amount and quality
of information available to Alliance leaders for decision making. 4
NATO’s core space capabilities also provide a strategic advantage for Alliance
operations worldwide. NATO depends on various national and commercial
launch capabilities, platforms, sensors, and space operations that are resilient
to environmental and man-made hazards. 5 This chapter will analyze terrorist
threats to space assets coming from direct attacks, man-portable air defense
systems, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks.
Space technologies, however, are increasingly vulnerable to interference and
attack from ground-based orbital threats, including direct-ascent anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons (such as the one China used to destroy a derelict weather
satellite in 2007). Cyber or physical attacks can also disrupt tracking stations
or control centers. Orbital threats include kinetic counter-space weapons and
satellites, which are inherently dual-use technologies.
To fulfill its basic deterrence and mutual defense functions, NATO needs
assured and secure access to space. Adversaries could intercept satellites using
rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) to disable, spy on, or neutralize
Alliance satellites. In 2018, France accused Russia of using its satellite
Luch (aka Olymp-K) to attempt an unfriendly espionage act through RPO
with the French-Italian communications satellite, Athéna-Fidus. 6
Additionally, orbital debris from decades of human space activity will continue
to pose collision risks to all objects occupying Earth’s low-, medium- and
geosynchronous orbital regimes.
Space is a domain in which state actors exert inf luence and power
to pursue interests on Earth and in outer space. As of 2022, there were
12 NATO members operating military or dual-purpose satellites that provide
3. D. F. Reding and J. Eaton, Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040: Exploring the S&T Edge
(Brussels: NATO Science & Technology Organization, March 2020), 75–76, https://www.nato.int/nato_static
_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf.
4. Kestutis Paulauskas, “Space: NATO’s Latest Frontier,” NATO (website), March 13, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html.
5.

Reding and Eaton, “Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040,” 76.

6. “France Accuses Russia of Trying to Spy on Franco-Italian Military Satellite,” France 24 (website),
last updated August 9, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180907-france-accuses-russia-trying
-spy-franco-italian-military-satellite-espionage-athena-fidus.
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space functions for defense purposes. However, only three possess the domestic
ability to place satellites into orbit: the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom. However, the emergence of commercial operators providing
launch services has lowered the threshold of space access for various state and
non-state actors. Once the exclusive purview of the superpowers, space and
Earth’s orbital regimes are increasingly congested, competitive, and contested
given the proliferation of spacef light and orbital capabilities.
The following section covers the four segments of space-critical
infrastructure and reviews the space capabilities upon which NATO
operations depend. The next section covers the threats facing space-critical
infrastructure and reviews the attendant risks and actors that possess the
necessary capabilities. The case study looks at threatening Russian behavior
in space and against space critical infrastructure. The chapter concludes
with recommendations based on NATO’s recently published space policy.

Space Critical Infrastructure Overview
Space operations rely on critical infrastructure consisting of four discrete
segments: space, user, link, and ground segments.7 Doctrinally, NATO
combines the link segment as part of the other three. This chapter treats
the link segment separately, which is useful for analyzing threats against the
functions of the link segment. The following section describes each segment
in greater detail.

Space Segment
The space segment consists of spacecraft, payloads, and satellite
constellations across the various orbital regimes that provide the space-based
capabilities upon which NATO forces rely. Examples include the Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) constellation, which consists of 29 satellites
operated by the US Space Force in medium-Earth orbit, and the German
SAR-Lupe satellite reconnaissance system, among others. 8

7. The US Space Force aggregates the ground and link segments into the “control” segment.
Separating these segments is useful for threat analysis purposes and is used here. See Brandon Bailey
et al., Defending Spacecraft in the Cyber Domain (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace Corporation Center
for Space Policy and Strategy, November 2019, https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08
/Bailey_DefendingSpacecraft_11052019.pdf.
8. “Space Segment,” GPS (website), n.d., accessed January 5, 2022, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/space/.
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User Segment
The user segment refers to any terrestrial device, vehicle, person,
or organization w ith receiver equipment for satel lite signa ls,
including positioning, navigation, timing (PNT), and imager y.
Examples include automobile navigation systems, smartphones, Internet
connections, ATMs, and others. NATO military forces operate in the
land, maritime, and air domains, which all comprise the user segment.
However, readers should note that large swaths of modern society are part
of the user segment, and national economies and industries worldwide
depend on space capabilities to function.

Ground Segment
The ground segment incorporates all Earth-based elements of the
space architecture and includes space support facilities, launch facilities,
mission control centers, and ground stations. The ground segment encompasses
the physical infrastructure of NATO space systems and is present in most
member states in some fashion. Examples include the European Space
Operations Center in Darmstadt, Germany; the Guiana Space Center
in Kourou, French Guiana; ground stations located around the world that
provide radio links and data storage; and the entire network infrastructure
connecting these elements. Ground stations support military operations,
day-to-day commercial functions, and space-based science and
research initiatives.

Link Segment
Information transmission architecture that connects the ground and
space segments comprises the link segment. The architecture includes
uplink and downlink data streams, security protocols, and the data that
is transmitted. This data includes telemetry and guidance and content
for the user segment. For example, communications, PNT data, and imagery
are delivered to the user segment via the link segment.
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Figure 3-1. Space system and critical infrastructure diagram
Source: US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Space Acquisitions:
Changing Environment Presents Continuing Challenges and Opportunities for DOD,
GAO-22-105900 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2022), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22105900.

Space Support Functions and Capabilities
Space is a resource and technology-intensive domain, and several NATO
member states operate advanced space systems across the four segments.
The United States is the world’s most prolific space power and operates the
greatest number of military satellites.9 The space domain allows Alliance forces
to anticipate threats and respond to crises quickly.10 The space capabilities
detailed below build on those outlined in NATO’s 2022 Space Policy
and the US Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations.11

9. “Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists (website), May 1, 2021, https://www.ucsusa.org
/resources/satellite-database.
10. “NATO’s Overarching Space Policy,” NATO (website), January 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm.
11. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Space Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, change 1 (Washington, DC:
JCS, October 26, 2020), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14Ch1.pdf.

49

Kuzminski

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
and Velocity
PNT is a mission-essential ser vice provided by Alliance and
non-NATO services to the entire user segment. The uses and effects
of PNT include precision strike, personnel recovery, combat search and rescue,
and digital network timing. The NATO forces in the user segment rely
on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise, accurate,
and near-instantaneous geographic location, navigation, and time-reference
services during all types of missions.

Integrated Tactical Warning and Threat Assessment
NATO’s deterrence and defense missions rely on early warning
of missile events to provide decision space for Alliance leaders while enabling
effective response measures. Tactical warning is a vital function of NATO’s
space -critical infrastructure, and the Alliance must maintain access to clear
and timely warning information. Persistent overhead monitoring satellites
form the backbone of NATO’s missile-warning system and provide coverage
over key areas and territories. Additionally, ground-based radars in the ground
segment help confirm strategic attacks and ballistic trajectories.

Environmental Monitoring
Space systems help planners predict the impact of atmospheric and
oceanic effects on NATO operations in the land, sea, and air domains.
Accurate weather forecasting and understanding maritime conditions mitigate
air and maritime operations risk while enabling f light planning for patrols
over NATO airspace. Weather forecasting also supports threat assessments
and munitions selection.

Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Satellite communication is vital for effective command and control
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, supporting forces operating
in remote areas. Satellite communication enables over-the-horizon and
beyond line-of-sight voice and data communication for NATO forces.
Satellite communication also enables unmanned aerial system (UAS)
operations supporting NATO missions. As part of recent investments
to improve SATCOM capabilities, the NATO Communications
and Information (NCI) Agency has partnered with France, Italy,
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the United Kingdom, and the United States, for SATCOM services
under NATO SATCOM Services Sixth Generation (NSS6G) Project.
Satellite communication is also where the space and cyber domains
intersect across the four space segments. The data transmission networks
that enable ground stations to command-and-control satellites in orbit and
enable forces in the user segment to utilize satellite capabilities exist in the
cyber domain. The medium over which data transmission occurs in the link
segment relies on communication protocols derived from the cyber domain.

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)
Alliance military operations rely heavily on space-based services
for ISR. Operational and tactical planning requires accurate satellite
imagery to understand the effects of terrain on land-based operations.
Sophisticated orbital capabilities like synthetic aperture radar and remote
sensing enable decision making at the strategic level with timely and accurate
information that reduces uncertainty and risk during crises.

Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
The importance of the space domain to Alliance operations and daily life
demands that NATO maintain continuous situational awareness of objects,
activities, and actors across the orbital regimes to anticipate and identify
risks. Spatial situational awareness is an emerging capability in response
to the proliferation of actors and threats in the space domain. Spatial situational
awareness enables effective command and control in support of Alliance
operations while providing a timely understanding of the space environment.
NATO forces have access to the most advanced space infrastructure
in the world. However, this access is not assured, and planners and
policymakers cannot assume space will remain an uncontested domain.
Moreover, technological advances have democratized the benef its
of space to a wide range of actors. Commercially available drones with onboard
satellite navigation and mapping can be improvised into precision-guided
explosives. In contrast, commercial mapping services such as Google Maps
can provide detailed satellite images of potential targets for terrorist attacks
within member states. Criminal organizations, violent extremist organizations
(VEO), and adversary states can also utilize the space capabilities detailed
above, thanks to the ubiquity of smart devices and satellite imagery on the
Internet. The next section, however, will focus on the main threats facing
NATO space critical infrastructure.

51

Kuzminski

Threats and Vulnerabilities
The growing ubiquity of commercial and national space technologies
suggests potential threat actors will seek to leverage space for the same
advantages as NATO.12 There are generally f ive categories of space
threat actors, plus the space environment itself, which is hazardous
to Alliance space capabilities. This discussion will focus on threat actors,
including insider threats, criminal gangs, terrorists/VEOs, non-state actors,
and state actors. In terms of technical complexity, each type of threat actor
is capable of low-threshold threats, while only state actors with advanced
space programs are capable of high-end threats.
The threats affecting NATO’s space capabilities exist on Earth and
in orbit and range from crude attacks resulting in physical destruction to space
support facilities on Earth, sophisticated counter-space weapons deployed
on orbital platforms, and the growing orbital debris problem. Lower threshold
threats may cause temporary disruptions to Alliance space functions and
local operations, while higher threshold threats could render catastrophic
consequences to the security of NATO members. Generally, terrorist actors
possess the ability to cause temporary disruptions to space infrastructure.
However, the most significant threats are the most technically complex and
thus will likely remain exclusive to advanced state actors (see figure 3-1).
The following threats have a lower technical and resource threshold and
are available to various actors seeking to disrupt critical space infrastructure.
Attacks can still cause much damage and impair vital functions but are
generally reversible in terms of NATO’s ability to continue to access space
and space support functions.

Direct Attack
NATO’s orbital capabilities depend on the space support functions
provided by various military and civilian organizations with facilities
located around the globe. Some facilities (such as France’s Guyana Space
Center or the United States’ Kennedy Space Center) host vital space launch
and space support facilities located on military installations or supported
by the host nation’s military forces. They are, therefore, relatively secure
from direct attacks. For example, in French Guyana, France’s 3rd Regiment

12. Reding and Eaton, “Science & Technology Trends 2020–2040,” 82.
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of the Foreign Legion is tasked with defending the facility from direct attack
by terrorists or VEOs.13
Other facilities, however, including the ESA’s European Space
Operations Centre (ESOC), located in Darmstadt, Germany, are primarily
civilian. They are often situated in congested metropolitan areas and
easily accessible by public transportation. The ESOC and other civilian
facilities perform vital space support functions and operate many
satellites that NATO relies upon to conduct its missions.14 Nevertheless, despite
local security, they could remain particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks,
including car/truck bombings, mass shootings, or suicide attacks.
A terrorist attack, such as the 2015 Paris shootings, against a key element
of the ground segment could result in catastrophic physical destruction
to vital space support facilities and the loss of life among space professionals,
technicians, and engineers who operate Alliance satellites. While such
damage and loss of life would be devastating, the impact on NATO’s ability
to use satellites and perform its core missions would likely be relatively low.
There is sufficient redundancy in satellite operation and tracking or launch
services. For example, isolated direct attacks against these facilities would
not meaningfully disrupt NATO’s ability to obtain PNT data from the
GPS constellation or for intelligence organizations to utilize satellite
imagery for reconnaissance purposes. In other words, an isolated terrorist
attack against the ground segment, while devastating, would have a limited
impact on NATO’s overall space critical infrastructure.

Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
MANPADS are lightweight air defense systems designed to protect
ground-based forces from air attacks. Widely distributed during the
Cold War, terrorist organizations and insurgent groups throughout
Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia have acquired MANPADS
through theft, illicit arms transfers, black market sales, and capture due
to loss of inventory control. Prolif ic examples include the US-made
FIM-92 Stinger and the Soviet/Russian-made 9K32 Strela-2 (NATO designation
SA-7 Grail). Additionally, there have been several documented events of terrorist
actors firing MANPADS against military and civilian aircraft. For example,
in November 2002, al-Qaeda–affiliated terrorists fired two Strela-2 missiles
13. “3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment,” French Foreign Legion (website), 2022, https://foreignlegion.info
/units/3rd-foreign-infantry-regiment/.
14. “Where Missions Come Alive,” European Space Agency (website), n.d., https://www.esa.int/About_Us
/ESOC/Where_missions_come_alive.
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at an Israeli civilian Boeing 737 airliner departing from Mombasa, Kenya.15
Additionally, in March 2020, the US Federal Aviation Administration issued
a notice to airmen (NOTAM) warning civilian aircraft of the surface-to-air
missile threat near Kabul, Afghanistan. The NOTAM was issued because
Taliban insurgents had acquired MANPADS and fired them against NATO
aircraft taking off from Bagram airfield.16
Terrorist organizations could conceivably target a space launch
in a manner similar to attacks against civilian and military aircraft taking
off from airports around the world. Due to their widespread availability,
MANPADS are an attractive choice for terrorists seeking to attack a symbolic
target such as an airliner or rocket. Unlike military aircraft, which carry
effective countermeasures against surface-to-air threats, rockets are unarmed
and highly vulnerable to MANPADS. While highly symbolic and devastating
in its immediate impact, a successful terrorist attack against a space vehicle
launch would likely not disrupt NATO’s overall space infrastructure or ability
to exploit space support functions for routine operations.

Electronic Warfare (EW )
Satellites beam signals to Earth and transmit their data to end users
via a defined set of radio frequencies across the electromagnetic spectrum.
Spectrum and signal interference, or jamming, using radio emissions
from adjacent spectrum bands, deliberately or accidentally, can degrade vital
space functions, including PNT and communications.17
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the
United Nations agency regulate and coordinate global radio frequency (RF)
spectrum allocations. Positioning, navigation, and timing signals from GPS
or GNSS satellites operate along a segment of the RF spectrum known
as the L-Band, with a frequency range between 1 to 2 gigahertz,
with satellites specifically operating between 1525 to 1660.5 megahertz.18
15. Martin Landauer, “The Threat from MANPADS,” Royal United Services Institute (website),
November 14, 2007, https://rusi.org/publication/threat-manpads.
16. “FA A Background Information Regarding U.S. Civil Aviation in the Kabul Flight
Information Region (OAKX),” Federal Aviation Administration (website), March 28, 2021, https://www.faa
.gov/air_traffic/publications/us_restrictions/media/Afghanistan-Background_Notice-28_MAR_2021.pdf.
17. “GPS Spectrum and Interference Issues,” GPS (website), accessed September 29, 2021, https://www.gps.gov
/spectrum/.
18. Radio signals in the L-Band are ideal for PNT and communications use because these waves can
travel long distances and penetrate Earth’s weather and vegetation. Jill C. Gallagher, Alyssa K. King,
and Clare Y. Cho, “Spectrum Interference Issues: Ligado, the L-Band, and GPS,” Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report IF11558 (Washington, DC: CRS, May 28, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov
/product/pdf/IF/IF11558/2.
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Jamming RF signals in the L-Band is relatively easy and cheap,
requiring powerful broadcast equipment to transmit interference signals
in the appropriate frequency range. Although illegal in many countries,
GPS signal jammers can be purchased or manufactured with readily
available electronic equipment.
For criminal and terrorist actors, satellite signal jamming is most
effective in a localized and targeted manner. Commercially available
“privacy-seeking” jammers are difficult to detect while far less capable than
military EW capabilities. Criminals and terrorists could disrupt financial
services and trading at stock exchanges, which rely on precise timing
for financial transactions.19 For example, actors seeking to disrupt Alliance
military forces operating in remote areas, could also easily jam GPS and
communications signals as part of a broader complex attack against NATO
forces. However, on a larger-scale, state actors, including Iran and Russia,
possess the technical ability to jam GPS signals across a large area.

Cyber Threats and Effects
In recent years, the proliferation of cyber threats and cyber-capable
actors has posed many threats to Alliance’s critical infrastructure,
including in space. Satellites and their services are vulnerable to cyber threats
because they often operate and rely on a digital network to communicate
with operators and users on the ground. Additionally, much of the equipment
across the four space segments linking space critical infrastructure
to users on Earth employs commercial hardware, firmware, and software.
There is an inescapable interdependence between the space and cyber domains.
Since these systems contain known and unknown vulnerabilities affecting
cyber and space domains, all segments of the space system depend on updates
and patching from manufacturers. Space systems and cybersecurity are
inherently linked.
Cyber threats, including malware, hacking, spoof ing, and denial
of service, can affect NATO’s space infrastructure: space segment,
user segment, link segment, and ground segment. Depending on the intent,
attackers can achieve command and control system intrusions to affect satellite
orbits, payload disruption, signal disruption, or data skimming, among other
risks. 20 Motivated attackers can also use sophisticated cyber techniques
19. Tegg Westbrook, “The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming: Geographies of Electronic
Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 2 (2019): 9.
20. Bailey et al., Defending Spacecraft, 3.
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for denial-of-service attacks against space infrastructure across all segments
of the space system, resulting in loss of services and capabilities. At worst,
sophisticated attackers could hijack NATO satellites and disrupt their orbits
or compromise sensitive payloads. 21
Cyber threats against space systems offer advantages to would-be attackers
due to the relatively low cost and potential for high-impact disruptions
to NATO operations and the attribution challenge which can obfuscate the
responsible party. 22 As a result, cyber threats against NATO space critical
infrastructure are an attractive option for the determined and well-resourced
threat actors. While non-state actors, including criminal and terrorist
organizations may lack the skill set and resources to target and strike specific
targets through the cyber domain, they may occasionally achieve some success,
given the unpredictable and uncertain nature of cyberspace vulnerabilities.
The following higher consequence threats to NATO space critical
infrastructure may cause irreversible damage to space systems and support
functions. Due to their technical complexity, they are generally within the
capability scope of advanced state actors.

Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT)
Ground-launched anti-satellite weapons, known as ASATs, are a significant
threat to satellites. They allow threat actors to destroy a satellite with a
kinetic kill vehicle launched atop a missile from an Earth-based platform.
The kinetic destruction produces a debris f ield that remains in Earth’s
orbit and poses collision risks to other satellites.
In January 2007, China successfully tested an ASAT in a show of force
when it destroyed a derelict weather satellite known as Fengyun using
a medium-range ballistic missile. 23 The act, widely condemned by other
countries and proponents of civilian space f light, generated a persistent
debris cloud and demonstrated China’s ability to target an adversary’s
space-based infrastructure in a potential future conf lict. Up to that point,
only the United States and Russia demonstrated such a capability.
India has also demonstrated an ASAT capability. The country
shot down one of its satellites using a modified ballistic missile defense
21. Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens (New York: Routledge, 2017), 97.
22.

Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare, 43.

23. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, Unnerving U.S.,”
New York Times (website), January 18, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia
/18cnd-china.html.

56

Chapter 3

NATO Space Critical Infrastructure

interceptor in March 2017 in a show of force mission called Shakti. 24
In November 2021, Russia destroyed a derelict satellite weighing
over 2,000 kilograms. 25 The event drew swift condemnation from NATO
and other space actors and created a sizable debris f ield that threatened
the International Space Station (ISS). 26 NASA had to alert the ISS
crew to evacuate into their escape capsule until the threat diminished.
W hile no countr y has ever shot down an adversar y’s satellite
during a conf lict, NATO must remain vigilant of the growing risks
to its space critical infrastructure with the proliferation of ASAT
capabilities and the debris any kinetic attack in orbit will create.

Rendezvous and Proximity Operation (RPO) and Intercept
Advanced satellite operators can maneuver and alter satellite orbits
to rendezvous with other orbital platforms. Known as rendezvous and
proximity operations (RPO), these maneuvers are often benign and deliberate,
such as a manned capsule docking with the International Space Station.
This ability suggests operators can intercept satellites situated in predictable
orbits, especially in low-Earth orbit (LEO), for nefarious purposes.
Malign actions include satellite capture, signal intercept for espionage
purposes, or ramming one satellite into another in a kinetically destructive
maneuver (in extreme circumstances). 27
Rendezvous and proximit y operation capabilit y primarily rests
within the purview of state actors. However, legitimate business and
commercial interests exist in pursuing RPO and satellite-capture
technologies. Several aerospace firms and startup companies are developing

24. Jeff Foust, “India Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon,” SpaceNews (website), March 27, 2019,
https://spacenews.com/india-tests-anti-satellite-weapon/.
25. Jeff Foust, “Russia Destroys Satellite in ASAT Test,” SpaceNews (website), November 15, 2021,
https://spacenews.com/russia-destroys-satellite-in-asat-test/.
26. “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Recent Anti-Satellite Missile Test Conducted
by the Russian Federation,” NATO (website), November 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/news_188780.htm. Regarding the International Space Station astronauts seeking shelter, see also
Joey Roulette, “Debris from Test of Russian Antisatellite Weapon Forces Astronauts to Shelter,”
New York Times (website), November 16, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/science/russia-anti
-satellite-missile-test-debris.html.
27.

Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare, 143.
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maintenance satellites to repair and refuel existing satellite constellations. 28
Space infrastructure servicing, including satellite refueling and debris
mitigation, is a developing and ostensibly beneficial capability that can extend
the service life of orbital payloads and declutter Earth’s orbital regimes.
Satellite servicing is promising for improving the resilience of space systems.
However, from a security perspective, the same spacecraft used to repair
or refuel a satellite can also be used to intercept signals, damage, or deliberately
deorbit an adversary’s satellites. 29 Absent operating standards and security
norms, the proliferation of RPO capability to commercial entities and
non-state actors for space servicing exposes another vector that can be exploited
through cyber or other means to threaten Alliance satellites. 30

Orbital Counter-Space Weapon (Directed Energy and Kinetic)
With perhaps the highest level of technical complexity, orbital counterspace weapons also pose the highest risk of irreversible and catastrophic damage
to NATO’s space critical infrastructure. These weapon systems include directed
energy (such as laser) and kinetic weapons (such as swarms of nanosatellites)
that can disable satellites from orbit. Several states, including France and
the United States, have announced plans to deploy or study such capabilities
in the future to defend their national space systems. France described
nanosatellites as “key areas of defense” and announced plans to deploy
“active defense measures” in space in its 2019 space defense strategy,
while the US has explored the potential of nanosatellites for defensive
purposes. 31 Additionally, General John W. Raymond, the US chief of space
operations, testified before Congress on June 16, 2021, that directed energy
is one of “several of the emerging technologies that are necessary to integrate

28. Examples include Northrop Grumman’s successful test of its Mission Extension Vehicle-1 (MEV-1)
in February 2020, and the Ukrainian startup Krus Orbital, which plans to launch a service satellite in 2023.
Caleb Henry, “Northrop Grumman’s MEV-1 Servicer Docks with Intelsat Satellite,” SpaceNews
(website), February 26, 2020, https://spacenews.com/northrop-grummans-mev-1-servicer-docks-with
-intelsat-satellite/; and Sandra Erwin, “Startup Using Soviet-Era Technology to Build Satellite Servicing Vehicle,”
SpaceNews, (website) March 10, 2021, https://spacenews.com/space-startup-using-soviet-era-technology
-to-build-satellite-servicing-vehicle/.
29. Saadia M. Pekkanen, “Neoclassical Realism in Japan’s Space Security,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Japanese Politics, ed. Robert J. Pekkanen and Saadia M. Pekkanen (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2021), 775.
30. Hussain Bokhari, “NSR Insight: In-orbit Servicing: Stepping Up to the Challenge?,” satnews
(website), February 17, 2021, https://news.satnews.com/2021/02/17/nsr-insight-in-orbit-servicing-stepping
-up-to-the-challenge/.
31. Stratégie spatiale de Défense: Rapport du Groupe de Travail “Espace” (Paris: Ministère des Armées,
July 2019), 32, https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/194000642.pdf.
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into the Space Force architectures to stay ahead of potential adversaries. 32
Notwithstanding the high debris-generating potential of such weapons,
a shooting war involving NATO extending to space poses catastrophic risks
to the Alliance’s space-critical infrastructure and humanity’s long-term
access to space. 33

Orbital Debris
This chapter mentions orbital debris, a pernicious problem to space
infrastructure that will only worsen as humans continue to place more objects
in space. Orbital debris is an objective hazard endemic to the orbital regimes
which NATO’s space infrastructure occupies. 34 Thanks to orbital mechanics,
space junk usually remains in orbit rather than decay into the Earth’s
atmosphere, posing a persistent risk to space f light. In this view, orbital debris
presents a space safety challenge to be mitigated through norms and behaviors.
While not a military or security problem, NATO’s ability to utilize
space reliably for its core missions necessitates a cooperative approach
with all space-faring nations to reduce the dangers of orbital debris.

Case Study – Russia as a Threat Actor
in the Space Domain
Russia inherited the Soviet space program after the fall of communism
and the end of the Cold War. While the Russian space program withered
during the 1990s, the country has devoted considerable time and resources
during the last 20 years to building its space program, especially its coercive
space capabilities. The following case study examines Russia’s threatening
behavior in the space domain. Specifically, the case study considers four
categories of space domain threats: rendezvous and proximity operations
(RPO), electronic warfare and jamming, direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons
(DA-ASAT), and cyber disruption.
32. David Vergun, “Nanosatellites Could Play Pivotal Role in Defense against Enemy Missiles,”
DOD News (website), July 12, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2685840
/nanosatellites-could-play-pivotal-role-in-defense-against-enemy-missiles/. See also Department
of the Air Force Posture Statement: Fiscal Year 2023 before the House Armed Services Committee (statements of
Frank Kendall, secretary of the Air Force, General Robert W. Raymond, chief of space operations,
US Space Force, and General Charles Q. Brown Jr., chief of staff, US Air Force, June 16, 2021),
https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2022SAF/FY23_DAF_Posture_Statement.pdf.
33. Rob Waugh, “France to Launch ‘Fearsome’ Satellites ‘Armed with Powerful Lasers’ into Space,” Yahoo!
Finance (website), July 30, 2019, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/france-to-launch-fearsome-satellites
-armed-with-powerful-lasers-into-space-193707222.html.
34. “What is Orbital Debris?” NASA (website), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features
/nasa-knows/what-is-orbital-debris-58.html.
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Rendezvous and Proximity Operations – 2015 through 2019
As early as 2015, the Russian satellite Luch (aka Olymp-K ) conducted
additional orbital maneuvers after entering the geosynchronous orbital
regime (GEO). By 2019, Luch occupied at least 16 distinct orbital positions,
which is unusual because most satellites maintain a stationary position relative
to the Earth once in GEO. 35 Several commercial and state-level satellite
operators criticized the Russians for what they viewed as inappropriate
and concerning behavior in the fragile orbital regime, which extends over
35,000 kilometers (22,000 miles) above the Earth. Intelsat, a commercial
satellite services provider, reported that Luch occupied a position between two
operational Intelsat satellites for nearly three months. 36 In 2018, France’s Armed
Forces Minister Florence Parly accused Russia of maneuvering Luch dangerously
close to the French-Italian military communications satellite Athéna-Fidus.
Parly called this maneuver an “unfriendly act” of espionage. 37 Later in 2019,
Luch approached Intelsat 36 in GEO and closed to a distance less than
1.8 kilometers. 38 By comparison, the average distance between satellites
occupying stationary positions in GEO is 207 kilometers. 39
The Luch satellite maneuvers are perhaps the most prolif ic example
of provocative RPO by Russia. However, Russia appears to have been
refining its RPO capabilities since at least 2013, when it launched several
military satellites that conducted RPO with other Russian satellites.
The military utility of Luch and Russia’s other RPO-capable satellites appears
to be surveillance, co-orbital inspection, and intelligence gathering. 40
Rendezvous and proximity operations capability could also support targeting
and tracking other counter-space attacks, including direct-ascent ASAT.
Russian satellite maneuvers (such as those described above) are not illegal
by international standards. Evidence suggests, however, that Russia’s behavior
35. Thomas G. Roberts, “Unusual Behavior in GEO: Luch (Olymp-K),” Aerospace Security: A Project
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), last updated September 1, 2022,
https://aerospace.csis.org/data/unusual-behavior-in-geo-olymp-k/.
36. Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark Redux: Recent Russian Rendezvous and Proximity Operations
in Space,” Space Review (website), October 5, 2021, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/1.
37. “France Accuses Russia of Trying to Spy on Franco-Italian Military Satellite,” France24
(website), September 7, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180907-france-accuses-russia-trying
-spy-franco-italian-military-satellite-espionage-athena-fidus.
38. Colin Clark, “US, China, Russia Test New Space War Tactics: Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying,”
Breaking Defense (website), October 28, 2021, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2021/10
/us-china-russia-test-new-space-war-tactics-sats-buzzing-spoofing-spying/.
39. Roberts, “Unusual Behavior.”
40. Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment
(Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, April 2021), 2–13.
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relative to other satellites increased the risk of collision. It also demonstrates
sophisticated and precise space situational awareness capability, enabling
the Russian satellite to loiter for extended periods and collect uplink data
from Alliance ground stations.41 The Luch incidents exposed the vulnerability
of civilian and NATO space infrastructure to RPO, which is inherently
a dual-use capability that could be used in a counter-space capacity
in the future. These developments suggest additional measures,
including transparency, monitoring, and norms, may be necessary to mitigate
the risks of such acts in the future.
Jamming – 2017 and 2018
In 2017, civilians and commercial airliners in Scandinavia reported
GPS signal disruption and degraded PNT data during periods
corresponding with military exercises in the region.42 Norway reported
the signal disruptions during Russia’s Zapad-17 exercise in conjunction
with NATO’s Trident Juncture exercise in 2018 and the United Kingdom’s
Clockwork exercise in 2019. 43 On more than one occasion, Norway’s
Civil Aviation Authority issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) about the
GPS signal disruptions in the vicinity of the Arctic Circle. 44 The signal
disruptions affected GPS, the PNT satellite constellation owned and operated
by the US Space Force. The specif ic nature of the disruptions suggests
Russia used electronic warfare assets to jam the GPS signals in a target fashion.
Electronic warfare, which includes jamming and spoof ing, is not
new to conf lict. Jamming is the deliberate transmission of signal noise
across one or more targeted frequencies to corrupt data transmissions
or overload transceiver circuits.45 Spoofing differs from jamming in that
it introduces false or misleading data to compromise the signal’s integrity and
allows an adversary to gain control of a system.46 The implications of jamming
and spoofing for NATO forces that rely on reliable PNT data are serious.
PNT signal jamming or spoofing can lead forces astray during complicated
maneuvers along international boundaries or compromise targeting data used
41. Clark, “US, China, Russia Test.”
42. Alexandra Coultrup, “GPS Jamming in the Arctic Circle,” Aerospace Security: A Project of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (website), March 31, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/data
/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/.
43.

Coultrup, “GPS Jamming.”

44. Coultrup, “GPS Jamming.”
45.

Westbrook, “Global Positioning System,” 2.

46.

Westbrook, “Global Positioning System,” 3.
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by precision-guided munitions during crises. Under extreme circumstances,
these events can create a pretext for an adversary to escalate a crisis.
During Zapad-17, Norway’s Foreign Ministry confronted Russian
authorities about jammed GPS signals affecting commercial airline traffic
near the Finnmark region in northern Norway. 47 The exercise involved
thousands of Russian troops near the Arctic Circle, with troops
maneuvering to within 10 kilometers of the Russian-Norwegian border.48
Similarly, during Trident Juncture the following year, NATO and Norway’s
Defense Ministry accused Russia of jamming GPS signals from the country’s
Kola Peninsula. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg noted that the Alliance
has seen “that cyber, electronic warfare, [and] electronic means are used
more frequent[ly] in different operations.”49 Defense analysts believe the
EW capabilities deployed during Trident Juncture are the same ones Russia
tested during Zapad-17 the previous year, suggesting jamming will become
a regular part of Russian military activity. 50

Direct Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) Weapon Test – 2021
Russia possesses one of the world’s most prolific direct-ascent ASAT
(DA-ASAT) capabilities, which it began testing in the Soviet era during the
Cold War. As of 2021, Russia possessed three primary DA-ASAT systems:
PL-19 Nudol, a ground-launched ballistic missile capable of intercepting
targets in low-earth orbit (LEO); Burevestnik, an air-launched DA-ASAT
that can reach LEO to intercept targets or possibly deploy a hypersonic missile;
and S-500, a ballistic missile with a next-generation exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle that is still in development. 51 In November 2021, Russia successfully
demonstrated the operational capability of its PL-19 Nudol DA-ASAT
when it destroyed the Cosmos-1408 satellite in LEO at an altitude
of approximately 485 kilometers. 52
According to the US Space Command (USSPACECOM), the Russian
test produced over 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and posed
47. Westbrook, “Global Positioning System,” 7.
48.

Westbrook, “Global Positioning System,” 7.

49. Brooks Tigner, “Electronic Jamming between Russia and NATO Is Par for the Course in the Future,
but It Has Its Risky Limits,” New Atlanticist (blog), November 15, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org
/blogs/new-atlanticist/electronic-jamming-between-russia-and-nato-is-par-for-the-course-in-the
-future-but-it-has-its-risky-limits/.
50.

Tigner, “Electronic Jamming.”

51.

Weeden and Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities.

52.

Foust, “Russia Destroys Satellite.”
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an immediate risk to the astronauts aboard the International Space Station,
including two Russian cosmonauts. 53 Shortly after Cosmos-1408 broke apart,
NASA ground control notified the crew to take emergency safety procedures
when it became apparent the space station would pass “through or near the
vicinity of the debris cloud.” 54 World leaders widely condemned the event,
while Russia denied the test posed any risk to the International Space
Station or other space activities. 55 The intensity of worldwide condemnation
was similar to the criticism against China after its 2007 DA-ASAT test,
which also produced large amounts of space debris. 56
Russia launched the Nudol interceptor from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome,
located about 800 kilometers north of Moscow. 57 Analysis of the
PL-19 Nudol missile suggests Russia possesses an operational
DA-ASAT capability to threaten credibly any satellite or spacecraft
in LEO. 58 The worldwide condemnation following the event suggests
Russia was willing to bear reputational and material costs to signal the
credibility of its coercive capacity in LEO.
When viewed as a coercive tool, Russia’s DA-ASAT capability
is another point of leverage to threaten objects of signif icant value
to its adversaries. Russia knows that NATO forces depend on space-based
capabilities for missions and operations. Possessing a credible capability
to threaten satellites in LEO, Russia has armed itself with another tool
to reinforce its bargaining power vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. 59
Given the peculiarities of the space environment and orbital mechanics,
all space-faring actors share common interests in maintaining stable
and safe access to space. Uncertainty surrounding Russia’s interests
and intentions in space complicates the overall bargaining situation and
53. Theresa Hitchens, “Russian Suspected Ground-Launched ASAT Test Scatters Dangerous
Debris through LEO,” Breaking Defense (website), November 15, 2021, https://breakingdefense.sites
.breakingmedia.com/2021/11/suspected-russian-ground-launched-asat-test-scatters-dangerous-debris
-through-leo/.
54. Bill Nelson, “NASA Administrator Statement on Russian ASAT Test,” NASA (website),
November 15, 2021, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-administrator-statement-on-russian-asat-test.
55. “Военные РФ подтвердили, что сбили советский спутник в ходе испытаний,” Interfax (website),
November 16, 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/803293.
56. Broad and Sanger, “China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon.”
57.

Hitchens, “Test Scatters Dangerous Debris.”

58. Todd Harrison et al., Space Threat Assessment 2022 (Washington, DC: Aerospace Security Project/
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat
-assessment-2022.
59. For a discussion on coercion and credible threats as instruments of bargaining, see Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 2–8.
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reinforces the need for NATO to maintain its credible deterrent and
coercive capabilities.

Disruption of Ukrainian Satellite Communications – 2022
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian forces
attacked along multiple axes to seize key terrain. Shortly before the invasion
began, Russian hackers targeted the Viasat KA-SAT commercial satellite
communications network by attacking modems and routers in the user
segment with malware. 60 The malware attack disabled thousands of systems
by erasing all data using “wiper” malware called AcidRain. 61 This attack
was significant because the Viasat provides high-bandwidth Internet and
satellite communications to the Ukrainian government and military, civilian,
and commercial customers. While the attack targeted Ukrainian users,
thousands of civilian customers across the European Union were also affected,
including NATO members. According to US Secretary of State Antony
Blinken, the attack was meant “to disrupt Ukrainian command and control
during the invasion” and to provide Russian forces a tactical advantage. 62
Cybersecurity analysts in several NATO and EU countries also attributed the
attack to the Russian military. 63
As Russian forces descended on Kyiv and surrounding areas
during the early days of the invasion, Ukraine’s command-and-control network
had been disabled. With military communications “completely paralyzed,”
commanders had to move physically to unit locations to assess the situation

60. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2–8.
61. Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the
Ukraine Invasion,” MIT Technology Review (website), May 10, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com
/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/.
62. James Pearson, “Russia Downed Satellite Internet in Ukraine – Western Officials,” Reuters (website),
May 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-behind-cyberattack-against-satellite
-internet-modems-ukraine-eu-2022-05-10/.
63. “Russia behind Cyberattack with Europe-Wide Impact an Hour before Ukraine Invasion,”
National Cyber Security Centre (website), May 10, 2022, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russia-behind
-cyber-attack-with-europe-wide-impact-hour-before-ukraine-invasion#:~:text=Russia%20has%20
been%20behind%20a,its%20major%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine; and Colin Demarest, “US and Allies
Blame Russia for Viasat Hack Ahead of Ukraine Invasion,” C4ISRNet (website), May 11, 2022,
https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/geoint/2022/05/11/us-and-allies-blame-russia-for-viasat-hack-ahead-of
-ukraine-invasion/.
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and issue orders. 64 For its part, Viasat required weeks to ship replacement
units to customers in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe to restore SATCOM.
The attack demonstrates how multi-domain effects in space and cyber
critical infrastructure can have persistent effects during a conf lict and are
an enduring feature of the modern battlefield. The attack also reveals the
interdependence between space critical infrastructure and cyberspace and
illustrates the effects adversaries can deliver against NATO’s space critical
infrastructure by exploiting cyberspace vulnerabilities. While Ukraine is not
a NATO member, Viasat is an American commercial telecommunications
firm providing vital SATCOM to Ukrainian government and military users.
In this respect, the Viasat SATCOM network comprises Ukraine’s space
critical infrastructure because of the degree to which Ukraine’s ability
to defend against Russian aggression depends on commercial SATCOM.

Recommendations
NATO faces serious challenges in the space domain. Technology
proliferation and the importance of space capabilities for nearly all modern
society functions demonstrate the critical vulnerabilities of NATO space
systems. The following recommendations build on existing efforts to instill
norms and best practices in space by all actors while hedging against the
increasing likelihood that adversaries may target NATO space systems
in a future crisis.

Promote Norms for Responsible Behavior in Space by All Actors
The best way to mitigate security risks in the space domain, especially
from debris-generating events like kinetic ASAT weapon strikes,
is for all space actors, state, and non-state alike, to observe norms and tenets
of responsible behavior in space. 65 These tenets include transparency of intent
and clear communication, avoiding debris generation and harmful interference,
and maintaining predictable and safe orbital trajectories. 66 In April 2020,
the United States declared a moratorium on direct-ascent, debris-producing
64. Paul Sonne et al., “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian Valor, Russian Blunders Combined to Save
the Capital,” Washington Post (website), August 24, 2022, https://w w w.washingtonpost.com
/national-security/interactive/2022/kyiv-battle-ukraine-survival/.
65. Lloyd J. Austin III, secretary of defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Chiefs of the Military Services, Commanders
of the Combatant Commands, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and Directors
of Defense Agencies, “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” July 7, 2021, https://media.defense.gov
/2021/Jul/23/2002809598/-1/-1/0/TENETS-OF-RESPONSIBLE-BEHAVIOR-IN-SPACE.PDF.
66.
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kinetic ASAT testing. 67 NATO should encourage its members to observe the
tenets of responsible behavior in space while reaffirming the mutual defense
provisions of Article 5 for the protection of Allied space systems.

Incorporate Space Capabilities and Considerations
into All Aspects of NATO Operational Planning
NATO can no longer assume that space is a benign environment and
must consider that future competition and conf lict will extend to the space
domain. NATO’s access to space capabilities is not guaranteed. Planners must
anticipate threats and challenges and plan for space operations to mitigate
those risks while preserving the key space roles required for NATO operations.
Additionally, every NATO exercise should incorporate space elements and
planning considerations that include as many Alliance members as possible

Maintain and Expand Partnerships with Commercial Operators
Commercia lizing cer tain aspects of NATO space systems
(such as deploying passive NATO payloads on commercial satellites) can
potentially reduce uncertainty about the purpose of military satellites and
reduce risks associated with a security dilemma in the space domain. 68
Coupled with growing international consensus about the need for norms
to govern behavior in space, contracting certain space capabilities
to commercial operators can signal that NATO does not intend to dominate
other space actors. 69 Additionally, increasing the capacity of certain space
systems through partnerships with commercial operators can increase the
resilience and redundancy of vital space functions, including SATCOM
and certain ISR.

Promote Space Capability Development across the Alliance
Only about half of NATO members operate some aspects of NATO’s space
infrastructure. Under a memorandum of agreement signed in 2020 through
the NCI, NATO relies on four member states for SATCOM capabilities.
However, cooperative space programs and commercial partnerships can
expand space capabilities across Alliance members to improve overall space
competencies while increasing the deterrent effect of diffuse and redundant
67. Kamala Harris, “Briefing Room: Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Ongoing Work
to Establish Norms in Space,” White House (website), April 19, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing
-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/18/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-ongoing-work-to-establish
-norms-in-space/.
68. Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: The Orbital Security Dilemma (New York:
Routledge, 2020), 205.
69.

Townsend, Security and Stability, 205.
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space capabilities.70 NATO should also encourage members to increase
space-specific budgets to expand the overall capabilities and capacity available
to the Alliance.

Increase Resilience of Link and User Segment and Prepare
to Conduct Operations in a Space-degraded Environment
NATO cannot assume it will continue enjoying unmolested access
to essential space functions such as PNT and ISR. Allied forces across the
land, maritime, and air domains must anticipate and train for operations
in a degraded space environment where adversaries jam or spoof PNT signals
to mislead NATO forces. The organization should be wary of commercially
available jammers and consider stronger global regulation to control their sale.

Harden Ground Segment against Physical and Cyberattacks
Force protection and physical security remain important measures
to mitigate direct attacks and terrorism risks. Although many ground-segment
facilities are located on secure military installations, others (such as ESOC)
are situated in dense urban areas. NATO members should consider increasing
force protection measures at key ground segment facilities and strengthen
cybersecurity protocols to defeat any attempts to penetrate networks.
Adversaries can access satellites via SATCOM terminals using remote access
tools from broader network activities such as file transfer protocols (FTP) and
secure copy protocols (SCP).71 The NATO satellite operators and users should
monitor equipment at SATCOM access points and other receiver equipment
in the user segment. In terms of physical security, NATO’s recently upgraded
satellite ground stations in Belgium, Italy, Greece, and Türkiye should
be secured from potential eavesdropping, jamming, and physical attacks.

Consider Implementing a Space Personnel Reliability Program
NATO members should consider implementing a space personnel
reliability program to ensure the trustworthiness of space professionals
across all segments of NATO space systems. Nuclear-armed members
of NATO use similar programs for personnel assigned to nuclear-related
duties. Personnel reliability programs support the national security of states
with sensitive weapons programs by ensuring only those with a demonstrated
degree of allegiance, personal responsibility, trustworthiness, and conduct
70.

Gregory L. Schulte, “Protecting NATO’s Advantage in Space” Transatlantic Current 5 (May 2012): 4.

71. Ruben Santamarta, SATCOM Terminals: Hacking by Air, Sea, Land, Technical White Paper
(Seattle: IOActive, 2014), https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Santamarta-SATCOM
-Terminals-Hacking-By-Air-Sea-And-Land-WP.pdf.
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are allowed to perform duties associated with a particular program.72
A space personnel reliability program could reduce the risks of espionage
and other insider threats. NATO should adopt standardized screening
and qualification procedures to ensure a trusted space workforce, military
and civilian, across the Alliance.

Improve Supply Chain Resilience
by Investing in NATO Defense Technical Industrial Base (DTIB)
Space systems require domestic supply chains and a stable aerospace
industry to preserve NATO’s leading edge in the development of space
capability. NATO member defense budgets must ensure that space-related
DTIB is suff iciently funded to preserve human capital and expertise
and reduce the risk of corporate insolvency during periods of decreased
demand.73 Additionally, NATO members should consider partnering
with commercial space operators and startups to foster space technology
innovation, research, and development.

Conclusion
NATO depends on critical space systems to fulf ill its core missions
of defense and deterrence, including early warning, positioning,
navigation and timing, communications, and imagery, among others.
Space systems comprise national and Alliance critical infrastructure.
However, the space systems that enable NATO operations are increasingly
vulnerable to state and non-state threats, including terrorist actors.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 suggests state actors
continue to pose the greatest threat to Alliance security and interests,
including in space. Thus, NATO members should focus on increasing
segment resilience through redundant capabilities, cybersecurity measures,
and physical security while incorporating space threat assessments
in all planning, training, and exercises. Additionally, NATO should
promote sustainable space capability development across the Alliance
while expanding partnerships with institutions and commercial operators
to promote norms, safe practices, and standards of orbital behavior.

72. Department of Defense (DoD), Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, DoD Manual
5210.42, change 4 (Washington, DC: DoD, January 13, 2015), 9, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54
/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/521042m.pdf?ver=2018-11-19-100837-003.
73. Daniel Fiott, Defence Industrial Cooperation in the European Union: The State, the Firm
and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2020), 137.
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The growing number of low-cost commercial space service providers
is an opportunity for NATO to expand access to members and partners.
For example, commercial satellite imagery has been useful for identifying
Russian positions to support Ukraine’s defenses and providing evidence
of war crimes perpetrated against innocent Ukrainians.74 States can obtain
access to routine space services more cheaply and easily than ever before, and
NATO should strengthen its relationship with commercial providers to expand
access and increase the redundancy of its systems for routine operations.
Despite the return of war in Europe, war has not extended into orbit.
NATO continues to enjoy access to vital space services, but that access
is no longer assured. Space systems remain vulnerable to kinetic and
non-kinetic attacks. Although individual launching states bear operational
responsibility for the objects they place in orbit, NATO lacks the ability
to synchronize space operations among Alliance members. NATO must
embrace an operational framework that builds on Article 5 commitments
to include the ability to protect and defend Alliance space critical
infrastructure. NATO’s ability to accomplish its missions and ensure the
territorial sovereignty of its members in a future conf lict is at stake.

74. Malachy Browne, David Botti, and Haley Willis, “Satellite Images Show Bodies Lay in Bucha
for Weeks, Despite Russian Claims,” New York Times (website), April 4, 2022, https://www.nytimes
.com/2022/04/04/world/europe/bucha-ukraine-bodies.html.
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ABSTRACT: Using two distinct case studies of extremist disinformation
content, this chapter addresses the intersection of terrorism and
disinformation and contextualizes these case studies within the modern
information landscape. Disinformation’s pervasive reach, ability to incite
violence, and potential to compromise critical human infrastructures
makes it an effective and attractive weapon that is difficult to identify and
combat. This chapter grounds these case studies of terrorist disinformation
in contemporary disinformation and communication scholarship to provide
flexible and tailorable recommendations for NATO countries and allies
as they approach this phenomenon.
Keywords: disinformation, terrorism, “four layers of responsibility,”
extremist content, social media

Introduction
In the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, NATO highlighted the
long-standing and developing threat posed by disinformation campaigns that
target democratic elections, alliances, and public trust in institutional norms
and processes.1 As the disinformation threat has grown, there is evidence that
terrorist groups and other threat actors have added disinformation campaigns
to their arsenal. Terrorist groups and terrorist networks have targeted and
corrupted information infrastructures with disinformation campaigns and
1. “NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation,” NATO (website), July 17, 2020,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
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content. This false content aims to radicalize with divisive ideology, distract
target countries with internal division and instability, compromise target
countries’ ability to combat external threats adequately, and spur domestic
or “homegrown” terrorist activity. Those who track and study these violent
movements have noted how these groups operate online to recruit members,
drum up support, and organize. False information spread online plays
a signif icant role in this process as inciting content attracts members
to terrorist cells, creates support for their activities, and encourages individuals
and groups to commit acts of public violence. For this reason, this chapter
approaches online informational networks—particularly online social spaces—
as a critical infrastructure.
The weaponization of disinformation by terrorist groups and networks
is alarming. However, right-wing terrorist groups and hostile nation-states
have targeted military personnel and veterans of NATO countries and
allies, particularly with recruitment messaging and infiltration attempts.
Right-wing groups that espouse the anti-immigration “great replacement”
conspiracy theory and identify themselves as white nationalists or white
identarian are an example of the racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremist (REMVE) activity that has been on the rise for decades.
These right-wing extremist groups have used coordinated disinformation
campaigns to recruit and radicalize potential members and have extended
their reach across various Europe and North American countries. 2
Scholars note that these right-wing groups, though active online and
responsible for a growing number of terrorist attacks, have not been afforded
the same attention as other terrorist groups. 3 Germany is facing an endemic
rise of this right-wing, neo-Nazi violence, and scholars of extremism have
2. Daniel Byman, Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2022); Daniel Koehler, “Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments
and Issues for the Future,” PRISM 6 no. 2 (July 18, 2016), http://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/839011/right
-wing-extremism-and-terrorism-in-europe-current-developments-and-issues-fo/; Seth G. Jones,
“The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Briefs (website), November 7, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states;
and Yassin Musharbash, “The Globalization of Far-Right Extremism: An Investigative Report,”
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) Sentinel 14, no. 6 ( July/August 2021),
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062021.pdf.
3. Michael German, Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law
Enforcement (New York: New York University School of Law/Brennan Center for Justice, August 27, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy
-and-far-right-militancy-law; Anna Meier, “Germany’s White Supremacist Problem—and What
It Means for the United States,” Lawfare (blog), January 30, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-white
-supremacist-problem%E2%80%94and-what-it-means-united-states; and Janet Reitman, “U.S. Law Enforcement
Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now They Don’t Know How to Stop It,” New York Times,
November 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism
-far-right.html.
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highlighted how disinformation content is a crucial factor in its spread and
the threat it poses to critical military infrastructures—though Germany
is not the only country facing this challenge. 4 The US Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe identif ied military personnel
among the top three targets of Russian disinformation campaigns leveraged
against OSCE countries, equal among political leaders and marginalized
society members. 5
Likewise, threat actors have used the COVID-19 pandemic to sow
domestic instability and weaken target countries, allowing terrorist groups
to extend their inf luence. Experts warned at the beginning of the pandemic
that disinformation would represent a significant threat to effective public
health messaging and the already strained public health infrastructure
capacity. 6 These warnings proved accurate as the pandemic continued,
and disinformation campaigns directly impacted vaccination efforts,
adherence to lockdown measures, and incited domestic strife. Terrorist-led
disinformation campaigns compromised public health measures to combat
the spread of COVID-19 with distrust and anger toward the government
and health-care systems.7 These campaigns were doubly effective in regions
that already reported high levels of institutional distrust, illustrating what

4. Peter Kuras, “Germany Has a Neo-Nazi Terrorism Epidemic,” Foreign Policy (website), July 2, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/02/germany-has-a-neo-nazi-terror-epidemic/.
5. The Scourge of Russian Disinformation: Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
115th Cong. (2017), https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/events/scourge-russian-disinformation.
6. Christina Pazzanese, “Social Media Used to Spread, Create COVID-19 Falsehoods,” Harvard Gazette
(blog), May 8, 2020, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/05/social-media-used-to-spread-create-covid
-19-falsehoods/; Samikshya Siwakoti et al., “Localized Misinformation in a Global Pandemic:
Report on COVID-19 Narratives around the World,” Empirical Studies of Conf lict (website),
March 25, 2021, https://esoc.princeton.edu/publications/localized-misinformation-global-pandemic-report
-covid-19-narratives-around-world; and Taylor Nelson et al., “The Danger of Misinformation in the COVID-19
Crisis,” Missouri Medicine 117, no. 6 (2020): 510–12.
7. Kate Cox et al., COVID-19, Disinformation and Hateful Extremism: Literature Review Report
(London: Commission for Countering Terrorism, July 14, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/external
_publications/EP68674.html; Teun van Dongen, “Assessing the Threat of Covid 19-related Extremism
in the West,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (website), August 5, 2021, https://icct.nl/publication
/assessing-the-threat-of-covid-19-related-extremism-in-the-west-2/; Michael King and Sam Mullins,
“COVID-19 and Terrorism in the West: Has Radicalization Really Gone Viral?,” Just Security (blog),
March 4, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/75064/covid-19-and-terrorism-in-the-west-has-radicalization
-really-gone-viral/; and Anne Craanen and Charley Gleeson, “The Overlap between Terrorist Content
Online, Disinformation, and the Tech Sector Response,” VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (blog),
March 30, 2022, https://www.voxpol.eu/the-overlap-between-terrorist-content-online-disinformation-and
-the-tech-sector-response/.
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disinformation scholars have long observed about disinformation’s ability
to weaponize already present instability. 8
This chapter proposes that the online information landscape
is a site where various critical infrastructures are vulnerable to attack,
particularly by threat actors who weaponize disinformation. It also
provides beginning recommendations for preventing and mitigating the
dissemination and effects of disinformation material through situational
awareness, transparency, resiliency measures, and coordination and regulation
of private-sector technology f irms. Although all terrorist groups use
disinformation content in some capacity to achieve their goals, this chapter
provides two case studies where terrorist networks targeted NATO countries
and allies using disinformation campaigns and material to sow instability,
recruit, radicalize, and incite violence. Case study selection was based
on strategic importance, the prevalence of disinformation that targets
military groups and members, and the research available to researchers.
Using Janis Sarts’ “ four layers of responsibilit y” in combating
disinformation, this chapter addresses how national governments can
mitigate disinformation threats to their military personnel and increase
national and international security.9

Definitions
This chapter’s def initions become important because the terms
misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda overlap and are sometimes
used interchangeably or differently within various fields. Similarly, distinctions
between terrorist, militia, and vigilante violence associated with disinformation
are often blurred in public and academic discourse. Likewise, terms used
to categorize those who espouse and act on racially or ethnically motivated
violent extremist (REMVE) ideology are common but sometimes misleading.
The groups and networks discussed in the f irst case study self-identify
as “white nationalist” or “identarian.” They are characterized by their belief
that there is a “white race,” and it is a distinct and superior racial group.
This chapter refers to these groups under their categorical distinction
8. Rachel Kuo and Alice Marwick, “Critical Disinformation Studies: History, Power, and Politics,”
Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review 2, no. 4 (2021): 1–11; and Kate Starbird,
“Disinformation Campaigns Are Murky Blends of Truth, Lies and Sincere Beliefs – Lessons from the Pandemic,”
Conversation (blog), July 23, 2020, http://theconversation.com/disinformation-campaigns-are-murky-blends
-of-truth-lies-and-sincere-beliefs-lessons-from-the-pandemic-140677.
9. Janis Sarts, “Disinformation as a Threat to National Security,” in Disinformation and Fake News,
ed. Shashi Jayakumar, Benjamin Ang, and Nur Diyanah Anwar (Singapore: Springer, 2021), 23–33,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_2.
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as REMVE groups or networks. The events and entities discussed range
from online disinformation campaigns designed to garner support for violent
groups and ideology to militia training camps to overt terrorist violence—
all activities and events instigated by types and levels of right-wing
dissidents or threat actors that use REMVE ideological content to further
their aims.
NATO has released various documents def ining disinformation
“as the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated
information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead.” NATO stated that
“Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between Allied
nations, and to undermine people’s confidence in elected governments.” 10
This chapter understands misinformation as “constituting a claim that
contradicts or distorts common understandings of verif iable facts” that
is spread purposefully or other wise.11 Disinformation is a subset
of misinformation that constitutes information known to be false by the
disseminator and spread with the intent to inf luence, deceive, or incite.
Propaganda, however, should be understood as true or false information
that can be used to “disparage opposing viewpoints,” though in some cases,
it may fall categorically under disinformation.12 Scholars and experts have
noted that these three categories often overlap even with the same piece
of content, and any given content’s label depends on the intentions
through which it was spread.
As we approach case studies of disinformation and terrorist activity,
we acknowledge that any given piece of disinformation content may be spread
as propaganda or disinformation f irst and then spread further
as misinformation. This spread does not lessen the threat of this type of false
information or its potential to mislead and radicalize its audience. It does
explains why this type of threat is particularly difficult to trace and attribute.
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to attribute disinformation to a particular
source or user and then respond with punitive action.

10. “NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation.”
11. Andrew M. Guess and Benjamin A. Lyons, “Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda,”
in Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field and Prospects for Reform, Social
Science Research Council Anxieties of Democracy Series, ed. Nathaniel Persily and
Joshua A. Tucker (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 10–33, https://www.cambridge.org
/core/books/social-media-and-democracy/misinformation-disinformation-and-online-propaganda/D14406
A631AA181839ED896916598500.
12. Joshua A. Tucker et al., Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation:
A Review of the Scientific Literature (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 19, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144139.
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Case Studies
The two cases in this section detail very different instances of terrorist
disinformation content, the impact and purpose of the content, and how
different actors sought to address and mitigate the effects of the weaponized
disinformation. The first case study examines right-wing REMVE Terrorist
Networks and loose but effective attempts to infiltrate military and law
enforcement sectors by radicalizing members. The second case study addresses
the terrorist organization al-Shabaab’s COVID-19–related disinformation
campaigns in Somalia and Kenya and the current local mobilization that has
played a role combating this false content and its effects.

Right-Wing REMVE Terrorist Networks and Germany
Germany has been a frequent target of foreign inf luence information
operations. The German government has been a core target of Russian
disinformation due to the country’s involvement in Ukraine, former
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s position on sanctions against Russia, and the
country’s key position in Europe. Germany’s Parliamentary Oversight
Panel (PKGr) has stated that individuals with an “extreme far-right and
violence-oriented mindset” can be found throughout their federal and state
police and intelligence agencies—presenting a considerable threat that
has been under-investigated.13 The extent of the threat is also highlighted
by REMVE groups that publicly set strategic sights on Germany,
such as Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev, the founder of the Russian Imperial
Movement (RIM), who stated that the future of his organization’s operations
and recruitment will be focused in Germany.
These operations are not limited to online spaces, and the presence
and use of online content by REMVE networks cannot be understated.
These networks include white power movements, neo-Nazi groups, and various
active militia or anti-government movements that uphold white supremacy
and work toward REMVE aims.14 Terms like alt-right, White nationalist,
White wellness, White identarian, pro-White, and White rights advocate
are outdated or laundered terms for White supremacy and are often used
by REMVE groups in disinformating content to disguise the inherent violence
of their ideology.
13. Florian Flade, “The Insider Threat: Far-Right Extremism in the German Military and Police,”
CTC Sentinel 14, no. 5 (May 20, 2021), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05
/CTC-SENTINEL-052021.pdf.
14. Kathleen Belew and Ramón A. Gutiérrez, eds., A Field Guide to White Supremacy (Oakland: University
of California Press, 2021).
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In a study of far-right extremism across European Internet communities,
the researchers highlighted the role of German far-right actors. They focused
on general Twitter usage and the content produced by three active far-right and
reactionary groups with varying levels of political credibility: the Autonome
Nationalisten (Autonomous Nationalists – AN), the Identitäre Bewegung
Deutschland (Identarian Movement Germany – IBD), and the Alternative für
Deutschland (Alternative for Germany –Af D).15
This study was designed to determine whether key far right parties
in Germany have radicalized into extremist ideology, armed violence,
or definable terrorism via a general sampling of European Twitter activity and
a complementary focused study of the Twitter activity of the groups above,
but their focus on Germany provides data on how widespread REMVEs have
mainstreamed conspiracy theories. Of the hashtags found in their data set
of tweets, #whitegenocide was the most frequently used.16 This hashtag refers
to a false but core REMVE belief that White people are dying out globally
due to forced assimilation and immigration and that a Jewish group of elites
are orchestrating this plot.17 The tweets in this sample often paired REMVE
conspiracy and disinformation references with more mainstream political
hashtags such as #merkel, #afd, #ukip, #brexit, and even #maga—the latter
of which displays the lack of borders on REMVE disinformating content.18
The tweets regularly outlinked to known disinformating sites like
Breitbart, Russia Today (RT), and Sputnik News to prove REMVE claims
about immigrants and refugees. The researchers noted the rate at which
these users were suspended for hate speech or disinformation violations.
They also found English-language suspensions were more common—
indicating far more content moderation focused on English-language content
that any other language content.19
In a 2021 report, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
compiled incidents of violent threats made by an entity calling themselves
NSU 2.0, a reference to the neo-Nazi terrorist group Nationalsozialistischer
Untergrund (NSU). These threats were levied against leftist politicians,
15. Reem Ahmed and Daniela Pisoiu, “How Extreme Is the European Far-Right: A Twitter Analysis”
VOX-Pol (blog), May 20, 2020, https://www.voxpol.eu/how-extreme-is-the-european-far-right-the-quantitative
-analysis/.
16. Ahmed and Pisoiu, “How Extreme Is European Far-Right.”
17. “Glossary Term: White Genocide,” Anti-Defamation League (website), May 4, 2017, https://www.adl
.org/resources/glossary-terms/white-genocide.
18.

Ahmed and Pisoiu, “How Extreme Is European Far-Right.”

19. Ahmed and Pisoiu, “How Extreme Is European Far-Right.”
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activists, comedians, and journalists, the majority of whom were female
and of minority heritage. These threats were unique because they contained
personally identifiable information only available in restricted databases.
When investigated, many of the threats were traced back to the various police
stations where they had been made and then to online networks and chat
groups on Telegram and WhatsApp networks where law enforcement shared
anti-Semitic and racist memes and disinformation regarding refugees and
migrants. 20 Many of the investigations into the threats and perpetrators are
still pending as of 2021.
In 2015, a Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command, KSK)
German soldier named André Schmitt set up a Telegram channel for German
military and law enforcement members to socialize and share information—
and eventually to plan violent action against pro-refugee politicians and
prep for a civil war or collapse scenario called “Day X.” Schmitt admits
to posting false or inf lated information about refugees and immigration’s
threat to Germany to “motivate” the chat’s members. 21 This network also
organized paramilitary training events and sold merchandise under a larger
prepper and doomsday organization registered under the name “Uniter.” 22
Another group would form out of this chat network and the disinformation
it spread, Nordkreuz or Northern Cross. Marco Gross, a police sniper and
former parachutist, acted as an unoff icial leader of the spin-off group
that included ex and current law enforcement and military members. 23
Using police records, this group compiled a list of pro-refugee politicians,
stole and stockpiled police ammunition, and ordered body bags and quicklime
to dispose of the anticipated bodies. 24
These visible instances are small compared to the amount of REMVE
content and organization that exists in online spaces across military, defense,
and law enforcement message boards, social media groups, and online chat
platforms. The extent of this threat has been underexamined in recent
history. Many scholars have critiqued Germany’s unwillingness to respond
20. Flade, “Insider Threat.”
21. Katrin Bennhold, “As Neo-Nazis Seed Military Ranks, Germany Confronts ‘an Enemy Within,’ ”
New York Times, July 3, 2020 (late edition), https://www.proquest.com/docview/2419759243?parentSessionId
=7QPUW0ouuHH9Ez8wjOAMcpq2nfhaYKdjkhEng6uNkwA%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14784.
22.

Flade, “Insider Threat.”

23. Katrin Bennhold, “Body Bags and Enemy Lists: How Far-Right Police Officers and Ex-Soldiers
Planned for ‘Day X,’ ” New York Times (website), August 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01
/world/europe/germany-nazi-infiltration.html.
24. Philip Oltermann, “German Far-Right Group ‘Used Police Data to Compile Death List,’ ”
Guardian (website), June 28, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/28/german-far-right
-group-used-police-data-to-compile-death-list.
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to or acknowledge the growth of REMVE terror in the country for what
it is—and part of that critique comes from the lack of monitoring of the online
spaces where disinformation spreads and radicalizes state agents into REMVE
ideology. 25 REMVE networks steeped in disinformating content developed,
organized, and evolved online for many years despite Germany having some
of the most stringent anti-disinformation laws in Europe. 26
Germany’s Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, often called the NetzDG
law or the Internet transparency law, is a case study of a policy solution
to disinformation. This law requires social media companies to remove
posts that incite violence or contain hate-speech content within 24 hours—
and has levied fines as high as $2.3 million US dollars to the US-based
company Facebook for violating the law. 27 Originally proposed in 2017
to reduce hate speech and associated crimes online, the law has been
leveraged against disinformation—though not without criticism
from international bodies like the United Nations and human rights advocacy
groups for its potential to curb free speech and weaponization against peaceful
government dissidents. 28
There is also evidence that far-right and neo-Nazi groups have avoided
suspension and social media bans by refraining from overt key words
or recognition by the algorithm—but still operating in encrypted chats and
online merchandise stores. 29 Germany has also successfully coordinated
preemptive responses to potential disinformation attacks and inf luence
operations. In the lead up to the 2017 German election, the domestic
intelligence agency Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Bf V) shared information
with German political parties regarding likely threats. Measures were also
25. Byman, Spreading Hate, 174; Daniel Byman, “Counterterrorism and Modern White Supremacy,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (July 27, 2021): 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1956100;
Melissa Eddy, “Far-Right Terrorism Is No. 1 Threat, Germany Is Told after Attack,” New York Times (website),
February 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/world/europe/germany-shooting-terrorism.html;
and Laura Tharsen, “Ethnic Nationalism in Germany,” Philosophia Africana 8, no. 2 (2005): 117–42.
26. Kate Connolly, “Hundreds of Rightwing Extremist Incidents by German Security Services Revealed,”
Guardian (website), October 6, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/06/report-reveals-hundreds
-of-rightwing-extremist-incidents-by-german-security-services.
27. Raphael S. Cohen et al., Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media: Study Overview
and Conclusions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 19, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs
/research_reports/RR4373z1.html, 68.
28. Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer, “Russian Election Interference: Europe’s Counter to Fake News
and Cyber Attacks,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), May 23, 2018, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/russian-election-interference-europe-s-counter-to-fake-news-and-cyber
-attacks-pub-76435.
29. Erika Kinetz, “Neo-Nazis Are Still on Facebook. And They’re Making Money,” ABC News (website),
September 25, 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/neo-nazis-facebook-theyre-making
-money-80225218.
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taken to ensure Russia knew any attempts to sway results or incite distrust
of election results would have far-reaching diplomatic repercussions.
Analysts suggest these preparator y measures successfully deterred
interference. 30 The latter case study concerns elections, which are set and
scheduled events that can be planned in advance. Disinformating content
designed to radicalize individuals and incite violence presents a more nebulous
challenge. Nonetheless, the German case study showcases the potential
of resilience and deterrence measures against threat actors who use
disinformation campaigns.
These localized upswings in REMVE and right-wing domestic terrorism
in Germany are part of a larger transnational trend that poses significant
risks to NATO countries, their security infrastructure, and their citizenry.
Moreover, a failure in many cases to recognize the coordinated campaigns
and organized movements as such, in favor of falsely labeling them
“lone wolf ” attacks, has resulted in these networks’ largely unmonitored
and unchecked growth and expansion into various countries. 31 Loose networks
of REMVEs have coordinated with larger threat actors to conduct inf luence
operations and compromise military members and veterans in many countries. 32
Understanding these networks, their use of disinformation and similar
radicalizing content, and the impact of their radicalization efforts is a vital
step in mitigating the adverse effects of disinformation and preventing the
spread of dangerous ideologies through critical military infrastructures.
REMVE extremists have found external allies in Russia. The mutually
beneficial relationship between these entities has allowed both to leverage
disinformation and conspiracy content to affect, radicalize, and impact military

30. Brattberg and Maurer, “Russian Election Interference.”
31.

Belew and Gutiérrez, White Supremacy.

32. Tim Lister, “The Nexus between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine,”
CTC (website), April 28, 2020), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-extremists-in
-the-united-states-and-ukraine/; “Canadian Report Warns of Extremist Infiltration in Military,”
ABC News (website), accessed May 12, 2022, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/canadian
-report-warns-extremist-infiltration-military-84301400; Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Joseph Stabile,
“Confronting Russia’s Role in Transnational White Supremacist Extremism,” Just Security (website),
February 6, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational
-white-supremacist-extremism/; and Simon Purdue, “The Other Epidemic: White Supremacists in Law
Enforcement,” Open Democracy (website), August 6, 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering
-radical-right/other-epidemic-white-supremacists-law-enforcement/.
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forces in various NATO and NATO-aligned countries. 33 The exact relationship
between these groups and national threat actors like Russia is still debated,
but they have deliberately borrowed Russian active-measure tactics for
their aims. REMVE disinformation, like other types of disinformation,
f lourishes when trust in traditional institutions is low, when there
is an “overload” of information from the many sources available to users,
and when the target audience is primed to accept disinformation as truth
because of their cultural, social, and political beliefs. 34

COVID-19 Disinformation and al-Shabaab
In 2020, al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based al-Qaeda aff iliate,
warned Muslims in East Africa about the infectious COVID-19 virus,
stating it has been spread “by the crusader forces who have invaded the country
and the disbelieving countries that support them.” 35 After a gathering
of approximately 100 elders and tribal leaders that discussed the state
of terror activities in East Africa, al-Shabaab issued a communique that blamed
COVID-19 on Western powers’ past and present military interventions.
From the beginning of the pandemic, the group targeted Muslims in Somalia
and Kenya with disinformation that questioned the government’s capacity
to keep the public safe and blamed diseases like HIV and the novel coronavirus
on Western militaries. 36 Unlike other powerful extremist groups in Africa
33. Hijacking Our Heroes: Exploiting Veterans through Disinformation on Social Media: Hearings before
the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Vladimir Barash, science director,
Graphika), https://veterans.house.gov/events/hearings/full-committee-hearing-hijacking-our-heroes-exploiting
-veterans-through-disinformation-on-social-media; and John D. Gallacher et al., “Data Memo No.
2017.9: Junk News on Military Affairs and National Security: Social Media Disinformation Campaigns
against US Military Personnel and Veterans,” Programme on Democracy & Technology (website),
October 9, 2017, https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/junk-news-on-military-affairs-and-national
-security/.
34. Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online (New York:
Data & Society Research Institute, May 15, 2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05
/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf; Whitney Phillips and
Ryan M. Milner, You Are Here: A Field Guide for Navigating Polarized Speech, Conspiracy Theories, and Our
Polluted Media Landscape (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2021); Edson C.
Tandoc Jr., Tools of Disinformation: How Fake News Gets to Deceive (Singapore: Springer, 2020), 35–46,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_3; Shuo Tang, Lars Willnat, and Hongzhong Zhang,
“Fake News, Information Overload, and the Third-Person Effect in China,” Global Media and China
6, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 492–507, https://doi.org/10.1177/20594364211047369; and Alena Bermes,
“Information Overload and Fake News Sharing: A Transactional Stress Perspective Exploring the
Mitigating Role of Consumers’ Resilience during COVID-19,” Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 61
(July 1, 2021): 102555, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2021.102555.
35. “Coronavirus: Fighting al-Shabab Propaganda in Somalia,” BBC News, April 1, 2020, https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-africa-52103799.
36. “Snapshot: How Extremist Groups Are Responding to Covid-19,” Tony Blair Institute for Global
Change (website), April 9, 2020, https://institute.global/policy/snapshot-how-extremist-groups-are-responding
-covid-19-9-april-2020.
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(for example, Boko Haram), al-Shabaab acknowledged the severity and
threat COVID-19 posed to public health instead of claiming the pandemic
was a hoax or the adherence to their extreme version of religion would keep its
practitioners safe from the virus. 37 However, al-Shabaab, like other extremist
religious organizations, did actively manipulate public discontent over the
closure of religious congregations to incite anger against the government and
lockdown efforts to curb the spread of COVID-19. 38
To complicate these matters, mid-pandemic, the group opened public
health facilities in competition with government-run sites. 39 They publicized
the creation and operation of these sites to prove they were a viable alternative
to government services and highlight the weaknesses of official international
and domestic COVID-19 responses.40 Scholars observe that when extremist
organizations set up and provide alternative or stopgap social services
in competition with government services, the results are often mixed and lack
the stability needed to ensure persistent and accessible support—and rarely,
if ever, supersede the violent activities of the group.41 The extent to which
al-Shabaab’s medical centers were effective responses to the COVID-19
pandemic is debatable. It is clear, however, that they leveraged their
coverage of this action as a form of propaganda for their group and as a form
of disinformation to decrease institutional trust in government measures.42

37. Yusuf Anka, “Abubakar Shekau Mocks World Leaders And Derides Social Distancing in New
Audio Message,” HumAngle Media (website), April 15, 2020, https://humanglemedia.com/abubakar
-shekau-mocks-world-leaders-and-derides-social-distancing-in-new-audio-message/.
38. Abdullahi Abdille Shahow, “Al-Shabab’s Territory in Somalia Is a COVID-19 Powder Keg,”
World Politics Review (website), May 1, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28726
/in-al-shabab-s-territory-in-east-africa-pandemic-could-spread-like-wildf ire; and “Coronavirus:
Fighting al-Shabab.”
39. Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia’s Islamist Group al Shabaab Says Sets up COVID-19 Treatment Centre,”
Reuters (website), June 12, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-somalia
-idUSKBN23J32C.
40. Christopher Hockey and Michael Jones, “The Limits of ‘Shabaab-CARE’: Militant Governance
amid COVID-19,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 6 ( June 29, 2020), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-limits-of-shabaab
-care-militant-governance-amid-covid-19/.
41. Pierre-Emmanuel Ly, “The Charitable Activities of Terrorist Organizations,” Public Choice 131,
no. 1/2 (2007): 177–95; and Emilia Columbo and Marielle Harris, “Commentary: Extremist Groups
Stepping Up Operations during the Covid-19 Outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa,” CSIS (website),
May 1, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/extremist-groups-stepping-operations-during-covid-19
-outbreak-sub-saharan-africa.
42.
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At the same time, al-Shabaab used the instability of the pandemic to increase
violent attacks and operational activity.43
As with most disinformating material, al-Shabaab’s campaigns leveraged
already present vulnerabilities in the target—in this case, a lack of adequate
health-care resources, discontent over Western involvement in the region,
and diaspora isolation and frustration—with false material that inf lamed
already present sentiment regarding real concerns and issues.44 As the pandemic
advanced, the group continued to use disinformation campaigns to mock the
weaknesses of the region’s health-care infrastructure and inf lame the public’s
fear of the virus.45 When vaccines became available, al-Shabaab took steps
to compromise faith in the official measures and vaccination campaigns,
spreading rumors that the vaccine was a conspiracy to decrease fertility.
Social media posts spread by al-Shabaab via YouTube, chatrooms, and Twitter
claimed the vaccine contained pig products, would kill Muslim children,
decrease women’s fertility, and was designed by Western countries to decrease
the Somalian population.46 This instance is not the first where vaccine and
public-health measures have been targeted by al-Shabaab; the group spread
similar rumors about the polio vaccine in 2014.47
43. Stephanie Carver and Samantha Kruber, “To Act, or Not? Al-Shabaab’s Response to a Covid-19
Crisis in Somalia,” Interpreter (website), May 15, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter
/act-or-not-al-shabaab-s-response-covid-19-crisis-somalia; and Eren Ersozoglu, “Al-Shabaab in the Age
of COVID-19,” Grey Dynamics (website), April 15, 2021, https://www.greydynamics.com/al-shabaab-in
-the-age-of-covid-19/.
44. Anne Speckhard, Othman Mahamud, and Molly Ellenberg, “When Religion and Culture Kill:
COVID-19 in the Somali Diaspora Communities in Sweden,” Homeland Security Today (website),”
April 4, 2020, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/when-religion-and-culture-kill
-covid-19-in-the-somali-diaspora-communities-in-sweden/; and Timothy A. Sikorski, Airwaves and
Microblogs: A Statistical Analysis of Al-Shabaab’s Propaganda Effectiveness (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, 2014).
45. Abdullahi Abdille Shahow, “Al-Shabab’s Territory in Somalia Is a COVID-19 Powder Keg,”
World Politics Review (website), May 1, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28726/in-al
-shabab-s-territory-in-east-africa-pandemic-could-spread-like-wildfire; “Snapshot: How Extremist
GroupsAre Responding”; and Columbo and Harris, “Extremist Groups Stepping up Operations.”
46. Abjata Khalif, “Kenya: The Women Resisting Al-Shabaab’s War on Covid-19 Vaccines,”
Nation (website), July 6, 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202107060099.html; Emma Ogao,
“Use Honey Instead of COVID Vaccines, Al-Qaeda Backed Militants Say,” Vice (website), April 8, 2021,
https://www.vice.com/en/article/5dbmpq/al-shabaab-somalia-covid-vaccine-anti-vax; Abjata Khalif,
“The Kenyan Women Resisting Al-Shabaab’s War on Vaccines,” Evening Standard (website), July 26, 2021,
https://w w w.standard.co.uk /optimist/vaccine-world/kenyan-women-al-shabaab-war-on-covid19
-vaccines-b942939.html; and Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword,”
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Technology and Terrorism 20, no. 2 (July 26, 2018), http://bjwa.brown.edu/20
-2/al-shabaab-and-social-media-a-double-edged-sword/.
47. Abdi Guled, “In Somalia, Polio Vaccines Rejected over Rumours Spread by Islamic Extremists,”
CTV News (website), June 1, 2013, https://www.ctvnews.ca/health/health-headlines/in-somalia-polio
-vaccines-rejected-over-rumours-spread-by-islamic-extremists-1.1306774.
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Al-Shabaab has an established history of using social media and
disinformation to reach and target enemy soldiers and international
audiences successfully. Beginning on Internet forums, the group moved
to Twitter and YouTube to recruit and spread videos of violence as propaganda
(such as their high-profile attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi,
Kenya, in 2013). Since the group’s rise to prominence in 2007—partly due
to the growth of online life and technologies at the time—al-Shabaab has
used the Internet effectively to fundraise, recruit, and incite violence.48
This success means they have decades of experience leveraging social media
and online networks to inf luence operations. These activities have
targeted their base in Somalia and Kenya and diaspora populations
across other countries.49
Responses to al-Shabaab’s disinformation have ranged from large social
media bans and content moderation to localized efforts to engage community
partners. After live-tweeting and taking responsibility on Twitter for an attack
and siege on Nairobi’s Westgate mall, Twitter banned all al-Shabaab accounts
and content. Analysts report these bans to have limited impact as banned
users can quickly make new accounts. Content moderation in languages other
than English also remains limited. 50 These limitations are not unique to the
al-Shabaab case. They are compounded by the low institutional trust and
low literacy levels found in the regions al-Shabaab inf luences and controls. 51
A potentially more effective means of combating al-Shabaab’s
disinformation came from localized efforts in rural areas to engage
elders and other sources of regional authority. Early in the pandemic,
48.

Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab and Social Media.”

49. Dominic Pkalya, “Kenyan Stakeholders Call for Implementation of Local Action Plans to Stem
Youth Radicalisation and Extremism,” Strong Cities Network (blog), January 15, 2021, https://strongcitiesnetwork
.org/en/kenyan-stakeholders-call-for-implementation-of-local-action-plans-to-stem-youth-radicalisation
-and-extremism/.
50. Mathew Ingram, “The Media Today: The Challenges of Global Content Moderation,”
Columbia Journalism Review (website), June 10, 2021, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/the-challenges-of
-global-content-moderation.php; Delia Marinescu, “Facebook’s Content Moderation Language Barrier,”
New America (website), September 8, 2021, http://newamerica.org/the-thread/facebooks-content-moderation
-language-barrier/; Sara Correia, “Regulating Terrorist Content on Social Media: Automation and the Rule
of Law,” International Journal of Law in Context 15, no. 2 (2019): 183; “Moderating Extremism: The State
of Online Terrorist Content Removal Policy in the United States,” Homeland Security Today (website),
December 20, 2021, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/moderating-extremism
-the-state-of-online-terrorist-content-removal-policy-in-the-united-states/; and Neal Ungerleider,
“Despite Ban, YouTube Is Still a Hotbed of Terrorist Group Video Propaganda,” Fast Company (website),
November 12, 2010, https://www.fastcompany.com/1701383/despite-ban-youtube-still-hotbed-terrorist
-group-video-propaganda.
51. “Women on the Frontline: Delivering COVID-19 Vaccines on the Kenya-Somalia Border,”
Gavi (website), April 16, 2021, https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/women-frontline-delivering-covid-19
-vaccines-kenya-somalia-border.
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analysts suggested a widespread alliance between public-health workers
and Muslim religious leaders to help combat disinformation and resistance
to lockdown, social distancing, and other public-health measures. 52
To a certain extent, the alliance was attempted. However, the most salient
examples of success in the face of terrorist disinformation have come
from localized efforts to engage traditional sources of local authority and
social capital.
When hospitals and dispensaries on the Kenyan-Somalia border closed,
local women mobilized to deliver medical care and provide updated health
information and vaccines to their communities and others through local and
personal contacts. Women and their local networks throughout Somalia
and Kenya have been at the forefront of combating terrorist disinformation
through house-to-house information campaigns, radio interview broadcasts,
village visits, and public forums like markets and village events. 53 By speaking
to key traditional leaders like elders and religious authorities and building
rapport through everyday interactions across communities, these women have
successfully countered terrorist narratives by working within the networks
where disinformation is likely to spread. These successes are limited by the
resources these women can access and the danger and retaliation they face
working against al-Shabaab’s narratives. They continue to request security
protection and now solar-power systems and coolers crucial for storing and
transporting the vaccine.” 54

Analysis
Stopping disinformation is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The nature
of modern information systems ensures there will always be false information
circulating online. Disinformation has proven to be an efficient weapon against
individuals, nations, and democratic processes, and it is unlikely that threat
actors will abandon the tactic. This is not to say that countries, social media
platforms, and international bodies should not cease efforts to deplatform
disinformation creators, create policies and requirements for content hosts
and platforms, or moderate harmful online posts, but that these efforts are
ultimately reactive. These solutions also require substantial coordination
with and regulation of private social media platforms, which brings in issues
52.
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53. Abjata Khalif, “The Kenyan Women Resisting Al-Shabaab’s War on Vaccines,” Evening Standard
(website), July 26, 2021, https://www.standard.co.uk/optimist/vaccine-world/kenyan-women-al-shabaab-war
-on-covid19-vaccines-b942939.html.
54.
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of government overreach, free speech, and the extensive manpower
commitment that comprehensive content moderation requires.
Currently, the international community and the countries discussed
above cannot address the disinformation threat as it exists with merely
reactive means. Solutions like social media content bans, fact-checking,
and taking down platforms have been implemented in a patchwork manner
and require continuous investment in resources to determine what is and
is not false information. Moderators scramble to keep up with the f lexible and
changing nature of the online information ecosystem, and automated content
moderation notoriously has difficulty protecting freedom of expression and
vulnerable users. 55 Multiple studies have indicated that content moderation
is limited by its focus on English language posts—leaving large amounts
of content unmonitored—and that moderation standards are applied unevenly
across different terrorist groups. 56
Disinformating actors are adept at avoiding bans with “dog whistles,”
which is speech that seems innocuous and forgettable to the general public
but simultaneously communicates “hidden meaning to fellow far-right
sympathizers.” Take, for example, the creative presentation of banned words,
such as representing the word “Vaccine” with “V—cc—n3” to avoid automatic

55. Heidi Tworek, “History Explains Why Global Content Moderation Cannot Work,” Brookings Tech
Stream (website), December 10, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/history-explains-why-global
-content-moderation-cannot-work/; Jillian C. York and Corynne McSherry, “Content Moderation Is Broken.
Let Us Count the Ways,” Electronic Frontier Foundation (website), April 29, 2019, https://www.eff.org
/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways; Thiago Dias Oliva, Dennys Marcelo
Antonialli, and Alessandra Gomes, “Fighting Hate Speech, Silencing Drag Queens? Artificial Intelligence
in Content Moderation and Risks to LGBTQ Voices Online,” Sexuality & Culture 25, no. 2 (April 1,
2021): 700–732, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-020-09790-w; Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns, and
Christian Katzenbach, “Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the
Automation of Platform Governance,” Big Data & Society 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 2053951719897945,
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719897945; Elizabeth Stewart, “Detecting Fake News: Two Problems
for Content Moderation,” Philosophy & Technology 34, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 923–40, https://doi.org/10.1007
/s13347-021-00442-x; and Emma J. Llansó, “No Amount of ‘AI’ in Content Moderation Will Solve
Filtering’s Prior-Restraint Problem,” Big Data & Society 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 2053951720920686,
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951720920686.
56. Ángel Díaz and Laura Hecht-Felella, “Research & Reports: Double Standards in Social Media
Content Moderation,” Brennan Center for Justice (website), August 4, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org
/our-work/research-reports/double-standards-social-media-content-moderation.
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f lagging and numerous backup accounts. 57 In addition, researchers of online
extremism have noted the phenomenon that occurs as everyday users are
deplatformed for nonviolent content. They often travel to more “fringe” sites
where they are exposed progressively to more extreme content. 58 The current
state of anti-disinformation measures has failed to curb the spread or effects
of disinformation with any consistency.
Reactive measures may also potentially threat users’ freedom of expression
and the ability to engage with political discourse. Governments and
political leaders have claimed “fake news” when faced with criticism
from journalists or citizens. State-sponsored disinformation is turned
against citizens as it is weaponized against other countries. 59
Governments have used reactive measures like deplatforming, bans,
and criminalization against political opponents as a way to keep them
from organizing or voicing dissent. 60 Since 2018, journalists and
human-rights scholars have noted the trend wherein various governments
57. Prashanth Bhat and Ofra Klein, “Covert Hate Speech: White Nationalists and Dog Whistle
Communication on Twitter,” in Twitter, the Public Sphere, and the Chaos of Online Deliberation,
ed. Gwen Bouvier and Judith E. Rosenbaum (Cham, CH: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 151–72,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41421-4_7; Sarah Myers West, “Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned:
User Interpretations of Content Moderation on Social Media Platforms,” New Media & Society 20,
no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 4366–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818773059; Mathilda Åkerlund,
“Dog Whistling Far-Right Code Words: The Case of ‘Culture Enricher’ on the Swedish Web,”
Information, Communication & Society 25, no. 12 (February 23, 2021): 1808–25, https://www.tandfonline
.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1889639; and Ysabel Gerrard, “Beyond the Hashtag: Circumventing
Content Moderation on Social Media,” New Media & Society 20, no. 12 (December 1, 2018): 4492–4511,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818776611.
58. Ryan Greer, “Insights: Weighing the Value and Risks of Deplatforming,” Global Network on Extremisn
& Technology (website), May 11, 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/05/11/weighing-the-value-and-risks
-of-deplatforming/; and Network Contagion Research Institute and Anti-Defamation League’s Center
on Extremism, “When Twitter Bans Extremists, GAB Puts Out the Welcome Mat,” ADL Blog Online:
Hate & Harassment (website), March 11, 2019, https://www.adl.org/blog/when-twitter-bans-extremists-gab
-puts-out-the-welcome-mat.
59. David M. Beskow and Kathleen M. Carley, “Characterization and Comparison of Russian and
Chinese Disinformation Campaigns,” in Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News in Social Media:
Emerging Research Challenges and Opportunities, Lecture Notes in Social Networks Series, ed. Kai Shu et al.
(Cham, CH: Springer, 2020), 63–81; Savvas Zannettou et al., “Disinformation Warfare: Understanding
State-Sponsored Trolls on Twitter and Their Influence on the Web,” in Companion Proceedings of the 2019
World Wide Web Conference (San Francisco: Association for Computing Machinery, May 2019), 218–26,
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3308560.3316495; and Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard,
“The Global Organization of Social Media Disinformation Campaigns,” Journal of International Affairs 71,
no. 1.5 (2018): 23–32.
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“Censorious Governments Are Abusing ‘Fake News’ Laws: The Pandemic Is Giving Them an Excuse to Gag
Reporters,” Economist (website), February 13, 2021, https://www.economist.com/international/2021/02/11
/censorious-governments-are-abusing-fake-news-laws.

87

Ward

have rushed “fake news” laws and subsequently used them to imprison and
silence critique, political expression, and reporting. 61
Therefore, the following analysis and recommendations focus on proactive
measures that may better address the threat of disinformation. It analyzes
the threat posed by content created and spread by terrorist networks.
Reactive measures should not be discarded entirely, and the
below recommendations ref lect reactive measures to be used in tandem
with proactive approaches. As we acknowledge disinformation’s inescapable
presence in the current information ecosystem, the focus should instead
turn to addressing and mitigating disinformation’s ability to be weaponized
strategically. If disinformation is here to stay, how might it be defanged?
Before addressing how disinformation may be rendered less effective,
it is necessary to understand why disinformation is effective. It is here
that the featured case studies become illustrative. Disinformation plays
into the audience’s preexisting desires, anxieties, and values in order to seem
credible where it would otherwise not be. 62 Disinformation is most effective
when it says something people feel is true—it leverages confirmation bias,
that is, their tendency to interpret new data as confirmation of already existing
beliefs. 63 The methods through which this is spread also play a role and are
one of the reasons why threat actors target online communities and spaces
of online engagement. Credibility is determined not by any given source
for the information but by the virality of the content—meaning the
likes, reposts, and shares any given piece of content has collected. 64
Disinformation also becomes potent on social media, where users are exposed
to false content by people they trust and know personally.
This method of disinformation is one of the reasons REMVE ideologies
are such a threat to military, security, and law enforcement communities.
In the Germany case study, the security communities have historically
been, and often still are, dominated by white men. The military and law
enforcement professions are commonly perceived to be important and crucial
to society. REMVE disinformation and conspiracy content warns of the
61. Mchangama, “Censorious Governments”; and Caroline Lees, “Fake News: The Global Silencer:
The Term Has Become a Useful Weapon in the Dictator’s Toolkit against the Media. Just Look at the
Philippines,” Index on Censorship 47, no. 1 (April 1, 2018): 88–91, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306422018769578.
62. Tom Buchanan, “Why Do People Spread False Information Online? The Effects of Message
and Viewer Characteristics on Self-Reported Likelihood of Sharing Social Media Disinformation,”
PLOS ONE 15, no. 10 (October 7, 2020): e0239666, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239666.
63. Tandoc, Tools of Disinformation, 35–46.
64.
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end of this dominance and the subsequent weakening of a community’s
strength through “feminization” or the loss of homogeneity. 65 This content
leverages an audience’s existing anxieties about shifts in gender roles and
racial demographics and distorts these normal changing conditions
into existential threats. This distortion is where terms like “white genocide”
may be explicit or couched within dog whistles about “declining birth rates
among white women.”
Similarly, memes present images of “feminized” men to be laughed
at and compared with historically, and white, soldiers from past wars who
supposedly exemplified traditional masculine traits and were emblematic
of those successful conf licts. 66 Because REMVE disinformation extols
examples of traditional masculinity and physical prowess—while positioning
immigration and increasing civil rights for women, LGBTQIA members,
and racial minorities as threats to those examples—disinformation coming
from these spaces may find fertile ground in fields that have historically been
dominated by white men and given high status within society.
Likewise, COVID-19 disinformation in the al-Shabaab case study was
specifically designed to resonate with the preexisting resentment against
Western military interventions, low trust in the Somalian government and
its health-care system, and the isolation and instability experienced by the
Somalian diaspora. Disinformating content that argued the government
would do little to help their population survive the pandemic and that people
should look to al-Shabaab instead, and then content that claimed international
vaccination efforts were designed to depopulate Somalia and destroy Muslims,
was directed at an already primed audience. Unique to the al-Shabaab case
is how informal public-health advocates could reach this already primed
audience and mitigate disinformation’s effect on the ground. The women
in Somalia and Kenya who mobilized to offset the reach of al-Shabaab’s
disinformation campaigns are a model for other countries and a potential ally
for stakeholders interested in the East African case.
The following recommendations are formed from these observations and
take the task of preventative measures against weaponized disinformation
seriously. Because the online information landscape can impact and affect
how various critical infrastructures operate, weaponized disinformation that
compromises this information landscape is a significant threat. Moreover,
65. Jessica Johnson, “The Self-radicalization of White Men: ‘Fake News’ and the Affective Networking
of Paranoia,” Communication Culture & Critique 11, no. 1 (2018): 100–15.
66. Nellie Bowles, “ ‘Replacement Theory,’ A Racist, Sexist Doctrine, Spreads in Far-Right Circles,”
New York Times (website), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html.
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the networked and nebulous nature of this information landscape makes
it difficult to isolate with confidence the source of disinformation and its
harmful effects on any given infrastructure. For this reason, this chapter
structures recommendations on Janis Sarts’ four layers of responsibility
that prioritizes preemptive and f lexible measures that can help curb
terrorist-sponsored disinformation’s ability to deceive and incite violence.

Four Layers of Responsibility
Sarts reiterates the above by explaining that the “contemporary
information environment has created a favorable space for the spread
of hostile disinformation campaigns.”67 Their four layers of responsibility
are prescriptive steps for creating a space where disinformation campaigns
are not as effective. Sarts’ prescriptive layers are not entirely self-contained,
and investment in one will aid the development of others. This method
allows countries to invest as they are capable and develop these layers,
building on one another.
The first layer is “awareness,” which includes governments and national
bodies maintaining a c lear and accurate picture of the information space
their citizens and state agents exist and engage with—and this can be done
without surveillance overreach by consistent coordination and investment
in academic scholarship and nonprofit research. States should always stay
abreast of the echo chambers existing across information ecosystems,
what actors are participating in and for what purpose, and what organic
and nonorganic inf luences are at play in any given online social space.
This surveillance also includes monitoring what organized troll networks
exist in a country’s information space. This awareness may seem obvious,
but REMVE networks in the above case study have expanded online
unmonitored in the last two decades, increasing their capacity and resources
to do harm because governments ignored warnings. 68
Governing bodies should examine their cultural positionality to ensure
key threats are not underestimated and resource allocation is based on realistic
risk metrics. By developing accurate awareness of a country’s information
space, these decisions can be made with confidence. States and international
agencies should invest in effective awareness tools and partnerships
with researchers that allow them to understand how national and
67. Sarts, “Disinformation as a Threat to National Security.”
68. Phillips and Milner, You Are Here; Daniel Byman, Spreading Hate; Meier, “Germany’s White
Supremacist Problem; Reitman, “U.S. Law Enforcement Failed”; and German, Hidden in Plain Sight.
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international extremist groups are networked and operate to radicalize
new online spaces. Tools should include consistent training and education
for members of security communities and other critical infrastructures who
are likely to be targeted. This curriculum should cover the threat emerging
terrorist groups pose, and how these networks use false content to leverage
common biases and grievances found in those spaces.
The second layer, labeled “government coordination and capability
development” by Sart, is designed to set protocols and reactive measures
preemptively to combat hostile and damaging disinformation campaigns
when detected and target critical infrastructures. These protocols can
ensure that when disinformation is detected, there is a standard process
to address its effects instead of patchwork or inconsistent responses that
may only confuse the information space. 69 In 2018, Sweden reported
the success of their “psychological defense” authority that would focus
on election-related disinformation, amplify independently verif ied
information, and confront inf luence operations “as a form of consumer
protection.” 70 Their focus on coordination between various levels of government,
civil society institutions, and independent expert communities was released
to the public and allowed consistent messaging while mitigating the potential
for any government monopoly on political narratives. As disinformation
leverages chaos, fear, and confusion, effective protocols will include clear
messaging and transparency.
Moreover, the second aspect of this layer speaks to the potential
for governments to expand their ability to reach those directly affected
by disinformation on the ground, as seen in the second case study.
The Somalia case study provides an excellent example of the potential
for expanded coordination and capability. The Somalian women running
local efforts to combat terrorist-sponsored disinformation have openly
communicated the support and protection they require to continue their
anti-disinformation measures and public-health work—support that could
come in the form of international military support and resources
69. Cohen et al., Combating Foreign Disinformation; and Shuo Tang, Lars Willnat, and Hongzhong Zhang,
“Fake News, Information Overload, and the Third-Person Effect in China,” Global Media and China 6, no. 4
(2021): 492–507.
70. Adela Suliman, “Sweden Sets Up Psychological Defense Agency to Fight Fake News, Foreign
Interference,” Washington Post (website), January 6, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01
/06/sweden-fake-news-psychological-defence-agency/; and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Effective State
Practices against Disinformation: Four Country Case Studies, Hybrid CoE Research Report 2 (Helsinki: European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, July 2021), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content
/uploads/2021/07/20210709_Hybrid_CoE_Research_Report_2_Effective_state_practices_against
_disinformation_WEB.pdf.
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for infrastructure development of their efforts.71 By coordinating with and
learning from those who have successfully combated terrorist disinformation
on the ground, international military and governing agencies can protect
vital infrastructures without alienating the population.72 Personnel tackling
disinformation should look at regional solutions that support those already
doing the work.
The third layer, “society and resilience,” focuses on efforts to inoculate
a population against disinformation effects. Due to disinformation’s penchant
for leveraging individuals’ confirmation bias, this layer can be considered
one of the most important. However, creating resilience against false content
is difficult, and there is no scholarly consensus on this inoculation process.
Many research institutions have posited that media literacy campaigns, training,
and schooling are the solution—and this curriculum works to encourage
critical thinking regarding personal and media bias, identification of credible
sources, and personal accountability in online interactions and behavior.
These relatively new media literacy efforts have yet to yield observable returns
as these efforts have not been implemented widely. Early results indicate that
media literacy and critical thinking alone cannot combat disinformation.
In one study of disinformation-spreading behavior, individuals with low
and high media literacy were just as likely to spread disinformation.73
Nevertheless, other studies produced more encouraging conclusions
documenting that media literacy education, when tailored to be culturally
sensitive and appropriate, has some effect reducing disinformation’s credibility.74
71. “Fostering Misinformation Literacy: Runtu Waa Nabad in Somalia,” Sentinel Project (blog),
April 16, 2021, https://thesentinelproject.org/2021/04/16/fostering-misinformation-literacy-runtu-waa
-nabad-in-somalia/; and Khalif, “Kenyan Women.”
72. Bharat Mehra, “Information ACTism in ‘Trumping’ the Contemporary Fake News Phenomenon
in Rural Libraries,” Open Information Science 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 181–96, https://doi.org/10.1515
/opis-2019-0013; and Aaron Bailey-Athias and Abbie Richards, “How to Tackle Mis/Disinformation
with a Human Centred Approach,” ODI (website), 2021, https://odi.org/en/insights/how-to-tackle
-misdisinformation-with-a-human-centred-approach/.
73.

Buchanan, “Why Do People Spread False Information Online?”
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between Mainstream and False News in the United States and India,” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 117, no. 27 ( July 7, 2020): 15536–45, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1920498117;
Michael Hameleers, “Separating Truth from Lies: Comparing the Effects of News Media Literacy
Interventions and Fact-Checkers in Response to Political Misinformation in the US and Netherlands,”
Information, Communication & Society 25, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 110–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/136
9118X.2020.1764603; Melissa Tully, Emily K. Vraga, and Leticia Bode, “Designing and Testing News
Literacy Messages for Social Media,” Mass Communication and Society 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2020):
22–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2019.1604970; and Yoori Hwang, Ji Youn Ryu, and
Se-Hoon Jeong, “Effects of Disinformation Using Deepfake: The Protective Effect of Media Literacy
Education,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 24, no. 3 (March 1, 2021): 188–93,
https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0174.
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Anyone combating terrorist-sponsored disinformation should
consider multipronged approaches that increase media literacy and trust
in government and nongovernment institutions. As discussed previously,
disinformation is adept at leveraging a population’s fear, isolation, distrust, and
grievance into acts of violence against individuals, groups, and both government
and nongovernment institutions. In a European Centre of Excellence
for Countering Hybrid Threats comparison of successful information-resilience
measures, countries with the highest index ratings for institutional trust and
accessible civil life were the least affected by coordinated disinformation
campaigns.75 Studies suggest that providing transparency into government
operation, protecting and supporting a free press, and facilitating accessible
civic participation will have a curative effect on one of the main drivers
of disinformation’s success—the lack of instit utiona l tr ust. 76
Finally, governments should look to areas with alternative forms of authority
(such as regional, cultural, or religious institutions) and seek partnerships
with those who work daily with the populations they wish to address.
The fourth layer, the development of regulatory frameworks with tech
platforms, stabilizes the information landscape and creates agreed-upon
norms for online socialization and content moderation. Large social media
companies like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok have explicit bans on terrorist
content on their platforms. However, the extent to which this content still
circulates speaks to the limits of social media bans and content moderation.
It also presents an accountability problem, as these corporations have little
fiscal incentive to moderate often-profitable disinformation, and efforts to fine
these companies for violating national content-hosting laws pale in comparison
to profit potential of disinformating material.77 As disinformation is hosted
and spread through these companies’ platforms, coordination is required
in some facet. These partnerships should be designed with regulatory oversight
and shared responsibility to protect users’ rights to safety and privacy.
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76. Tarun Khanna, Trust: Creating the Foundation for Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries
(Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2018); and William D. Eggers et al., “Rebuilding Trust
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March 9, 2021, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/building-trust
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77. Denise Clifton, “Here’s Why Facebook and Twitter Aren’t Stopping the Flood of False and Toxic
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Recommendations
The recommendations below are distilled from the above. Intergovernmental
alliances (such as NATO and other organizations) can encourage their members
to adopt the following recommendations under the premise that an effective
response might involve:
 Investment in intelligence and accurate mapping of the online
information ecosystem that actively monitors known and
emerging threat actors
 Awareness about disinformation threats on various levels,
not just nationally, but also provincially, regionally, and locally
 State readiness and messaging protocols if disinformation
targets key critical infrastructures
 Engagement with civil society organizations and experts
from industry, civil society, and academia when creating and
implementing legal, educational, regulatory, or structural
solutions to disinformation
 Consistent coordination with trusted forms of authority
on the ground (such as religious and cultural leaders) to better
understand the regional impact of disinformation and how
it might be addressed
 Efforts to increase resilience against disinformation
through critical-thinking education like media literacy and
digital education curriculum at all ages.
 Support for accessible and quality independent journalism
in terms of funding, transparency protocols, and open f low
of information
 Interorganization codes of conduct that pose consequences
for those that knowingly create or spread disinformation
 Cooperative and regulatory relationships with social media
companies to address how false content will be handled while
ensuring the protection of users’ safety and rights to privacy

94

Chapter 4

Terrorism, Disinformation, and Information Critical Infrastructure

Conclusion
Disinformation will likely continue to be a part of the modern information
ecosystem for as long as people interact online, and it will also likely
be weaponized by threat actors to compromise the military response capability
and incite instability. Intergovernmental organizations, like NATO,
can provide guidance and resources to countries seeking to secure their
online information infrastructure. The layers of responsibility outlined
in this chapter provide a general approach that an individual country can
tailor to its needs when approaching weaponized disinformation.
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ABSTRACT: Democratic resilience and election integrity are foundational
to NATO’s future success as a military alliance. The Alliance underlined
in the 2022 Strategic Concept an intent to reinforce political unity
and deepen consultations to address all matters that affect security—
including democratic resilience. With election infrastructures being
the backbone of liberal democracies, they are NATO mission critical
infrastructures—with all due respect to national sovereignty. They stand
at the epicenter of NATO adversaries’ activities against the Alliance’s
stability. One weak democracy in NATO can harm the Alliance.
NATO’s active role as a political alliance in creating defense and
democratic resilience against disruptions to critical societal functions
(such as elections and cohesion) is therefore central to a prosperous future
of liberal democracies and the unity of member states.
Key words: election securit y, critical election infrastructures,
societal and democratic resilience

Introduction and Definition
In the last seven years, much strategic discussion has focused
on election integrity in the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom.1
It was mainly a reaction to Russian election interference in the United States,
1. “Die Wahlinfrastruktur aller EU-Mitgliedstaaten muss als kritische Infrastruktur erheblich besser
geschützt werden [The Electoral Infrastructure of All EU Member States as Critical Infrastructure Must
Be Significantly Better Protected],” FDP (German Liberal Party) Election Programme 2021, Summer 2021,
FDP_Programm_Bundestagswahl2021_1.pdf, 52.
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starting in 2014. It was also a response to other civil adversaries’ hackings
and election manipulations (such as the Cambridge Analytica Scandal and
activities conducted by political movements that pay little heed to democratic
values or the rule of law in many member countries of the Alliance).
Discussions centered around the following topics: competition among states
of “great power” as a reason for election interferences, election integrity and
critical election infrastructures being weaponized to fight liberal democracies,
and specific and new types of adversaries: politically motivated terrorism.

Competition of Political Philosophies
The international competition among states has been increasingly
focused on the long-term success of different political systems and political
philosophies (such as China and Russia) but also on newly invented types
of governance in democracies and in NATO member states. In this political
ecosystem, election infrastructures have been leveraged and weaponized
as a strategic instrument of hybrid warfare against other states,
against democracies but also within democracies. This is true for weaker
states like Ukraine and Northern Macedonia but also for superpowers like
the United States. 2

Democracy Depends on Trust of the People
in Election Infrastructures
The discussion on election integrity, especially in the United States,
has mostly centered around the idea of a democracy depending
on the stability of the will of most of the people. They trust in their votes
to be counted correctly and not manipulated. This is seen as a critical pillar
of democratic stability. When a breach of trust occurs in the complex physical
and societal election system, a critical disruption might follow that affects
defense capabilities. In fact, democracies are not governed by one party
or person. They depend on the functionality of a myriad of institutions.
The will of millions of people and the stability of critical infrastructures are
key to their unity. The trust of their constituencies in election infrastructures,
whether critical infrastructures, administrative processes, or political
organizations, is important to the core stability of a Western democracy.
Russian interferences in the 2016 US election caused operational
measures to secure democratic values and infrastructures in the United States.
2. “Ukrainian Election Task Force, Foreign Interference in Ukrainian Democracy,” Atlantic Council
(website), May 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Foreign_Interference
_in_Ukraines_Election.pdf; and Carol V. Evans, “Future Warfare: Weaponizing Critical Infrastructure,”
Parameters 50, no. 2 (Spring 2020), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss2/6/.

98

Chapter 5

Critical Election Infrastructure: Backbone of Democracy with Relevance for NATO?

The possible involvements of Donald Trump in the US Capitol riot
on January 6, 2021, have led to legal investigations against the 45th president
of the United States. Both events have created distrust among US citizens
about the elections, although the US Elections Infrastructure Government
Coordination Council (GCC) announced there was no evidence of any impact
on and interference with the election infrastructure in the 2020 elections. 3
An official reaction to the 2016 events conducted by the authorities was
the classification of election infrastructure, voting systems, the associated
infrastructure, and storage for ballots and equipment as critical infrastructure
in the government facilities sector by the US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in 2017.
Then DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson observed: “Given the vital role elections
play in this country, it is clear that certain systems and assets of election
infrastructure meet the def inition of critical infrastructure, in fact and
in law.”4 Further, he stated:
election infrastructure should be designated as a subsector
of the existing Government Facilities critical infrastructure
sector. As such, election infrastructure belongs now to the
group of critical national infrastructure in the definition
catalogue of NATO. . . . . Particularly in these times, this
designation is simply the right and obvious thing to do. 5
Johnson’s decision put election equipment in a highly protected
strategic category alongside the other 16 critical and vital infrastructures
in the country’s basic operations like power grids and the financial sector. 6
Election infrastructures now have higher awareness and support and better
financing sources available.
This decision to classify election infrastructure came the same day three
of the top intelligence agencies in the United States released unclassified
reports concluding Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a hacking
3. US Government Coordination Council, “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government
Coordinating Council and the Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” CISA,
November 12, 2020.
4. US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “News Archive: Statement by Secretary
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector,”
DHS (website), January 6, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson
-designation-election-infrastructure-critical.
5.

DHS, “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson.”

6. “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” CISA (website), n.d., https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
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campaign against Democratic organizations and officials that eventually aimed
to help elect Donald Trump, who then was considered by Russian officials
as a friend of Russia.7
Following the Department of Homeland Security classif ied election
infrastructure, the US GCC defined critical election infrastructure (CEI)
as follows:
Critical
Election
Infrastructures
includes
voter
registration databases and associated IT-systems as well
as IT-infrastructure and systems used to manage elections
(such as the counting, auditing, and displaying of election
results, and post-election reporting to certify and validate
results), voting systems and associated infrastructure,
additionally storage facilities for election and voting
system infrastructure as well as polling places and early
voting locations.
The definition explicitly does not include political action committees,
campaigns, or any other non-state or local government election related group. 8
Behind the classif ication and specif ic def inition of CEI and the
DHS decision in 2017 stood discoveries from the investigations on the broad
and Russian-backed election campaign interference, starting well before
(2014) and lasting after the 2016 US presidential election.9 The interference
in the 2016 US general election was said to have been unprecedented.
Widespread foreign interference and meddling were reported.
Specifically in 2019, the US Senate Intelligence Committee confirmed all
50 states were subject to some form of attack on their elections process
in 2016.10 Such activity inherently brought increased focus to the 2020 general
election, especially given that Special Counsel Robert Mueller III testified
to Congress (also in 2019) that interference was ongoing and continuing.
7. Yara Bayoumy and Warren Strobel, “U.S. Intel Report: Putin Directed Cyber Campaign to Help
Trump,” Reuters (website), January 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-cyber
-idUSKBN14Q1T8.
8. “Election Security,” DHS (website), n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/topics/election-security.
9. US Congress, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, on Russian Active
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 1: Russian Efforts against Election
Infrastructure with Additional Views, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf, 3.
10. David E. Sanger and Catie Edmonson, “Russia Targeted Election Systems in All 50 States,
Report Finds,” New York Times (website), July 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics
/russian-hacking-elections.html.
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Broader Activities against Democratic Elections Ongoing
In 2020, another election year, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA)
in Brussels—the NATO-independent discussion forum for parliaments
of NATO members and consulting forum for NATO—adopted a resolution
on what they called “the Russian Challenge” and turned their eyes
on other countries and NATO allies rather than only the United States.
The resolution focused on the broader Russian activities and how NATO
could deal with additional aggression conducted by Russia, its affiliates,
and proxies in other regions of NATO and within the territories of NATO
allies. In No. 13 of the resolution, the signatories condemn illegal organization
and holding by Russia of the elections to the State Duma in the annexed
Crimea as well as compelling Ukrainian citizens with illegally issued Russian
passports to take part in elections in the occupied territories in Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.11 The resolution says Russia has also sought
to undermine necessary reforms and interfered in elections in the
Republic of North Macedonia and Montenegro.12 It is therefore
recognized the problem of election integrity does not exist in one state only,
but in many states.

Manifold Types of Adversaries on the Rise
At the same time, recognized types of adversaries and terrorist
attacks against democratic structures and processes have become more
diverse than they were when NATO adopted its 2010 Strategic Concept
in an “age of relative stability.” 13
In that past order, eastern Europe (and potentially Russia) could find
a place while the United States remained as an affirmative European power.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept reads differently.

11. Political Committee, Maintaining NATO’S Focus on the Russian Challenge: Resolution 470
(Brussels: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2021), https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=
/sites/default/files/2021-10/2021%20-%20NATO%20PA%20Resolution%20470%20-%20Russia.pdf.
12. Gerald E. Connolly, “2019 – NATO@70: Why the Alliance Remains Indispensable,” NATO
Parliamentary Assembly (website), October 12, 2019, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2019-nato70
-why-alliance-remains-indispensable-146-pctr-19-e-rev1-fin.
13. Daniel S. Hamilton, ”One Plus Four: What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Should Say, and How
to Achieve It,” Real Instituto Elcano (website), December 17, 2021, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en
/analyses/one-plus-four-what-natos-new-strategic-concept-should-say-and-how-to-achieve-it/.
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Current Situation in NATO
NATO’s Resilience Challenge
The military Alliance needs to anticipate, identify, mitigate, and recover
from attacks with minimum disruptive impacts on the Alliance’s social,
political, and military cohesion. As the current geopolitical competition
for political leadership goes beyond the traditional power play and the
use of hard power, the last 10 years have been primarily about new forms
of governance and livelihoods. Despite this, political systems and the violation
of borders and national territories re-emerged in Europe in 2014
with the invasion of Ukraine and after the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.
This continuing problem became evident within NATO member states
and placed the challenge of strengthening democratic and social resilience
at the center of the new international system and competition after an era
of stability that began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
This age of stability is a paradigm lost. In Europe and elsewhere,
lower trust in institutions, increasing political apathy, and political polarization
and fragmentation takes place. Different kinds of manipulation and
disinformation, especially during electoral campaigns, are on the rise, and
highly polarized societies are the most vulnerable to this. The key challenge
for NATO democracies in the twenty-first century is to find the right means
to protect the democratic freedoms that come with more access to information
and infrastructures while limiting the risks that go along with them.
To adapt to the new situation and the ongoing change in the international
order, the alliance must reaff irm shared values and principles—
the glue binding NATO together and the raison d’être for NATO.14

Democratic Resilience: Foundation of the Cohesion of the Alliance
Within the broad f ield of democratic resilience, the specif ic f ield
of election integrity/election infrastructures is the strategic backbone that
needs to be secured first. In some countries, this area is mostly unguarded
compared to emerging threats. A breach on the other side could cause
a massive disruption. A portion of Germany’s election infrastructures
is exempt because it is not fully digitized and as vulnerable as other
systems have been (for example, in the United States and Estonia, which
14. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Contribution to the
NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO, February 22, 2022), https://www.nato-pa.int
/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2022-03/NATO%20PA%20contribution%20to%20the%202022%20
Strategic%20Concept.pdf.
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have a blockchain-based i-Voting system, and in Northern Europe,
where digitalization has made progress).
At f irst glance, the diversity of election systems in countries and
their vulnerabilities forms a second-tier resilience challenge as it falls
under the scope of national sovereign decisions and responsibilities.
NATO is foremost a military alliance, focusing on the three core tasks
of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative
security, even after the announcement of the renewed NATO 2022 Strategic
Concept at the NATO Summit 2022 in Madrid.15
Nonetheless, with the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty,
NATO members committed themselves to “safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles
of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” 16 By doing so,
they accepted and bound themselves to shared values, including the
Western way of living, rights for the people, and the rule of law
as common denominator among Allied partners. This also makes NATO
a political alliance.
Yet, is there a broader and growing need to implement operationally
a comprehensive concept of resilience to secure those shared values
among NATO members? Does NATO need to strengthen the Alliance’s ability
to anticipate, prevent, and, if necessary, protect against and bounce forward
from disruptions to critical functions of member societies? Does that mean
election security became one of NATO’s core tasks and is essential to the other
three core tasks of NATO as Daniel S. Hamilton and Gerald E. Connolly
of the United States, the president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
have been promoting since the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s 2019 report
on the 70th anniversary of the founding of NATO?17
Such an additional task has not been integrated into allied planning
or operational activities. Comprehensive concepts of resilience haven’t
been implemented beyond country-by-country baseline requirements at the
2022 NATO Summit in Madrid.18 However, the 2022 Strategic Concept
15. Parliamentary Assembly, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.
16. “North Atlantic Treaty, Released to the Press, March 18, 1949,” International Organization 3, no. 2,
(1949): 393–96.
17. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Working Group on a NATO Democratic Resilience Centre
(Brussels: NATO, October 2021), https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files
/2021-11/NATO%20PA%20WORKING%20GROUP%20ON%20A%20NATO%20DEMOCRATIC%20
RESILIENCE%20CENTRE_5.pdf.
18.

Hamilton, ”One Plus Four,” 5.
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refers to the will of the Allies to continue to stand together to defend security,
values, and the democratic way of life to ensure the Alliance’s continued
success only.
The idea for establishing a NATO Democratic Resilience Centre
within NATO Headquarters was promoted by the president of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly. It should provide support to individual Allies,
upon their request, for strengthening societal resilience to resist interference
from hostile actors in the functioning of their democratic institutions and
processes. The idea was not made concrete by the decisions at the Madrid
summit, though 29 out of 30 members of the Parliamentary Assembly and its
resolution No. 466 backed the proposal. The countries who wished to deter
and defend more effectively below the threshold of Article 5 of the treaty did
not have their vote ref lected in a decision.
Does this demonstrated interest of member states, based on a recognized
growing threat and need, lead to a duty of care on the part of NATO,
but at a much lower level than that of the usual NATO missions?

Why NATO Should Care
for Critical Election Infrastructure
Enabling Effective Fulfillment of NATO’s Three Core Tasks
The strongest line of defense against threats are resilient democratic
institutions with robust and transparent accountability mechanisms
that enable NATO’s three core missions to be fulf illed effectively.
Therefore, the heads of state and government of the North Atlantic
Alliance aff irmed in Madrid that national and collective resilience are
an essential basis for credible deterrence and defense, the effective
fulfillment of the Alliance’s three core tasks and vital in efforts to safeguard
societies, populations, and shared values. These democratic values and
institutions upon which the NATO alliance was founded are under pressure
and permanently being investigated from external and internal adversaries.
While NATO members are under permanent surveillance and attacks
conducted by adversaries, they have seen fundamental technological changes
and changes of control in their infrastructures. Most member states are
now owned by private parties and some by adversary state-owned or related
companies (such as the Chinese telecom giant Huawei). The Alliance and
its members and partners face interdependency and large-scale challenges
in all critical infrastructure sectors and the public sector—depending on their
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specific circumstances. Together, they rely much more on cooperation and
coordination between different sectors of society, industry, and technology
than ever before to fulf ill NATO’s three core tasks. Allies and partner
countries with weak protection are vulnerable and threaten the strength
of the Alliance.

Broader and Coordinated Approaches
to Resilience as a National Duty
NATO 2030 Agenda
In another reaction to that ever-growing complex threat landscape,
the NATO 2030 agenda set up an ambitious plan to make sure NATO remains
ready, strong, and united for a new era of increased global competition.
It includes an improved and coordinated resilience approach and the
goal to uphold the rule-based international order. Member states agreed
to develop resilience objectives to guide tailored-by-nation resilience
goals and implementation plans based on more measurable Alliance-wide
resilience objectives. The Allies agreed to strengthen NATO’s relationship
with like-minded partners such as the European Union.

NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué
In the NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué of June 14, 2021,
the heads of participating state and governments agreed on securing the
Alliance and its members from threat actor’s interferences. Russia was identified
as an actor using hybrid actions against NATO, including through proxies.
The attacks identified and included in the NATO document cover attempted
interference in Allied elections and democratic processes, political and
economic pressure and intimidation, widespread disinformation campaigns,
malicious cyber activities, and those of cybercriminals operating from member
states’ territories, including those who target and disrupt critical infrastructure
in NATO countries.19
While the Alliance is already active in the f ield of election security
and has accepted this emerging threat to NATO stability, specific action
is now necessary and has been agreed to with the broader view of democratic
resilience. Critical infrastructure security remains a matter of national

19. “Brussels Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 14 June 2021,” NATO (website), last updated
on July 1, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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security. 20 NATO has expressed in communiques and frameworks that
it is concerned about the broader effects of resilience caused by attacks
on elections, election integrity, and infrastructures in member states
and partner countries. It would be possible for NATO member states
to classif y their election infrastructure as critical infrastructure,
as has been done in the United States. They could also build on political wishes
of European ruling parties (such as Germany’s Free Democratic Party)
that focus on securing election infrastructures across Europe as critical
infrastructures. The next section discusses whether NATO can take the
helm and initiate concrete measures and if so, what these measures could be.

Measures NATO Can Apply to Election Security
NATO could indirectly support democratic resilience in member states
with a few measures. It was also stated in the 2022 Strategic Concept that
consultations shall be deepened to address all matters affecting security.
Additional measures include creating a new framework based on the
2014 Wales Summit Framework Nation Concept, establishing a Democratic
Resilience Centre within NATO, and developing resilience objectives
to guide nationally tailored goals and implementation plans as stated
in the NATO 2030 agenda, but with a specif ic view to critical election
infrastructure.

A New Framework Concept
Based on the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) of the 2014 Wales
Summit, NATO could establish new frameworks. 21 In 2013, the idea
behind the new concept was to enhance collective defense through multinational
cooperation. The concept proved to be successful in all three types
of FNCs that have been established since 2014 (UK-led FNC,
German-led FNC, Italian-led FNC). 22 The basic principle of treaty
planning is that each nation should undertake the task, or tasks, for which
20. “Building Transatlantic Resilience: Why Critical Infrastructure Is a Matter of National Security,”
NATO (website), December 10, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180067.htm;
and “Strengthened Resilience Commitment,” NATO (website), June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm.
21. “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” no. 67, NATO (website), September 5, 2014,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease.
22. Sean Monaghan and Ed Arnold, “Indispensable, NATO’s Framework Nations Concept
beyond Madrid,” CSIS (website), June 27, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/indispensable-natos-framework
-nations-concept-beyond-madrid.
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it is best suited. Certain nations because of their geographic location
or capabilities will conduct appropriate specific missions. 23
The FNC-concept of 2014 encouraged nations within NATO
to work “multinationally for the joint development of forces and
capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by a framework nation.” 24
The concept includes regional FNCs intricately linked to thematic
specializations. While not a new concept, it has proven to be a complex
challenge due to different views and the tendency of states not to give up
on their sovereignty. The concept of an FNC, however, could offer a more
f lexible approach to solve critical problems among member states.
FNCs could also be built on existing NATO Centres of Excellence. 25
In the case of election security, these centres could be the Tallinn-based NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, the Ankara-based NATO
COE DAT, and the Riga-based NATO Strategic Communications Centre
of Excellence. These centres could tack le the challenges relating
to election integrity and the safeguarding of critical election infrastructures—
cyber security and elections as a social process with a specific view to strategic
communications. 26 New work could build on the work already done by the
US GCC that outlined further actions to strengthen the security of elections
and election infrastructures. 27
A thematic FNC could develop best practices and share information
and knowledge. It would offer additional working space and operational and
deployable capability to complement existing COE activities. It could also
work on assessments and shared definitions, checklists, and key performance
indicators to be achieved by member states, safeguarding their critical election
infrastructure from emerging threats. The United States could be viewed
as a key opinion leader (KOL) for inventing the def inition of CEI.
The United States could be joined by Germany, where some politicians
23. C. H. Donnelly, Note by the Secretary of the North Atlantic Defense Committee on the Strategic Concept
for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area (Brussels: NATO, 1949), https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc
/eng/a491201a.pdf.
24. “Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” NATO (website), September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
25.

Monaghan and Arnold, “Indispensable.”

26. Sebastian Bay and Guna Šnore, Protecting Elections: A Strategic Communications Approach
(Riga, LV: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2019), https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads
/pfiles/nato_report_-_protecting_elections_1.pdf.
27. “Election Infrastructure Subsector: Government Coordinating Council Charter,” February 2021,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/gov-facilities-EIS-gcc-charter-2021-508.pdf.
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advocate for a shared CEI-model on a European level. The framework
would include partners from two continents, which could help overcome
differences and individual political views, especially since the United States
and Germany represent two continents’ views on national security based
on shared values.

Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO
In 2019, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly president proposed the
creation of a centre within NATO to coordinate Allied efforts to strengthen
democratic resilience. The recommendation was endorsed by the full
Assembly in resolution 457. The president has placed safeguarding the Alliance’s
shared democratic values at the heart of his presidency. The establishment
of the NATO Democratic Resilience Centre is a key priority. The proposal
is a response to the growing threat to democracies from within and without.
As stated in its founding treaty, NATO is an alliance of democracies,
committed to safeguarding “the freedom, common heritage and civilization
of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law.” 28 Yet, no structure fully dedicated to democratic resilience
exists within NATO.
The centre’s activities would be centered around two broad lines
of effort safeguarding critical election infrastructures. First, it would monitor
and identify challenges to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
among member states. Second, it would facilitate democracy and governance
assistance to member states on a voluntary basis. The centre could assist
member-state governments to improve election integrity and other governance
challenges undermining democracy and making member states vulnerable
to external malign inf luence. 29 This centre could be the place to exchange
information on a trusted basis and help member states better understand the
vulnerabilities of critical election infrastructures.

Future Definition of Critical Election Infrastructure
The first job of the centre would be creating a NATO-wide definition
of critical election infrastructure. The US definition of CEI is currently based
on lessons learned and results from investigations in 2017. The public knows
the Russian campaign included the following tools, events, and actions from the
2016 presidential election. Theses actions included hacking state voter databases
28.

“North Atlantic Treaty,” 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

29. “Working Group on NATO Democratic Resilience Centre, Origins and Purpose.”
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for insecurities and hacking e-mails of the Hillary Clinton campaign, the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and the Democratic
National Committee. 30 It also included hacking attempts on e-mails
from Senator Marco Rubio’s campaign and the Republican National
Committee, releasing politically damaging information about certain candidates
on the Internet and spreading propaganda on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube,
and Instagram. The interference also included using fake social media
profiles to invite people to events and stage rallies in Florida and Pennsylvania,
set up meetings with members of the Trump campaign and associates,
and f loat business propositions for a skyscraper in Moscow dedicated to the
Trump Organization. 31
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) oversaw analyzing
evidence gathered by Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, who discovered
Russian actors scanned databases for vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions,
and, in a small number of cases, successfully penetrated voter registration
databases. The SSCI also discovered the final goal of the interference—
to damage the Clinton campaign, boost Trump’s chances, and sow distrust
in American democracy overall. These actions ref lect Russia’s clear intent
to affect votes, destabilize American society, and threaten societal resilience
in the United States. 32

Internet of Behaviors as a Driver
for a Changing Security Threat Landscape
Especially with a view to the power of social media platforms, be they
classif ied critical infrastructures or not, the business and technological
development of such platforms is relevant for NATO. Facebook changed its
strategy and renamed the company “Meta.” With that step, a new technological
era of the metaverse has risen in the lives of many people. The metaverse
is the digital reality that combines aspects of social media, online gaming,
augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR), and cryptocurrencies to allow
users to interact virtually. This new world and its business models are built
on the behavior of its users, the people.
30. Abigail Abrams, “Here’s What We Know So Far about Russia’s 2016 Meddling,” TIME (website),
April 18, 2019, https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/.
31. Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference
in the 2016 Presidential Election, vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, March 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download.
32. US Congress, Report of the Seelct Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian
Active Measures Campaign and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election: Volume 1: Russian Efforts
against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views, 116th Cong. (2020), 116–290, https://www.intelligence
.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf.
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Gartner, a US tech research analytics f irm, has announced the rise
of the new “Internet of Behaviors” (IoB). The term is explained in Gartner’s
2021 Top Strategic Technology Trends-Report. 33 It is def ined as the use
of IoT’s data to inf luence behavior, which will, potentially create a new group
of threat actors at a place where inf luencing people’s behavior stands at the
center of the platform’s purpose. 34 In a world where everything happens
in cyberspace—shopping, socializing, working, forming wills, voting
in elections, advertising, and marketing—the Metaverse should be considered
part of a future critical electoral infrastructure.

Threat Actors
A second program line should focus on types of threat actors.
Shared assessment and shared information could help the Alliance strengthen
resilience and fight interferences when they arise.

Internal Threat Actors
Although Russia has caused most of the reactions from NATO member
states with its interferences and activities, the country is not alone in the
group of adversaries weaponizing election infrastructures. In democracies,
once elected, populist politicians with authoritarian leanings can work
to paralyze the executive branch of government. For example, politicians
started using “dark posts” and propaganda to target voters and undermine
the electorate’s faith long before Brexit in 2016 and the US elections
in 2016 and 2020. 35 There are forces at work that intend to eat away
at liberalism from within democracies.
In 2021, retired US Marine Corps General James Mattis said the West,
to him, seems to be in a strategy-free mode where democratic values are
doubted. 36 In Germany, Querdenker spread bizarre conspiracy theories,
and it was revealed in December 2022 that the anti-constitutional group
33. Kasey Panetta, “Garnter Top Strategic Technology Trends for 2021,” Gartner (website), October 19, 2020,
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-strategic-technology-trends-for-2021.
34.

Panetta, “Top Strategic Technology.”

35. “Virtual Propaganda – Reporter Peter Kreysler in Conversation,” ARD Audiothek (website),
September 1, 2021, https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/das-ard-radiofeature/virtuelle-propaganda
-reporter-peter-kreysler-im-gespraech/ard-de/92319872.
36. James N. Mattis, “Allies, Allies, Allies” (speech, 2021 Atlantik-Brücke Young Leaders
Conference, Brandenburg, 2021), https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/en/allies-allies-allies-general-james
- m a t t i s - a t- t h e - y o u n g - l e a d e r s - c o n f e r e n c e / ? p k _ c a m p a i g n = R E C A P+1 3 % 2 F 2 0 2 1 & p k
_kwd=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlantik-bruecke.org%2Fen%2Fallies-allies-allies-general-james-mattis
-at-the-young-leaders-conference%2F.
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“Reichsbuerger” planned to storm the Reichstag in Berlin, knock out
electricity, and take over the government. 37 In the US, armed militias and
extremists stormed the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, spreading their views
on the election results, claiming the election was stolen from Donald Trump.
In Western societies, politically motivated activists, be they left-wing
or right-wing or politically motivated, are classif ied as adversaries
against the core values of democracy. 38

External Threat Actors
At the same time, NATO as a military alliance faces stronger headwinds
from outside adversaries weaponizing critical infrastructure inside NATO.
The enormous increase in the number of non-state actors relates to the end
of the Cold War, globalization, and processes of democratization since the
1990s. With the liberalization of the f lows of goods and financial services
and the lifting of stringent barriers to the movement of persons, companies,
media, and nongovernmental organizations, all types of actors can move
easily across the world and have quicker and easier access to capital and labor.
Cheap information technology means even the smallest organizations and
movements can portray themselves as actors not bound by national sovereignty.
The combination of a high diversity of actors and the ongoing technological
developments makes it diff icult to determine where threats originate.
Dual-use technologies that can make life more pleasant can also fall
into the hands of ill-intentioned non-state actors. Increasingly, these terrorist
groups and adversaries organize themselves individually as loose illegal
networks that are difficult to track. The groups make smart use of global
communications chains and secret communication channels (such as dark
net, crypto mobile phones, and chat programs). These terrorist groups seek
to undermine weak state institutions and the precarious security situation
of citizens in fragile states. Like nation-states, those groups use “hard”
military means and “softer” instruments (such as media, social media,

37. Svenja Moller, “Bundesweite Razzia: Gruppe soll Staatsstreich geplant haben,” Augsburger
Allgemeine (website), December 7, 2022, https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/panorama/bundesweite
-razzia-in-reichsbuergerszene-25-festnahmen-id64800536.html; and see Michael Nienaber,
“Germany Conducts Nationwide Raid to Thwart Right-Wing Extremists Planning Coup,” Bloomberg (website),
December 7, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-07/germany-detains-25-suspects
-in-nationwide-domestic-terror-raids?leadSource=uverify%20wall.
38. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat,
2022), https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte
/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021-startseitenmodul.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, 26.

111

Feldner

and the Internet) to bolster their legitimacy and win the hearts and minds
of potential supporters.
Specific actors with known interest in interfering with the will of the
people are China and affiliated groups, Russia and affiliated groups, and
other authoritarian states (Iran and North Korea), and terrorist groups
(al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Da’esh, and the Taliban). 39

The Influence Industry: A New Type of Adversary
In an assessment of interferences in election processes in 2018, the
UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee
in London published the “Disinformation and Fake News: Interim Report.”40
In the report, the committee focused on distinct types of threat actors.
It included data analytics firms and strategic communications companies
as adversaries. The committee members picked the company Strategic
Communications Laboratories (SCL) Elections and related companies
as examples and stated the companies worked on campaigns that were not
financed in a transparent way, overstepping legal and ethical boundaries.41
The companies were said to run campaigns globally. Representatives of the
companies were cited with talking about using misinformation, dirty tricks,
and social media manipulation to inf luence elections around the world and
boasted of using bribery, honey traps, and sex workers to discredit politicians
and inf luence the political outcome of elections in several countries.42
Information was provided to the committee about the manipulation
of social media companies, in order to play on and distort people’s
negative views of themselves and others. 43 Election campaigns and
referenda manipulated by SCL are said to have taken place in the
Kenya Kenyatta campaign 2013, the Kenya Kenyatta campaign 2017,
Ghana 2013, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Germany, England, Guyana,
Czech Republic, Kosovo; and the Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis,

39. “Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,” Crisis Groups (website), March 14, 2016,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state.
40. Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News”: Final Report,
HC 1791 (London: House of Commons, February 18, 2019), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa
/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf.
41. Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News.”
42.

Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News,” 53.

43.

Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News.”
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and Dominica.44 Part of that work was also a referendum in St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. The report says Henley and Partners organized funding for
the campaigns in exchange for citizenship-by-investment (CBI) programs.45
The companies’ representatives admitted they worked for the British
government, the US government, and other Allied governments.46
The report concludes with a statement from the committee:
“We . . . urge the Government to ensure that the National Crime Agency
thoroughly investigates these allegations.”47 The report also urged the
government to audit the public relations and strategic communications
industries, warning in its final report how “easy it is for discredited companies
to reinvent themselves and potentially use the same data and the same tactics
to undermine governments, including in the UK.”48 It was said those
companies need to be monitored and regulated as they operate in a constant
conf lict of interest situation.
Emma Briant, a researcher who consulted with UK authorities,
supported stricter regulation of strategic communications companies—
as she sees them as adversaries of democratic societies, with the establishment
of professional licensing that can be revoked if necessary. Such licensing
“would commercially protect the industry itself, creating a resulting
“soft power” economic benefit for industry and Western governments.”49
She gave two examples of Cambridge Analytica’s perceived conf licts
of interest: (1) Cambridge Analytica pitched an offer to Lukoil, a Russian
oil company with ubiquitous political connections, while at the same time,
the SCL Group delivered counter-Russian propaganda training for Western
states, and (2) “around the same time, Alexander Nix from Cambridge
Analytica contacted Julian Assange at Wikileaks amplifying the release
of damaging e-mails; Russia has been accused of the hacking of these,
which it denies.” 50
44. Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News,” 54.
45.

Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News,” 58.

46.

Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News,” 58.

47. Digital Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “Fake News,” 50, 59, 72.
48. Jesse Witt and Alex Pasternack, “The Strange Afterlife of Cambridge Analytica and the Mysterious
Fate of Its Data,” Fast Company (website), July 26, 2019, https://www.fastcompany.com/90381366
/the-mysterious-afterlife-of-cambridge-analytica-and-its-trove-of-data.
49. Emma Briant, “Written Evidence: Dr. Emma Briant, Senior Lecturer at University of Essex”
(London: House of Commons, Committee on Culture, Media, and Sport), https://committees.parliament.uk
/writtenevidence/39329/pdf/.
50.

Briant, “Written Evidence.”
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Briant suggested US and UK inquiries examining the intelligence and
oversight mechanisms in information operations contracting strengthen
these systems. 51 Further, the countries should ensure defense-derived
expertise and techniques are not used in electoral campaigns or pitched
to organizations with risk factors for national security. She proposed additional
solutions like the monitoring and restriction of technologies and methods
developed by contractors with defense collaboration and funding being used
in elections or pitched for any work abroad. A need for greater transparency
in government contracting, reporting mechanisms, and substantial penalties
for defense contractors found to be obscuring overlaps and company
relationships from government was included in her report.

Threat Responses
Another program line for the work on securing critical election
infrastructure could be the broader sector of responses to threats
against CEI. It should begin with a dynamic and holistic view of the complex
and evolving security landscape in which NATO and NATO members operate.

Holistic Monitoring Approach to Threat Responses
Election infrastructure security is a complex problem covering several
layers of infrastructures and types of organizations and groups of people,
responses, and recommendations. For this reason, the Riga-based NATO
Strategic Communications Centre divides elections into three types: the
administrative process, the will and ability of voters to participate in elections,
and the election as a political process.
NATO could eventually come from different angles to analyze the problem
and find appropriate answers. Starting at the infrastructural angle might
not be sufficient. With the intensifying digital penetration of everything
in the world that transforms into the Internet of Behaviors, blurring lines
between the individual human’s behavior, online life and traditional
organizations should be considered, and with them, all layers of the system.

51.

Briant, “Written Evidence.”
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Those layers are the:


Organizational layer



Individual layer



Time layer



Impact layer



Layer and scope of uncertainty

Figure 5-1. Layers of systems affected by the Internet of Behaviors
(Original by author)
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This holistic view, which considers that different layers inf luence
each other at the same time but can have different effects because there
are so many interdependencies, could be of significant use in the current
rapidly evolving and changing security landscape. To tackle the challenge
of the multilayer matrix, the GCC thinks of the people involved in election
processes. These people and decisionmakers need additional human support
to navigate the cyber sphere. All people involved in election processes need
better training. In addition, a management and staffing plan needs to be
implemented to support the efforts.
The GCC also aims to secure voting equipment and voter data,
update all operating systems and software, establish incident tracking
systems and software, and deploy multifactor authentication products and
new password management software. The GCC recommended auditing the
entire election process; patching management systems, network architecture,
and cybersecurity assessment; and enabling net work segmentation
and air-gapping. 52

A Strategic Communications Approach 2019
The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga,
Latvia, addressed the social part of election processes and published a study
in 2019 on how to respond to election threats from a strategic communication
perspective. 53 The study outlines three types of threats to elections, types
of interferences, and common stratagems having relations to CEI. 54


Threats against the election as an administrative process



Threats against the will and ability of voters to participate
in elections



Threats against the election as a political process

The centre suggests a mapping of the strategic communications dimensions.

52. Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council, Election Infrastructure
Security Funding Considerations (Washington, DC: DHS/CISA, March 12, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov
/sites/default/files/publications/20_0311_cisa_eis-gcc-funding-considerations.pdf.
53. Sebastian Bay and Guna Šnore, Protecting Elections: A Strategic Communications Approach,
(Riga, LV: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2019), https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads
/pfiles/nato_report_-_protecting_elections_1.pdf.
54.

Bay and Šnore, Protecting Elections, 10–11.
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Information Landscape
What is the situation NATO and NATO members are in, and
what are they protecting? It suggests mapping the core elements
of the information environment and the election process, identifying elements
affecting the decision making of voters in a country, and identifying and
prioritizing the most important things to protect.

Threat Assessment
What is the threat? What does the current threat assessment look
like, and what are the publicly recognized security risks? What does the
threat consist of ? How could activities aimed at inf luencing information
materialize? What are the likelihood and consequences of inf luence activities?
Which risks do we accept?

Risk and Capability Assessment
How do countries handle the identified risks? How can they reduce the
probability of election interference? How can they reduce the consequences
of election interference? What is the monitoring capability (such as scope,
stakeholders, mandates, and tasks)? What are the deterrence mechanisms
at the members’ disposal? What are the mechanisms through which the
countries will coordinate responses?55
In the analysis, the team found that individual methods and techniques
for election interference are rarely used in isolation. Rather, inf luence operations
and campaigns most often combine a multitude of methods and techniques
into a complex chain of events or stratagems. While such combinations
are theoretically inf inite, some stratagems are frequently encountered
in contemporary inf luence operations. 56
These different f indings and their broad scope, interdependencies,
and diverse playing fields support the idea of starting with a holistic view
to election integrity and safeguarding CEI in NATO in a new cooperation
structure within the Alliance.

55.

Bay and Šnore, Protecting Elections, 8.

56. Bay and Šnore, Protecting Elections, 12.
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Recommendations and Conclusion: Protection of Election
Infrastructure against Terrorism Threat
Democratic resilience and election integrity are foundational to NATO’s
future successes as a military alliance. This fact was also underlined in the
2022 Strategic Concept where member states ref lected an intent to reinforce
political unity and deepen consultations to address all matters affecting
security—including democratic resilience.
The safeguarding of Western democracies’ elections and election
infrastructures stand at the epicenter of NATO’s assessments and secures
the Alliance’s core stability. One weak democracy in NATO can weaken
the Alliance. NATO’s role as a political alliance in creating defense and
democratic resilience against disruptions to critical societal functions and
cohesion is central to a prosperous future for the Western way of life and the
unity of member states.

Putting Election Security High on the Agenda
To protect election infrastructure in the future and safeguard the basic
framework of democracy, NATO member states must put election integrity
high on the agenda and support shared knowledge from all NATO members.
New platforms for discussion, research, or exchange of information can
be created to gather and share current developments.

Act on Fast-moving Technological Developments
The rapid development of technologies, including digital technologies
and artif icial intelligence, should be closely monitored and acted
upon as they can fundamentally change the basic characteristics of current
electoral infrastructures and the industries behind them.

Concrete Actions Regarding Adversaries
The group of politically motivated terrorists focusing on elections and
election infrastructures as key targets need to be monitored, and responses
to these growing challenges within and outside democratic societies need
to be developed. Monitoring and preventive activities resulting
from observation and information sharing must be followed by the
development of concrete actions to contain growing threats. These activities
require a joint effort by NATO members, as weak members can damage the
strength of the community.
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Set Up a Dedicated Structure
NATO should implement the 2022 Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030
agenda and set up a dedicated structure to assess election-critical infrastructure
in member states. In addition, resilience objectives are needed to guide
nationally tailored resilience goals—with a specific focus on critical election
infrastructures and election security. Implementation plans on measurable
Alliance-wide objectives help member states and allies respond quickly
to the ever-changing security landscape.
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ABSTRACT: Medical resilience is a key critical infrastructure in a nation’s
preparedness against vulnerabilities. Pandemics such as COVID-19 are
one of the potent disruptors of this infrastructure. Health systems that are
considered low resourced have adapted and deployed seemingly simple but
effective methods to survive such disruptions.
Keywords: medical resilience, pandemics, COVID-19, low-resourced
health systems

Introduction
In this chapter, medical resilience will be explored as a component
of critical infrastructure, and pandemics will be assessed as a disruption
using a low-resourced health system to build resilience. Medical resilience
is one of the components of critical infrastructure, security, and resilience
of any nation. It is aligned with the ability to deal with mass casualties,
one of the NATO’s seven baseline requirements of resilience for member
states. While there are several definitions of resilience across fields, a common
feature is the capacity of a system, (such as health care or public health)
to identify small or large disruptions and invoke mechanisms to bounce
back or establish a new normal situation. There are different scales
of disruptions. They could be positive when innovative solutions are
deployed or negative, as in a pandemic.
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Pandemics are large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases that can greatly
increase morbidity and mortality over a wide geographic area and cause
significant economic, social, and political disruption. These pandemic-induced
disruptions are often linked to terrorism and armed conf lict as terrorists use
the power vacuum left by the outbreaks to incite violence and further their
causes. A pandemic is different from an epidemic, which is the occurrence
of an illness in a community or region beyond normal expectancy.
Pandemics are global and def ined by geographical scale rather than the
severity of illness. Throughout history, there have been several pandemics—
the plague in the fourteenth century, smallpox in the mid-eighteenth century,
and the Spanish f lu in 1918. See figure 6-1. More recent events include
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, or most currently SARS-CoV-2.
This chapter will discuss COVID-19 in relation to health system capacity
and insecurity, leveraging low technology, experience from previous outbreaks,
and other lessons from Nigeria that may be useful in other health systems
(such as NATO countries). It will also use Boko Haram as a case study
in the linkage of terrorism to pandemics and propose recommendations
for how such conf licts can be addressed.

COVID-19 Pandemic and Nigeria
COVID-19 is an illness caused by a novel coronavirus called severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2; formerly called
2019-nCoV). Coronaviruses comprise a vast family of viruses. While they
typically infect animals, seven of the known types cause disease in humans.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 likely belongs to one
of these. The disease was off icially named by the World Health
Organization (WHO) on February 11, 2020, and declared a global pandemic
on March 11, 2020.1

1. David J. Cennimo and Michael Stuart Bronze, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID 19),” Medscape
(website), https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2500114-overview?; and Domenico Cucinotta
and Maurizio Vanelli, “WHO Declares COVID-19 a Pandemic,” Acta Biomedica 91, no. 1 (2020): 157,
https://www.mattioli1885journals.com/index.php/actabiomedica/article/view/9397.
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Figure 6-1. Infographic showing the history of pandemics
(Image by Visual Capitalist)
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Although there is speculation of earlier presence, the f irst off icial
reported case in humans was recorded in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China,
in December 2019. It began as a pneumonic case. 2 The common symptoms
are cough, shortness of breath, and loss of smell, and complications could
lead to pneumonia, viral sepsis, acute respiratory distress syndrome,
kidney failure, or worse, depending on the health status of the individual. 3
People with comorbidities (such as diabetes, respiratory tract infections,
or immune suppression) experience worse symptoms.
The principal mode of transmission of the COVID-19 virus is through
exposure to respiratory droplets carrying infectious viruses within a space
of up to six feet or 1.82 meters. Other methods are contact transmission
(such as shaking hands) and airborne transmission of droplets that linger
in the air over long distances (greater than six feet). Viruses released
in respiratory secretions (such as during coughing, sneezing, or talking)
can infect other individuals via contact with mucous membranes. 4
Two months after the first known case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in China,
the first confirmed Nigerian case was a passenger who f lew into the country
from Italy on February 24 and presented with symptoms at a small clinic
in Ogun state. The clinician on duty suspected it could be COVID-19.
This suspicion was conf irmed at the Infectious Disease Centre, Yaba,
Lagos State, Nigeria on February 27, 2020. 5

Health Capacity, COVID-19, and Insecurity in Nigeria
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, access to critical care was one
of the global indicators of readiness. Nigeria’s epidemic response is carried
out in the context of a fragile and under-resourced existing health delivery
system and is complicated by economic, political, social, and security issues
throughout the country. 6 To give a context to the capacity, Nigeria has
an equivalent of 0.07 intensive care unit (ICU) beds per 100,000 population
compared to countries like Germany, the United States, and Türkiye
2. Nita Madhav et al., “Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation” in Disease Control Priorities:
Improving Health and Reducing Poverty, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/World Bank, 2017), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30212163/.
3. Oluwaseun Oyeranti and Babajide Sokeye, “The Evolution and Spread of COVID-19 in Nigeria,”
Centre for Petroleum, Energy Economics and Law (website), 2020, 1–18, https://cpeel.ui.edu.ng/publication
/evolution-and-spread-covid-19-nigeria.
4.

Madhav et al., “Pandemics.”

5. Chioma Dan-Nwafor et al., “Nigeria’s Public Health Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic:
January to May 2020,” Journal of Global Health 10, no. 2 (December 2020), https://jogh.org/documents
/issue202002/jogh-10-020399.pdf.
6

Dan-Nwafor et al., “Nigeria’s Public Health Response.”
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with 29.2, 34.7, and 46 ICU beds per 100,000 respectively.7 Attacks on critical
infrastructure, including health care were not unusual before the COVID-19
pandemic, but the COVID-19 pandemic enabled the proliferation of insecurity
via different mechanisms (such as increased armed group activities that can
be linked to economic hardship due to lockdown, movement restriction, and
gaps in security provisions).
Figure 6-2 shows a detailed framework and the degree of connectedness
of three key pathways of the COVID-19 pandemic and conf lict in Nigeria—
increasing armed group activities, intensifying youth grievances, and shifting
pattern of social cohesion. While none of them were solely created
by the COVID-19 pandemic, specific elements of the pandemic aggravated
and reinforced patterns of behavior by the government, armed groups
and community. 8

Figure 6-2. Summary of connections between COVID-19 and conflict in Nigeria
(Image by MERCY CORPS)
Source: Mercy Corps, Living with Two Worrisome Pandemics
7. Adeteju Ogunbameru et al., “Estimating Healthcare Resource Needs for COVID-19 Patients
in Nigeria,” Pan African Medical Journal 37, no. 293 (December 2, 2020), https://www.panafrican-med-journal
.com/content/article/37/293/full/; and Kamlesh Khunti et al., “Is Ethnicity Linked to Incidence
or Outcomes of COVID-19?,” BMJ (website), April 20, 2020, https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m1548.
8. Mercy Corps, Living with Two Worrisome Pandemics: How the COVID-10 Pandemic Is Shaping
Nigeria (Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, June 28, 2021), https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2021-06
/Clash-of-Contagions-Nigeria-Case-June-2021.pdf.
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Boko Haram, a prominent terror group, leveraged the COVID-19 pandemic
to promote the disruption of health systems and cross border activities and
used the lockdown to expand territories and propagate misinformation
in a way that undermines public health.9 The Borno state in Nigeria,
considered the epicenter of Boko Haram activities, was one of the worst hit.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the group continued their attack on the
region. In February 2020, the group attacked and set ablaze about 18 vehicles
carrying passengers in Auno town, Maiduguri, Borno State, and killed three
military men in Damboa town, Borno State. In March, the Nigerian military
responded with counterinsurgency operations, and about 100 insurgents were
reportedly killed near Gorgi village in Borno State.10
A faction of Boko Haram, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad,
(People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad,
abbreviated as JAS) led by Abubakar Shekau, released its position in an audio
message. Shekau asserted the virus is a divine punishment for world sins and
was being used by hypocrites to stop believers from practicing their faith.
He urged the continuation of congregational prayers, which was against the
public health recommendation.11 He also claimed his group members were
immune from the virus, debunked the claim of his willingness to surrender,
and attempted to lure new recruits by the promise of safety and a better life
in the Sambisa Forest, where he operates.12
Rural banditry due to multifaceted and complex factors characterized
by armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and raids using both local
and sophisticated arms, had escalated. The emergence of the COVID-19
pandemic escalated it—especially in the Northwestern states of Kaduna,
Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara of Nigeria.13 Rural banditry—characterized
by large-scale killings, abductions, raids on vulnerable communities,
and violence against women—started as localized disputes in the agro-pastoral
sector of the country but continued and worsened during the COVID-19
pandemic. The intensity and pervasiveness of banditry was also enabled
9. Audu Bulama Bukarti, “How Is Boko Haram Responding to COVID-19?,” Tony Blair Institute
for Global Change (website), May 20, 2020, https://institute.global/policy/how-boko-Haram-responding
-COVID-19.
10. Philip Olayoku, “Boko Haram and the COVID-19 Propaganda Dynamics,” Spoor Africa (website),
September 15, 2020, https://medium.com/spoor-africa/boko-haram-and-the-covid-19-propaganda-dynamics
-philip-olayoku-4c9e076b80cb.
11.

Bukarti, “Boko Haram Responding.”

12. Olayoku, “Boko Haram and COVID-19.”
13. Noah Echa Attah et al., “COVID 19 and Increased Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria:
Interrogating Armed Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria,” SIASAT 6, no. 1 (January 31, 2021): 33–44,
https://siasatjournal.com/index.php/siasat/article/view/87.
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by porous borders and reduced efficiency of law and order due to the overstretch
of security agencies.14 During the lockdown and interstate travel ban,
there was free movement of armed bandits and increased attacks.
For example, in April 2020, several villages were attacked in Katsina state,
and about 50 people were killed. Bandits also demanded villagers surrender
COVID-19 palliatives donated as food items.15 The elements of instability,
such as banditry and terrorism, created an atmosphere where people were
more concerned about protecting their lives and belongings than adhering
to precautionary health measures.16

Key Lessons on Managing Pandemics from Nigeria
Leveraging Previous Experience in Outbreaks
One of the defining factors of controlling the COVID-19 pandemic
in Nigeria was the experience of managing previous public health crises.
For context, the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) of 2014 came out of the affected
countries of Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Nigeria should have
been the perfect medium for transmission due to its high population of freely
mobile people, who are well connected to the rest of the world. However,
the swift prevention of community transmission and management by the
Nigerian Center for Disease Control (NCDC) nullified the various disease
spread mathematical models.17
There were several factors in Nigeria, not present in the other countries,
that enabled quick action, including the availability of trained health workers
with hands-on experience in f ield epidemiology managing diseases like
Lassa fever and cholera. They were educated through the Nigeria
Field Epidemiolog y and Laborator y Training Program (NFELT),
established in Nigeria in 2008 by the US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Ministry of Health to train field
14. Angela Ajodo-Adebanjoko, “Rural Banditry in Northwest Nigeria amidst a Global Pandemic:
A Gender Perspective,” Political Crossroads 24, no. 1 (September 1, 2020): 59–78, https://www.ingentaconnect
.com/content/jnp/pc/2020/00000024/00000001/art00005.
15. Attah et al., “COVID 19 and Increased Security Challenges.”
16. Yusuff Adebayo Adebisi, “Political Instability in the Context of Health Security
amid COVID-19 Pandemic,” Epidemiology International Journal 5, no. 4 (December 2021), https://
medwinpublishers.com/EIJ/political-instability-in-the-context-of-health-security-amid-covid-19-pandemic.pdf.
17. Obinna Ositadimma Oleribe, Mary Margaret Elizabeth Crossey, and Simon David Taylor-Robinson,
“Nigerian Response to the 2014 Ebola Viral Disease Outbreak: Lessons and Cautions,” Pan African
Medical Journal 22, no. S1 (October 2015), https://www.panafrican-med-journal.com/content/series
/22/1/13/full/.
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epidemiologists and functional state epidemiology units in interdisciplinary
collaboration and setting up temporary and permanent infectious disease
centers and emergency operation centers.18 This expertise sensitized the health
system to the impact of highly infectious diseases, and allowed for the fast
reactivation of proactive frameworks used in the management of COVID-19.
This lesson makes a case for leveraging existing management frameworks in
a pandemic and not reinventing the wheel.

Surveillance, Data Analysis, and Public Data Sharing
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the surveillance and epidemiology team
at the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) deployed Surveillance,
Outbreak Response Management, and Analysis System (SOR MAS),
an open and free software for tracking information about conf irmed
or suspected cases. Its availability aided real-time data analysis, data-based
trend analysis, prediction of patterns, rumor management, and interoperability
with other systems like the Distinct Health Information System (DHIS),
an open-source software platform used in up to 60 countries for reporting,
analysis, and dissemination of data for all health programs. A central database
like SORMAS is important because there is currently no centralized database
for general electronic health records.19
The Surveillance, Outbreak Response Management, and Analysis
System, an initiative of the Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research (HZI),
Germany, was first deployed in Nigeria and Ghana during the Ebola outbreak.
SOR MAS has been implemented in Nepal and the Ivor y Coast,
and these partnerships are depicted in figure 6-4. Before COVID-19, its use
was expanded for other diseases like Mpox and Lassa fever. The modular
design, ease of use, joint ownership, and cross-platform availability
of SORMAS enabled it to scale and be updated easily as shown in figure 6-3. 20

18.

Oleribe, Crossey, and Taylor-Robinson “Nigerian Response.”

19. “Tracking Coronavirus in West Africa and Beyond,” European Commission (website),
April 23, 2021, https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20210423131754/https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy
/recovery-plan-europe/recovery-coronavirus-success-stories/global-response/tracking-coronavirus-west-africa
-and-beyond; and “SORMAS in Nigeria: Adapting a Fully Integrated Surveillance System to Track
COVID-19,” Exemplars in Global Health (website), n.d., https://www.exemplars.health/emerging-topics
/epidemic-preparedness-and-response/digital-health-tools/sormas-nigeria.
20. “SORMAS in Nigeria.”
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Figure 6-3. How SORMAS works
(Image by Exemplars)
Source: “SORMAS in Nigeria”

Figure 6-4. Technical and organizational interoperability of SORMAS
(Image by Exemplars)
Source: “SORMAS in Nigeria”
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The NCDC also provided daily easy-to-understand infographics
on social media platforms (like Facebook and Twitter) showing the total
number of cases confirmed, detected, and discharged as well as deaths.

Non-pharmacological Intervention (NPI)
Low-resourced health systems have perfected the leveraging
of non-pharmacological interventions (NPI). Nigeria leveraged several NPIs
such as handwashing, face-mask wearing, lockdowns, travel restrictions,
restricted public gatherings, and school closures. Enforcement of these
interventions required intense, effective, and socioculturally relevant
communications. 21 Public education materials were prepared in different
languages and disseminated via several channels (such as print, radio, social
media, and television). The reference to languages is important. While English
is the official language of Nigeria, there are at least 500 other languages spoken
there, creating opportunities for regional inf luence in how the government,
nonprofits, organized religion, and volunteers disseminate information. 22
“Learn at Home,” an educational intervention by the Mastercard
Foundation, shows how inf luentia l information dissemination
through the radio can be. This program delivered off line remote learning
to one million children via radio and low-end mobile devices using unstructured
supplementary service data (USSD) and short messaging service (SMS)
through Data Science Nigeria. 23 Its goal was to ensure universal learning
was compatible with the national education curriculum to mitigate the
effects of being out of school and improve access to quality learning content
for children who did not have access before the pandemic.
The culture of hand hygiene was also implemented. Most public places
mandated handwashing, hand sanitization, face-mask wearing, and temperature
checking before entry. Figure 6-6 shows a sample of how handwashing
is communicated and implemented in the described context.

21. Olumuyiwa O. Odusanya et al., “COVID-19: A Review of the Effectiveness of Non-pharmacological
Interventions,” Nigerian Postgraduate Medical Journal 27, no. 3 (October–December, 2020): 261.
22. “Language Data for Nigeria,” Translators without Borders (website), n.d., https://translatorswithoutborders
.org/language-data-nigeria.
23. “About Us,” Learn at Home (website), https://learnathome.com.ng/; and “1 Million Disadvantaged
School Children to Benefit from ‘Learn at Home’ Project by Data Science Nigeria/Malezi in Partnership
with the Mastercard Foundation,” Mastercard Foundation (website), n.d., https://mastercardfdn.org/1-million
-disadvantaged-school-children-to-benefit-from-learn-at-home-project-by-data-science-nigeria-malezi
-in-partnership-with-the-mastercard-foundation/.
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Figure 6-5. Poster by WaterAid encouraging handwashing
(Image by WaterAid)
Source: “Responding to Coronavirus,” WaterAid, May 12, 2021,
https://www.wateraid.org/us/wateraids-covid-19-response#Nigeria.

Figure 6-6. A makeshift handwashing station
Source: Peter Duru, “COVID-19: UNICEF Donates 5,000 WASH Kits, 100 Touchless Hand
Washing Stations to Benue IDPs,” Vanguard Media (website), https://www.vanguardngr
.com/2020/07/COVID-19-unicef-donates-5000-wash-kits-100-touchless
-hand-washing-stations-to-benue-idps/.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored medical resilience, a core component of the NATO
seven baseline resilience requirements for its member states. For the use
case, the chapter explored pandemics as disruptors and what can be learned
from their management in a low-resourced health system. The research
showed how Nigeria effectively managed the COVID-19 pandemic despite the
low-resourced health system and insecurity due to terrorism and banditry.
To help readers understand the situation’s complexity, COVID-19 and
a conf lict-connected framework, which def ined three key pathways,
were explored. The pathways include increasing armed group activities,
intensifying youth grievances, and shifting patterns of social cohesion
based on work by the Mercy Corps. Some of the key points of strength
in how Nigeria managed the situation are leveraging experience and tools
from previous outbreaks like Ebola (SORMAS) and the use of low-cost and
non-pharmacological public health interventions (effective communications
on precautions via radio and social media channels and multilingual
printed materials).
When disruptions occur concurrently with insecurity, managing
outcomes is complex, and the solutions are multidimensional. A key lesson
for high-resourced systems within NATO is that much can be achieved even
with resource constraints. If there is a call for support by these systems,
it is also important to understand the local and historical context
through collaboration with the resident military of the low-resourced system,
as underscored in the case study on the fight against terrorism with groups
like Boko Haram and bandits, where the home militaries had approaches
that worked well and may only require reinforcement. NATO can also
support local and national activities that strengthen trust in the
government to keep citizens safe when disruptions (such as pandemics)
occur concurrently with terrorist activities. These solutions include focusing
on communications, logistics, and community health campaigns and providing
contacts for local community questions. These whole-of-government
approaches are building blocks to aiding medical resilience and strengthening
the Alliance.
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ABSTRACT: Military mission’s health surveillance of soldiers is one key
to enforce operational readiness. It can help provide the commander and
medical personnel with adequate information about the epidemiological
situation of the contingent and their options to intervene in a timely
way in the case of an outbreak. Current surveillance systems are not
providing the full range of needed tools to ensure this goal for the alliance,
t herefore add it iona l nea r-rea l-t ime su r vei l la nce is needed.
This chapter introduces case studies for surveillance systems, existing
and in development, and provides an outlook into future surveillance
abilities to support NATO and its partners, with an outline of the necessary
developmental factors and requirements for a successful system.
Keywords: health surveillance systems, pandemics, EpiNATO2, Q fever,
MILMED COE

Since 2019, the world has experienced the first real global pandemic
of the century, disrupting nearly every aspect of life, including the world
economy and overall military readiness. For military forces, health surveillance
systems are an essential element in disease prevention and control as these
forces are confronted with a continuum of operational scenarios, including
war, peacekeeping, potential terrorist use of biological weapons, and natural
disasters. Health surveillance, defined as the ongoing, systematic collection,
analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health events in the NATO
Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2535, delivers critical health status
information about serving military personnel, which can assist in early the
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identification of new or emerging public health threats. The epidemiological
data collected by surveillance systems are critically important for military
leaders and planners to identify trends in the overall medical situation
and treatment requirements, and they are an important facet to consider
when planning for future operations. Altogether, the data and f indings
of such a system provide a basis for immediate action and can help NATO
prepare appropriate response measures in the future.
The effect of transmissible diseases and possible biological attacks and
the importance of preparing for them cannot be overstated as they can have
a massive impact on mission readiness and the potential to weaken troop
strength and pose a risk to the civilian population. This chapter provides
a case study of how existing and newly developed health surveillance
systems are critical in mitigating the effects of such emerging threats.
It compares how a well-established medical system for civilian and military
use can provide proactive solutions and be deployed in more austere conditions.
The Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support outlines the personnel and
national security importance of such systems: “Deployment health surveillance
aims to provide a key indication of the forces heath status and an estimate
of its impact on manpower and working day losses. Surveillance and
reporting may also identify chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
(CBRN) weapons involvement. Deployment of health surveillance is intended
to serve as a warning system to trigger further investigation and implement
preventive countermeasures or other command actions needed to reduce the
adverse impacts of health threats. A comprehensive disease and non-battle
injury analysis can produce more effective preventive medicine measures,
including recommended policy on immunization, prophylaxis, and personal
health education. It can also be a driving factor in the size and capability
of medical resources required in different scenarios.” 1

EpiNATO2:
NATO’s Only Health Surveillance System
In 2002, one year after the September 11 attacks in the United States,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) heads of state and government
endorsed five initiatives to enhance the capacity of the Alliance for deterrence
and defense against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons:
1. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support, Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.10, ed. C, ver. 1
(Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, September 2019), https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags
/01_AJP/AJP-4.10_EDC_V1_E_2228.pdf.
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“a Prototype Deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory; a Prototype NBC
Event Response team; a virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Weapons
Defence; a NATO Biological and Chemical Defence Stockpile; and a Disease
Surveillance system.” 2
Currently, deployed NATO forces use a NATO surveillance tool called
EpiNATO2, where every NATO Medical Treatment Facility (MTF)
reports cases of predefined events such as “gastro-intestinal illnesses” to the
Force Health Protection Branch (FHPB) in Munich, Germany, on a weekly
basis. EpiNATO2 is the current and only interoperable military health
surveillance system defined in the NATO doctrine. 3 In 2013, it was first
implemented in the Kosovo Force and European Union Training Mission Mali.
EpiNATO-2 is mandated for use during all NATO operations.
Its coverage has increased over time and now includes all NATO Joint and
Component Command Operations and several non-NATO operations.4
The feedback provided by the FHPB for every mission is needed to enhance
situational awareness about evolving trends in health issues across the deployed
force in a multinational theater and is intended to provide information
for action and medical decision making and force health protection assurance
at the local and theater levels. Additionally, most nations use a national
disease surveillance system working with ICD-10 codes from primary care
once a week.

Case Study: Military Public Health Surveillance Systems
Exemplified by a Q Fever Outbreak in Kosovo
During recent military interventions, 65 to 80 percent of hospitalizations
of soldiers were due to infectious diseases. 5 Military forces are expected
to maintain maximum operational readiness before, during, and after
the mission. Therefore, a reliable health surveillance system is needed
2. “Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic,” NATO (website), November 21,2002,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm.
3.

NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support.

4. Jean L. Wilson, Maureen T. Carew, and Barbara A. Strauss, “Canadian Forces Evaluation
of the EPINATO Health Surveillance System in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Military Medicine 171, no. 10 (2006):
955–61, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/171/10/955/4577942; and Hagen Frickmann et al.,
“Infectious Diseases during the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM MLI) – A Four-year
Experience,” Military Medical Research 5, no. 19 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1186/s40779-018-0166-5.
5. Matthew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew Cliff, War Epidemics: A Historical Geography of Infectious
Diseases in Military Conflict and Civil Strife, 1850–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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to provide commanders and medical personnel with adequate information
about the epidemiological situation of the contingent and options to intervene
in a timely way in case of an outbreak.
In March 2016, a cluster of confirmed inf luenza A and B virus cases
was diagnosed at the German KFOR-Field Hospital in Priene, Kosovo.
In April, soldiers could still be seen with the same clinical signs
without confirmation of inf luenza. Most of the cases expressed a radiologically
confirmed atypical pneumonia. Because of the nature of the diseases and the
known endemicity of its pathogen (Coxiella burnetii) in the Balkan region,
the suspected diagnosis of Q fever was mentioned. On-site, no diagnostic
test was available for the conf irmation of this differential diagnosis.
Therefore, to investigate the outbreak, a Rapidly Deployable Outbreak
Investigation Team (RDOIT) was sent to the camp in the 15th calendar week.
Q fever is an important but underestimated public health problem
in the Balkan region, due to inadequate surveillance. Outbreaks within
KFOR have been described regularly since the beginning of the mission. 6
Due to the nature of the work of military personnel who must patrol farmland,
train on grounds that are grazed upon by sheep, or breathe in air from such
fields during helicopter loading and unloading, they are generally deemed
to be at a high risk of contracting vector-borne and zoonotic infections.7
This is exacerbated by a lack of expertise in the differential diagnosis
of such zoonotic or tropical diseases, which leads to reduced sensitivity
and specificity within the diagnostic process. Therefore, the latter should
be supported by a robust and reliable health surveillance system. Coxiella
burnetti infections often go undiagnosed because of their nonspecific symptoms
or lack of adequate diagnostic capabilities. 8 Q fever can lead to severe chronic
disease (such as endocarditis and fatigue syndrome) if not treated properly
in the early stage of the infection, ending a military career and severely
6. Alicia Anderson et al.,“Q Fever and the US Military,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 11, no. 8 (August 2005),
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/11/8/05-0314_article.
7. Wiebke Hellenbran, Thomas Breuer, and Lyle Petersen, “Changing Epidemiology of Q Fever
in Germany, 1947–1999,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 7, no. 5 (October 2001): 789–96, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov
/eid/article/7/5/01-0504_article; and Edmund N. C. Newman et al., “Seroconversion for Infectious
Pathogens among UK Military Personnel Deployed to Afghanistan, 2008–2011,” Emerging Infectious
Diseases 20, no. 12 (December 2014), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/12/13-1830_article.
8. R. Eibach et al., “Q Fever: Baseline Monitoring of a Sheep and a Goat Flock Associated with
Human Infections,” Epidemiology & Infection 140, no. 11 (January 5, 2012), https://www.cambridge.org
/core/journals/epidemiolog y-and-infection/article/q-fever-baseline-monitoring-of-a-sheep-and
a-goat-f lock-associated-with-human-infections/4762E4A96F54D145AF45DD21C5375562; and
Dennis Faix et al., “Outbreak of Q Fever among US Military in Western Iraq, June–July 2005,”
Clinical Infectious Diseases 47, no. 7 (April 1, 2008), https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/46/7/e65/293077.
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impeding the quality of life of the patient.9 A robust microbiological diagnostic
capability and effective surveillance is needed to detect cases as fast as possible
to protect an individual’s health, maintain military readiness, and raise awareness
for the presence of the disease.10
One of the main objectives of military health surveillance systems is the
early detection of outbreaks to limit their impact on operational capacity
through appropriate interventions. These systems can differ from civilian
systems.11 Military peculiarities like variable geographic location of missions,
high mobility of forces, diff icult working and living conditions in the
field, multinational target populations, regular turnover of the population
in short intervals, heightened levels of security, or lack of historical surveillance
data for the target population must be integrated into the creation.
In this case study, the current surveillance systems, EpiNATO-2,
and a national system were critically reviewed based on numbers and
information collected during the Q fever outbreak in 2016 and improvement
actions were defined.

Descriptive Analysis of the Q Fever Data
The two systems worked both technically as well as procedurally but
showed misclassifications and could not detect the previously mentioned
cases early in the outbreak. Even though the Q fever outbreak could
be clearly detected in both systems with a high unique peak in addition
to the typical temporal window for seasonal inf luenza or upper respiratory
tract diseases (figure 7-1), there are differences. A likely reason for the almost
double incidence in the national system compared to EpiNATO2 is the raised
awareness among medical personnel and the presence of the RDOIT team.

9. Florence Fenollar et al., “Risks Factors and Prevention of Q Fever Endocarditis,” Clinical Infectious Disease
33, no. 3 (August 1, 2001), https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/33/3/312/277191.
10. Shannon Ellis et al., “Outbreak of Sandfly Fever in Central Iraq, September 2007,” Military Medicine 173,
no. 10 (October 2008): 949–53, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/173/10/949/4283061.
11. Jean-Baptiste Meynard et al., “Proposal of a Framework for Evaluating Military Surveillance Systems
for Early Detection of Outbreaks on Duty Areas,” BMC Public Health 8, no. 146 (2008), https://bmcpublichealth
.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-8-146.
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Figure 7-1. Notified respiratory tract infections due to ICD-10 code
and EpiNATO-2
Source: NATO Standardization Office (NSO), “Deployment Health Surveillance,” Edition A
Version 2, January 2017, https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/03_AMEDP/AMedP-4.1
_EDA_V2_E_2535.pdf.

The partial overlap of inf luenza and Q fever cases in 2016 is likely
responsible for the latter’s initial misinterpretation as inf luenza cases
(see table 7-1). Only the unusual decision for lung X-rays showing a high
number of atypical pneumonia cases led to the potential differential diagnosis
of Q fever, which was eventually confirmed through serum samples by the
reach-back laboratory.
This conf irmation resulted in a high-quality but delayed f inal
diagnosis, which was not useful for early-warning purposes. Such a delay
has the potential of missing an outbreak.12 The differences between the
national system and EpiNATO2 in picking up the f irst inf luenza peak
in figures 7-1 and 7-2 suggest the EpiNATO2 could be more sensitive than
the national system.

12. Colleen Lau “Combating Infectious Diseases in the Pacific Islands: Sentinel Surveillance,
Environmental Health, and Geospatial Tools,” Reviews on Environmental Health 29, no. 1–2
(February 24, 2014), https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/reveh-2014-0028/html.
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Table 7-1. Limitations of the current surveillance systems obtained
from screening Q fever data
Source: “Deployment Health Surveillance.”
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Figure 7-2. Notified respiratory tract infections due to the national system
without 2016 data
Source: “Deployment Health Surveillance.”

Qualitative Analysis of the Current Military
Surveillance Systems – Lessons Identified
In both systems, misclassification due to lack of training or qualification
and completeness of data were the main problem areas. Overall, the EpiNATO2
systems show fewer limitations than the national system. Most highlighted
issues were difficulties in classification of patients’ presentation, absence
of a feedback report to motivate data-entering personnel, and the
inadequate automation of the national system.
For the national system, one likely reason is the lack of analysis and
feedback of the reported data at the evaluation unit in the homeland due
to staff ing shortages, leading to severe problems with data quality.13
The major problems of all health surveillance systems are related to human
factors, including lack of qualification, training, motivation, and supervision.14
This problem was especially notable in the national system—data quality
depends on the actions of the hygiene inspector in the mission and

13. K. Wilkins et al., “The Data for Decision Making Project: Assessment of Surveillance Systems
in Developing Countries to Improve Access to Public Health Information,” Public Health 122, no. 9
(September 2008): 914–22, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0033350607003563
?via%3Dihub; and Weiyi Xiong, Jun Lv, and Liming Li, “A Survey of Core and Support Activities
of Communicable Disease Surveillance Systems at Operating-level CDCs in China,” BMC Public
Health 10, no. 704 (November 17, 2010), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186
/1471-2458-10-704.
14. Henry Jefferson et al., “Evaluation of a Syndromic Surveillance for the Early Detection of Outbreaks
among Military Personnel in a Tropical Country,” Journal of Public Health 30, no. 4 (December 2008):
375–83, https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/30/4/375/1508419.
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his enthusiasm to go to visit the MTF physically and ask weekly for the
necessary information.
Second, the same information must be sent to two different databases,
using two different spreadsheets and dissemination routes for the national
system and EpiNATO2, doubling the workload. Thus, personal motivation
becomes crucial to the quality of the reported data. A possible solution
is to use automated routine reporting and a single dissemination chain.15
Alternatively, both systems could be linked with primary-care patient
documentation mandated by law. Both the national system (disease-specific)
and EpiNATO2 (event-based surveillance) could generate data automatically
from the entered data and distribute it to the different SMEs for analysis
and feedback, benefiting the personnel workload and the data quality of the
systems.16 Both systems were designed to assess the public health burden
of diseases and injuries but not for early detection of outbreaks as they
use only weekly reporting and rely on the reporting of clinical diagnoses
with the associated temporal lag. To close the capability gap to detect
an outbreak in a timely manner, a syndromic surveillance should be designed
that can also be fed from the same real-time (or at least daily) data source
in primary care.
Another challenge for both systems is reliable coding. The observed
misclassifications can limit the early detection of an outbreak, overlap the
severity of a disease, and indirectly affect military operations. The most
important way to reduce misclassification is the willingness and qualification
of users to participate in the system. Lack thereof leads to poor data
quality. Acceptance is also increased by feedback where the users see a result
of their efforts.
Both systems work without laboratory confirmation. Laboratory results
are needed to decrease the percentage of misdiagnosing and incorrect
management.17 Therefore, results should be automatically fed into the
15. Badraih Alotaibi et al., “Strengthening Health Security at the Hajj Mass Gatherings: Characteristics
of the Infectious Diseases Surveillance Systems Operational during the 2015 Hajj,” Journal of Travel
Medicine 24, no. 3 (May–June, 2017), https://academic.oup.com/jtm/article/24/3/taw087/305346;
and James W. Buehler et al., “Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for Early
Detection of Outbreaks: Recommendations from the CDC Working Group,” Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report, Recommendations and Reports, May 7, 2004.
16. Cédric Abat et al., “Traditional and Syndromic Surveillance of Infectious Diseases and Pathogens,”
International Journal of Infectious Diseases 48 (July 2016): 22–28, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science
/article/pii/S1201971216310384?via%3Dihub.
17.

Lau, “Infectious Diseases in the Pacific Islands.”
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surveillance system to support the analysis.18 Routine laboratory service has
a temporal lag of one to two weeks—often due to the necessity of sending
specimens to a reach-back laboratory, which is not useful for a timely response.19
In the context of an outbreak, appropriate laboratory capabilities according
to endemic agents on-site are necessary to provide timely laboratory support
and combine the strengths of syndromic and specific surveillance. 20

Analysis
Due to their design, both surveillance systems analyzed here cannot
operate as a near-real-time surveillance system. To improve user compliance,
the two systems should be integrated into the primary health care medical
recording, where the needed data could be automatically captured and
transferred for epidemiological analysis and feedback. As seen above,
NATO can complement national situational awareness through surveillance,
intelligence-sharing, and risk assessments vital for NATO biodefense. 21
Robust disease surveillance is a key factor for the early detection
of an outbreak, regardless of whether deliberated or naturally occurring.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of an early-warning system
for early infectious disease outbreak detection was again visible and addressed
by different national bodies and experts. Since the above-mentioned meeting
of NATO in 2002, armed forces have begun to develop syndromic surveillance
systems on a national level, with their own objectives and procedures. They all
have been tailored to the main objectives of early detection of potential epidemics,
evaluation of their potential impact on operational capacity, and the provision
of information to facilitate the medical response for the representative nation.
Many studies showed the value of syndromic surveillance within the military. 22
A mandated NATO solution for a near-real-time surveillance tool that will
18. Andres G. Lescano et al., “Statistical Analyses in Disease Surveillance Systems,” BMC Proceedings 2,
no. 7 (November 14, 2008), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/1753-6561-2-s3-s7.
19. Axel A. Bonačić Marinović et al., “Speed Versus Coverage Trade Off in Targeted Interventions
during an Outbreak,” Epidemics 8 (September 2014): 28–40, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science
/article/pii/S1755436514000358?via%3Dihub.
20. S. Arunmozhi Balajee, Ray Arthur, and Anthony W. Mounts, “Global Health Security: Building
Capacities for Early Event Detection, Epidemiologic Workforce, and Laboratory Response,” Health Security
14, no. 6 (December 1, 2016), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/hs.2015.0062.
21. “New RD Publications – COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics,” NATO (website), May 25. 2020,
https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1440.
22. Jean-Baptiste Meynard et al., “Value of Syndromic Surveillance within the Armed Forces
for Early Warning during a Dengue Fever Outbreak in French Guiana in 2006,” BMC Medical
Informatics and Decision Making 8, no. 29 (July 2, 2008), https://bmcmedinformdecismak.biomedcentral.com
/articles/10.1186/1472-6947-8-29.
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cover the whole theatre, including the reporting from all deployed nations,
is not available at the present time.
Therefore, the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine
(NATO MILMED COE) started the development of a fully automated,
early-warning system that may help prevent the mentioned lessons identified,
including misclassifications, doubling of workload, and especially delivering
up-to-date health status information to the commander in mission, as described
in the next section.
Table 7-2. Main characteristics of the two systems used for public health
surveillance in case study
(Original by author)
Surveillance Characteristics

GSfND

EpiNATO-2

Nationality

National

Multinational

Year implemented

2006

2013

Activation period

Permanent

Permanent

Periodicity of surveillance

Weekly

Weekly

Geographic scope

National Armed Forces
mission

NATO, EU, single nations

Participating units

All national MTFs in missions

Specified NATO nations MTFs,
depending on national contribution

Population monitored

Active-duty national military
personnel in mission

Deployed NATO/EU forces

Recorded data for patients

ICD10 code, weekly FHP
reports

14 specific disease and injuries
events and 4 nonspecific disease
and injuries events

Syndrome
for recorded data

Acute respiratory tract
infection, flu symptoms and
pneumonia, other respiratory
tract infection

Upper respiratory tract infection,
influenza-like illness, and lower
respiratory tract infection

Person responsible
for data input

Military general practitioner
or nurses

Military general practitioner or
nurse

Support for input

PC – Word and Excel

PC – Excel

Person responsible for data
collecting and sending
to experts

National hygiene inspector

CJMed, PREVMed

Data transmission

National intranet (secured
network)

Internet unclassified

Automatization of data analysis

Not automated

Automated

147

Ruhl and Tóth

Surveillance Characteristics

GSfND

EpiNATO-2

Methods of data analysis

No data analysis

Crude rates and statistical process
control, u-Chart, EWMA, funnel plot

Syntheses for commander

No indicators

Narrative in feedback

Feedback for actors

No feedback

Weekly

Dissemination to user

No dissemination

To CJMed, LSO, MTFs

Evaluation program

No evaluation

Regular side surveys to conduct
audit and evaluation during
deployment

Near-Real-Time Surveillance Project
of the NATO MILMED COE
Timely detection and countermeasures are critical in mitigating the
effects of natural outbreaks and biological attacks. Due to the exponential
nature of the diseases causing major outbreaks, countermeasures introduced
early can fundamentally change the impact on society as a whole and,
more specifically, our military and medical support systems. Furthermore,
such a system may provide data to inform force health protection and
overall disease control and a quantif ied database on the health of the
surveyed population that can help planning, stockpiling of resources, and
evidence-based decision-making and reforms.

Brief Overview of Real-time Surveillance Efforts in NATO
The idea to establish a NATO-wide disease surveillance system has
been a declared goal of the Alliance for the last 20 years. As referenced
in the previous section, at the 2002 Prague NATO Summit of Heads
of State and Government, decisive capability gaps in NATO’s abilities
to react to asymmetric threats were identif ied. Among these capability
gaps was the lack of an early-warning disease surveillance system to detect
naturally occurring or deliberately caused outbreaks of infectious disease.
By 2005, several national medical surveillance capabilities had been
identified and tested concerning their ability to serve NATO’s requirements.
Finally, two syndromic surveillance systems were identified, which could
possibly close the early-warning gap: the British (GBR) Portable Remote
Illness and Symptoms Monitor (PRISM) system and the French (FRA) system
Alert et Surveillance en temps Reel (ASTER). After multiple international
testing phases and a live deployment to KFOR, the concept was solid enough
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to be implemented in the form of an institution, and so, NATO’s highest
medical decision-making body, the Committee of the Chiefs of Medical
Services in NATO (COMEDS), supported the establishment of a deployment
health surveillance capability (DHSC) for NATO in Munich, which came
to realization in 2010.
Since then, there have been several high-level initiatives to create
an all-encompassing logistical and medical information system,
which has manifested in the medical communications and information systems
(MEDCIS) development initiative, and later in the NATO Enablement
Support Services (ESS) Medical Suite (MEDSUITE) development.
The latter is currently in development, with the disease surveillance
function being one of the planned modules for deployment in 2026
at the earliest.
In 2011, to integrate the DHSC into NATO better and to utilize
an obvious synergy between these organizations, the DHSC was integrated
into the NATO MILMED COE as a satellite branch. For the next 11 years,
the DHSC branch deployed and tested the ASTER system and provided
force protection advice to nations, and finally expanded into being a provider
of a broader, force health protection function. 23
This role change, which has been ref lected in the branch taking up the
name “Force Health Protection Branch” (FHPB), and the regular activities
of the branch with such systems, ensured that they had the broadest possible
experience in the field of disease surveillance and its importance in NATO.
This need was further reinforced by the fact that the branch has taken
custodianship of the NATO Standardization Agreement “Deployment Health
Surveillance,” which is a template and set of requirements for an effective
disease surveillance system in NATO. 24 This seemingly simple administrative
role and its overall background positioned the branch ideally to take
up the long-dormant initiative of a near-real-time medical surveillance system
for NATO.
Since neither the PR ISM nor the ASTER system has proven
to be a perfect and stable solution for this issue, mainly due to national
23. Hans-Ulrich Holtherm, “Development of a Multinational Deployment Health Surveillance
Capability (DHSC) for NATO,” Worldwide Military-Medicine (website), January 31, 2019,
https://military-medicine.com/article/3650-development-of-a-multinational-deployment-health
-surveillance-capability-dhsc-for-nato.html.
24. NATO, Deployment Health Surveillance, Allied Medical Publication (AMP)-4.1, ed. A, ver. 2
(Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, January 2017), https://coemed.org/files/stanags/03_AMEDP
/AMedP-4.1_EDA_V2_E_2535.pdf.

149

Ruhl and Tóth

restrictions and having no control over the development of these tools,
the FHPB, with the support of subject matter experts (SMEs) of the NATO
MILMED COE, has decided to develop a prototype system based on a widely
available software development environment: Microsoft Office 365 Apps and
Azure Cloud.

Development of a Working Near-real-time Surveillance Tool
In 2019, the NATO MILMED COE successfully migrated its information
systems to the cloud. This step opened previously unavailable options for system
and process integration and short development cycles for new capabilities and
has been especially useful during the lockdown and remote-work periods that
came in early 2020, as the COE could transition to remote-work immediately.
The measures against the pandemic also meant a great number of COE
courses, events, and other planned activities were canceled or postponed,
resulting in a higher availability of funds for experimental projects and
a more available staff to work on such an initiative. Moreover, the FHP
Branch has been very active with organizing an important forum for the
military-medical staff involved in the fight against COVID-19. These forums
have been reinforced with additional SMEs joining the ranks and seconded
experts from within the MILMED COE, which include an epidemiologist
and an information management expert with experience in designing field
data collection systems. The first concept to be proven was technical viability,
while keeping the development platform in-house. The tool had to meet
multiple key requirements to be considered a success:
1. Modular setup. The three distinct modules (see description
of system below) can function without each other and allow
external partners to choose which functions they use from the COE’s
tool and which ones they solve on their own. Practically, this means
that a nation can decide only to use the analysis tool or only to send
data to the database, but not use the COE’s data-entry solution.
Data entry must not require any preexisting medical training, and
it must focus on symptoms that can be collected during a simple
primary-care visit.
2. Interoperability and compatibility. The tool must run on the
widest possible spectrum of hardware devices and operating systems.
It must be able to receive and display data from other medical
databases as background or for common analysis.

150

Chapter 7 Military Health Surveillance Systems Supporting Resilience and Critical Infrastructure

3. Scalability. The tool must be able to work with a virtually
unlimited number of medical treatment facilities.
4. Security. While the current system runs on open Internet,
it has to offer encrypted communication through the entire process
and be portable to secure networks.
5. Easily modifiable/short development cycles. The tool should
be built in a way that it is easily modifiable, as it will always
be under development, and it will probably be tailored for specific
missions to enhance precision.
6. Eases the work of the SMEs. The tool should provide clear
and well-established quantitative analysis with visual aides to ease
the work of the epidemiologists and provide tailored feedback
to MTFs and other users.
The system can be divided into three distinct parts:
1. Data entry module/API. Data can be submitted via MILMED
COE’s custom-made application running on Android, IOS, Mac,
or Windows and in practically any modern browser or directly
to the database from national systems or databases via API calls,
automated e-mails or specific workflows. Customized, remotely
managed tablets are being tested live in the Bundeswehr’s Military
Hospital in Munich.
2. Database. The main, live fact tables are stored in SharePoint
lists until archived. The support data, such as a list and location
of treatment facilities, population figures, and camp locations are
stored in separate lists with easy maintainability by the administrative
staff. The database can be shared easily if required.
3. Data analysis, visualization, and alert module. The data is fed
to a PowerBI report and dashboard, which analyses and visualizes the
specific symptom groups as determined by the underlying algorithms.
The system fetches data every working hour automatically but can
be updated at any moment manually. A larger frequency of automated
updates is possible, and it can generate e-mail–based alerts for special
parameters and thresholds.
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The f irst version of the tool was completed within three months
between September and November 2020 and was demonstrated live at the
COMEDS Plenary in December, where the nations noted its development
and lauded the NATO MILMED COE’s proactive stance on the issue.
The limited goals of the prototype were also stated as the following:
1. Proof of concept. Such a tool can be developed easily
with modern software solutions, and the end product’s
capabilities and versatility far outpace previous attempts.
2. Possibility to test syndromic algorithms. The most
important intellectual property in such a tool is the precision
of the algorithms and the know-how of data collection with
standardized symptom lists, thresholds, and diagnoses that one
can program for the tool to provide a precise analysis. These
algorithms have to be tested by dummy and live data determine
their precision.
3. Capturing data. The tool, even in a work-in-progress version,
has to collect as much live data as possible. Currently, a great portion
of syndromic data is not recorded properly in missions, which leaves
important benchmark data unrecorded.
The Committee of Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO was
also informed that the tool would participate in the Coalition Warrior
Interoperability Exercise, CWIX 2021, where it would interface with other
national and NATO-wide systems to provide further proof of its viability.
The member states noted the tool’s development and lauded the NATO
MILMED COE’s proactive stance. Some expressed a deeper interest
in the project. During the months after, the COE’s SMEs introduced the tool
to several COMEDS working groups and at Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) events. They started to build the scientific community behind the
tool to develop the algorithms and syndromes for it, while at the same time
initiating changes and improvements to the tool’s modules. These developments
were put to the test at the CWIX’21, where a biological threat caused
by an attack on critical infrastructure was simulated. The next subsection
analyzes how the tool performed during the exercise and informed
further development.
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Case Study: NATO MILMED COE Near-real-time
Surveillance Tool in Practice
The real-time surveillance tool produced a simulated attack on critical
infrastructure resulting in biological threats. The CWIX in 2021 was
mainly a virtual event, due to the pandemic, but this did not hamper the
deployment of the NRTS tool. The MILMED COE team established
connections to the national and NATO systems being tested and performed
a comprehensive mapping of how NATO’s and the participating nations’
systems communicate and what message standards are being applied.
The team also created translation/mapping tables that transformed the
incoming data to the NATO format. The scenario included a cyberattack
on a water treatment plant that supplied multiple units on the f ield
with potable water. The units were colocated and organized in the same higher
unit but had their own ROLE-1 level treatment facilities (basic primary care)
reporting in, so we could also monitor and process data coming from different
sources at about the same location (see figure 7-3).

Figure 7-3. The quick map reference of cases. The overlapping circles show multiple
units reporting from the same camp, and the size of the circle refers to the number
of cases
(Original by author)
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In the meantime, the team monitored the messages in JCHAT,
the text-based chat in NATO’s missions, where they could see the alert of
the cyberattack and connect it to the outbreak of a gastrointestinal disease,
so the FHPB could run an analysis and provide advice to the commander
on countermeasures. The tool could receive, process, and feed data back
into these systems, including NATO’s Integration Core (INTCORE),
which automatically transformed the alerts into JCHAT messages and made
it available with key data to a wide range of systems in the mission.
During the three days of simulations and running the entire scenario
twice, the system recorded 320 visits and alerted for gastrointestinal disease
for 39 patients, triggering an early alarm on the first day (see table 7-3).

Figure 7-4. Analysis dashboard of the gastrointestinal disease cases
(Original by author)
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It also picked up alerts for possible COVID-like diseases, and some
other, less critical illnesses. The patient profiles were built by the FHPB
and distributed to the exercise audience, who made their inputs either
via their national systems or using the COE’s data-entry module.
The processed data and alerts were reviewed by FHPB staff and verified, in the
end, that while certain improvements in message standards and communication
protocols will be necessary, the system worked as intended.
When evaluating the overall outcome, the criteria for success for the
entire system were:
1. Modular setup. The modules have been used separately from
each other successfully, as the training audience could enter data via
its normal medical dataflow, ensuring that no duplicate data entry
was needed.
2. Interoperability and compatibility. The tool imported data from
external databases and the entry module was run on phones, tablets,
and PCs with multiple operating systems and browsers.
3. Scalability. The tool received the data without issue when
receiving the entries of the three simulated days within a span of a
few hours. Data refresh remained consistent within a few minutes.
4. Security. The tool ran on MILMED COE’s secure cloud and
data entry only happened from verified sources and with
authenticated users.
5. Easily modifiable/short development cycles. The tool has since
been further developed based on user feedback from the exercise.
The development, which added new functionality of storing and
sending the data onward when Internet coverage is not stable, was
completed in a few days. Since then, the tool has been deployed
for a real-life test in Munich.
6. Eases the work of the SMEs: The analysis of whether the first
alerts are merited was done in minutes, and the corresponding
messages to the commanders and warnings to the deployed forces
were sent soon afterward, with automatically collated data to verify
them. It also offers a simplified graphical interface, which can
be overlaid with various Common Operational Picture (COP) maps
and data.
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Table 7-3. Simplified, automated export to NATO INTCORE data lake and
transmission service on suspected COVID-19 cases
(Original by author)
Theatre

MTF Serial

ID

Syndrome

Latitude

Longitude

Date and
Time of
Admission

SKOLKAN

Kuldiga-NLD-R2

NRTSP-69

COVID-19

56.58128

21.57689

09/06/2021

Iraq

Mosul-US-R1

NRTSP-72

COVID-19

36.201

43.7133

09/06/2021

SKOLKAN

COE-DEU-R1

NRTSP-99

COVID-19

57.1989

22.3531

09/06/2021

Congo/Mali

Gao-BEL-R1

NRTSP-107

COVID-19

0.01293

16.14742

09/06/2021

Congo/Mali

Gao-BEL-R1

NRTSP-112

COVID-19

0.01293

16.14742

09/06/2021

Congo/Mali

Gao-BEL-R1

NRTSP-116

COVID-19

0.01293

16.14742

09/06/2021

SKOLKAN

Talsi-NLD-R1

NRTSP-70

COVID-19

57.1488

22.35243

10/06/2021

SKOLKAN

Latvia-FIN-R1

NRTSP-83

COVID-19

57.20349

22.35391

10/06/2021

Iraq

Mosul-US-R1

NRTSP-68

COVID-19

36.201

43.7133

10/06/2021

Iraq

Mosul-US-R1

NRTSP-78

COVID-19

36.201

43.7133

10/06/2021

SKOLKAN

Kuldiga-NLD-R2

NRTSP-88

COVID-19

56.58128

21.57689

10/06/2021

SKOLKAN

Latvia-FIN-R1

NRTSP-110

COVID-19

57.20349

22.35391

10/06/2021

SKOLKAN

Talsi-NLD-R1

NRTSP-108

COVID-19

57.1488

22.35243

10/06/2021

Conclusion
In recent decades, it has become clear that the protection of critical
infrastructure requires a wide spectrum of capabilities, many of which
are outside the scope of regular military tasks. The effects of climate
change and the change in the volume of migration can substantially
increase the chance of transmission of contagious diseases and highlight
the need for functional, fast, and easy-to-use monitoring systems in areas
such as the arctic or new military deployment theaters around the world.
This will require f lexible, rugged, and easily scalable systems
with a short turnaround in development to meet the ever-changing mission
parameters. The systems introduced here play a role, but truly functional
preventive measures will rely on timely information. The advancement
in technology, especially in data collection and analysis, and the accessibility
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of this technology means data can be collected more easily than a few
years ago, giving NATO an important tool to protect against the devastating
effects of an unmitigated pandemic or biological attack. Therefore, national
and NATO assets that collect syndromic patient data should be pooled
to provide the widest possible reach for data collection while keeping all
necessary privacy and data protection rules. NATO MILMED COE’s
surveillance tool could serve as a model for a NATO-wide, near-real-time
disease surveillance system.
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ABSTRACT: Energy security plays an increasingly important role in the
common security of NATO Allies. Energy facilities such as pipelines,
oil and gas terminals, and even oil fields have become targets of attacks
by various terrorist groups. By taking over energy-sector infrastructure,
terrorists can manipulate state actors and obtain significant revenues
to develop their military capabilities. In such circumstances, NATO
countries and their troops must consider the harmful activities of terrorist
groups to protect NATO’s energy resources and ensure future supplies
to Alliance members.
Keywords: terrorism, energy, fuel, Africa, oil

Introduction
Energy security plays a critical role in the common security of the NATO
Alliance. NATO’s role in energy security was first defined in 2008 at the
Bucharest Summit and has since been strengthened.1 Disruption of energy
supplies has a signif icant impact on the safety of NATO members and
partner countries and may affect the implementation of military operations.
While these topics are primarily the responsibility of the member states,
NATO member countries regularly hold consultations on energy security
to increase their strategic awareness of energy security and provide the military
1. “NATO’s Role in Energy Security,” NATO (website), n.d., accessed October 12, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.
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with a reliable energy supply. Crude oil, as well as gas, are currently the main
sources for the production of goods, health care, transport, and investment
in new technologies. Moreover, fuel is indispensable for the sustainment
of military operations. The high fuel demand of combat forces must be fulfilled
to ensure the effectiveness and safety of the alliance.
This chapter will discuss the increasing number of terrorist groups
and rebel cells that interfere with global energy supplies and carry out
terrorist attacks on energy facilities. As many European countries strongly
rely on imports from Africa and the Middle East and at the same time aim
to reduce energy dependence on Russia, it is crucial to indicate the main
pillars and actions that jeopardize the extraction and transport
of natural resources.
In this chapter, the author initially indicates threats to the energy sector
that have evolved since 2003 because of terrorist attacks. Afterward, the most
significant strikes on energy infrastructure in the last decade are distinguished.
Subsequently, the emphasis is put on terrorist organizations that are acquiring
and transporting energy resources. Finally, the author offers recommendations
that NATO could implement due to the current terrorist threats to the energy
sector in Africa and the Middle East. Fundamental sources include reports
from think tanks, national authorities, press releases, scientific articles, and
historical analyses.
Research on this scale, focused on terrorist threats to the energy sector,
has been conducted to a very limited extent. This study will show that primarily
terrorist organizations from Africa and the Middle East impede supplies
to NATO members.
The following chapter is vital for NATO military and policy practitioners
due to several factors. Energy supplies are crucial to any military activity.
The majority of NATO countries are partially dependent on Russian supplies
and therefore need diversification. Many regions in Africa and the Middle
East are many rich in energy resources but vulnerable to terrorist threats.
This vulnerability will need to be considered regarding future NATO missions
in the region. In order to sustain current technological development, it is crucial
to provide vital energy from a secure and constant source. The involvement
of terrorists in seizing energy supplies, the international crisis, and
the increasing role of Russia and China in the energy market should
be a cornerstone for future research on threats to the energy sector.
Notable drivers that impact the energy supplies to NATO include the
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, an unstable internal situation
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of many states in Africa and the Middle East, aggressive Russian energy policy,
and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These phenomena have led governments
to introduce numerous measures affecting the economic situation and fuel
demand and supply worldwide. Complicated relations between the elements
inf luencing fuel supply make it necessary to pursue the efficient use of fuels
to ensure an uninterrupted supply chain.
The energy sector is a fundamental part of every baseline requirement
defined by NATO as crucial to sustaining the resilience of the Alliance.
Energy supplies and their use are strongly connected with supporting the
continuous work of critical government services, maintaining the supply
of raw materials, controlling the inf low of people, providing water and food,
sustaining the electricity to deal with mass casualties, offering constant
communication, and maintaining means of transport. 2
The energy sector is vital on the civilian and military levels.
Without energy supplies, no NATO members could use tanks or planes.
The disruption of energy supplies would cause insecurity in the societies of
member and partner countries of the Alliance and adversely affect NATO
military operations. Energy security is a key resilience factor and has
become more important since the emergence of cyber and hybrid threats
to infrastructure. As the energy transition has begun globally, armed forces must
adapt to new challenges and maintain operational efficiency by diversifying
sources of supplies. Moreover, combat forces have significant fuel needs,
and this dependence can affect their performance, increase their
vulnerability, and force them to reassign part of their personnel to the
protection of supply lines. 3
The operability of NATO and allied states’ troops in Africa and the
Middle East using the energy infrastructure of states in the region requires
access to the deposits, pipelines, and transmission routes. To fulf ill its
potential, NATO needs energy for standard mobility. Using local resources,
NATO can carr y out operations more easily in a sustained and
efficient manner.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is also triggering true NATO
cohesion and demonstrating reliance of the Alliance on energy imported
from Russia. However, differing approaches toward sanctioning and boycotting
2. Jamie Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” NATO Review (website),
March 30, 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective
-defence/index.html.
3. “Energy Security,” NATO (website), updated July 11, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq
/topics_49208.htm.

163

Olech

energy supplies undermine the internal cooperation of NATO and show
its vulnerabilities. Although some countries decided to ban gas and oil
from Russia, others are unwilling to cut the supplies. Moreover, Russian
actions, such as attacks on nuclear power plants and the destruction of pipelines
in Ukraine, must be considered as such war tactics could be used by terrorists
and other malign actors. Adding to their gray warfare tactics of plausible
denial, during the period when Russia halted energy exports to some countries,
the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines were sabotaged, causing the single largest
release of methane in history.4
Russia holds leverage over some European countries because it produces
roughly 30 percent of Europe’s natural gas supply. Notwithstanding,
in 2019, there were 12 countries exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to NATO (including Alliance members Norway and the United States).
Qatar, the largest trader of LNG to European NATO members, is responsible
for over a quarter of LNG imports, which means more than 25 percent
of LNG imports are transported through the important straits of Hormuz
and Bab el-Mandeb and the dangerous waters of the Gulf of Aden. 5
Other important exporters are Algeria, accounting for 13.5 percent,
and Nigeria, constituting 13 percent; both countries are struggling
with terrorist organizations that want to control energy supplies. 6
Furthermore, some LNG that could be rerouted to Europe is exported
from Africa and then sold to Asia, the main importer. In December 2021,
as much as 2.73 metric tons of LNG was delivered from Africa to Europe
in comparison with Russia, which supplied 1.44 metric tons to Europe.7
Some NATO countries mainly rely on the imports of Russian gas
(for example, the Czech Republic and Hungary). At the same time,
other countries (such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France) are only

4. Richard Valdmanis, “Nord Stream Rupture May Mark the Biggest Single Methane Release Ever
Recorded, U.N. Says” Reuters (website), September 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nord
-stream-rupture-may-mark-biggest-single-methane-release-ever-recorded-un-2022-09-30/.
5. “From Where Do We Import Energy?,” Eurostat (website), n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache
/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html.
6. International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL), GIIGNL Annual Report 2020:
The LNG Industry, https://giignl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/giignl_-_2020_annual_report_-_04082020
.pdf; and Nina Howell and Adam Quigley, “LNG in Europe 2020: Current Trends, The European LNG
Landscape and Country Focus” (New York: Bracewell, 2020), https://bracewell.cld.bz/LNG-in-Europe-2020
-Current-Trends-The-European-LNG-Landscape-and-Country-Focus.
7. Nikos Tasafos (@ntsafos), “LNG flows in December 2021,” Twitter, January 23, 2022, 4:34 PM,
https://twitter.com/ntsafos/status/1485274819109212164.
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dependent on the Russian supplies for about 15 percent or less of their supply,
and the Baltic States stopped importing gas from Russia. 8
Therefore, the maintenance and protection of energy supplies are crucial
to the Alliance and its development. The Alliance’s dependency on fossil
fuels and its continuous search for diversif ication will continue to pose
a significant challenge.

Defining the Phenomenon of Terrorist Attacks
on Energy Infrastructure
From 1970–2018, there were almost 2,000 terrorist incidents in which
gas or oil facilities were the primary targets.9 Various African and Middle
Eastern countries rely economically on the extraction and processing of crude
oil and natural gas. However, production and distribution depend on critical
infrastructures such as pipelines, refineries, processing plants, terminals,
oil rig substations, pumping stations, ships, and tankers. At the same time,
several countries struggle with internal wars and terrorist organizations that
attempt to destroy critical infrastructure, threaten to make it their target,
or seize it for their purposes and benefits. Between 1999–2012, more than
200 attacks on critical infrastructure related to Africa’s oil and gas industry
occurred.10 Between 2014–16, al-Qaeda and Daesh alone were responsible
for over 70 attacks on the energy sector in North Africa (Algeria, Libya,
and Egypt).11
Despite being significantly enfeebled in recent years, Daesh has persisted
in striking oil and gas industry-related facilities. Instances include attacks
on Libya’s al-Ghani oil f ield in 2015, in which 11 guards were killed,
and the Zillah oil facility in 2019, which caused the death of five people.
Similarly, energy facilities in the Middle East have also been frequent targets
8. “Russia ‘Earned’ $98bn in Fuel Exports in 100 Days of Ukraine War,” Al Jazeera (website),
June 13, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/13/russia-earned-98bn-from-fuel-export-in
-100-days-of-ukraine-war; and “Baltic States Become First in Europe to Stop Russian Gas Imports,”
Euractiv (website), April 4, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/baltic-states-become
-first-in-europe-to-stop-russian-gas-imports.
9. Chia-yi Lee, “Why Do Terrorists Target the Energy Industry? A Review of Kidnapping, Violence and
Attacks against Energy Infrastructure,” Energy Research & Social Science 87 (May 2022): 5.
10. Lord Aikins Adusei, “Terrorism, Insurgency, Kidnapping, and Security in Africa’s Energy Sector,”
African Security Review 24, no. 3 (2015): 332–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2015.1072967.
11. Lukáš Tichý and Jan Eichler, “Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector: The Case of Al Qaeda
and the Islamic State,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 6 (2018): 450–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057
610X.2017.1323469.
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of terrorist organizations. Analogous incidents have occurred with the gas
and oil pipeline in Yemen and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
One meaningful example would be the failed al-Qaeda attack on the Saudi
giant Abqaiq oil processing plant in February 2006, the first incident of this
type in the world’s top oil provider country.12
Terrorism targeting the energ y sector is a growing worldwide
phenomenon. In 2003, such strikes accounted for 25 percent of terrorist
attacks, rising to 35 percent in 2005.13 In 2016, there was a 14 percent increase
in terrorist attacks targeted at the oil and gas industry, which comprised
almost 42 percent of all attacks.14 Not limited to physical attacks on power
plants, refineries, and gas or oil pipelines, they include other illegal activities
(such as theft of oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or selling raw
materials) to finance and support groups carrying out the physical attacks.15
Nevertheless, funding mechanism characteristics remain unknown, as the only
transparent and reliably verifiable money transfers are those from kidnapping
and extortion.16 Refineries, platforms, and factory workers’ abductions are
not uncommon. Such actions are aimed at obtaining a ransom, drawing
attention to terrorist organizations, destabilizing the activities of corporations
from countries considered to be enemies by harming them economically,
or lastly, undermining the credibility of a given country as it becomes unable
to ensure the safety of companies and employees.
Moreover, oil terrorism has been proven to have negative repercussions
on the country’s internal social situation as the related human rights violations
perpetrated by terrorists have amplified popular grievances and multiplied
terrorist and criminal activity as a consequence.17 Furthermore, quantitative
studies have shown that this kind of domestic terrorism is directly responsible
12. Simon Henderson, “Al-Qaeda Attack on Abqaiq: The Vulnerability of Saudi Oil,” Washington Institute
(website), February 28, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/al-qaeda-attack-abqaiq
-vulnerability-saudi-oil.
13. Jennifer Giroux, “Targeting Energy Infrastructure: Examining the Terrorist Threat in North Africa
and its Broader Implications (ARI)” (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute, February 13, 2009),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145554/ARI25-2009_Giroux_Energy_Infraestructure_Terrorist_Threat_North
_Africa.pdf.
14. “Terrorist Attacks and Political Violence: How Oil Is Impacted,” One Brief (website), n.d.,
accessed November 18, 2021, https://theonebrief.com/terrorism-political-violence-risk-impact-to-oil
-energy-industry.
15. Lukáš Tichý, “The Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy in North Africa,” Energy Strategy Reviews 24 (2019):
254–60, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.04.001.
16. Chia-yi Lee, “Oil and Terrorism: Uncovering the Mechanisms,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 5
(May 2018): 903–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716673702.
17. James A. Piazza, “Oil and Terrorism: An Investigation of Mediators,” Public Choice 169 (2016): 251–68,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0357-0.
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for the increase in oil prices, which may lead to the worsening of social and
economic instability. Such a scenario becomes even more pressing and alarming
in particularly fragile countries, mainly in Africa and the Middle East,
which often must deal with terrorism in the energy industry.18 It is also
a challenge for NATO countries importing from insecure regions. A cessation
of energy supplies could strongly impact the majority of European countries
and create an inability to use military forces that rely on gasoline.

Most Significant Terrorist Attacks
on Energy Infrastructure in the Last Decade

Figure 8-1. The most significant terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure
in the last decade
(Original map by author)

Aramco, Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest energy suppliers in the world and
closely cooperates, frequently on a military basis, with many NATO countries
(for example, the United States and France). Aramco is a Saudi Arabian
18. Dillon F. Farrell, “Oil & Terrorism: How Terrorism Affects Oil Rents” (master’s thesis, Ridge College
of Intelligence Studies and Applied Sciences/Mercyhurst University, 2016).
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oil company based in Dhahran and is the biggest oil producer worldwide,
as it is responsible for providing 10 percent of the global supply.19
In 2016, Saudi Arabia ranked as the second country in the world as far
as oil reserves are concerned, constituting 16.2 percent of the global oil
reserve. 20 Such conditioning makes this region crucial for NATO energy
security. Moreover, the Saudi economy itself is highly dependent on the oil
industry. Being a critical point of the energy sector, Aramco has been the target
of aggression, including two signif icant cyberattacks in 2012 and 2017
and a drone attack in 2019. 21
The 2012 attack, executed with the Shamoon virus, damaged
10,000 company computers. The virus, malicious malware classif ied
as a wiper, erases the hard drives of the computers it infects.
According to former US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, it was the most
destructive cyberattack on the private sector to that date. 22 The attack occurred
on August 15, 2012. Consequently, all significant internal networks were
shut down for almost a month. It is acknowledged that the attack aimed
not to seize data but to eliminate the greatest possible number of systems. 23
The attack raised concerns regarding the company’s cybersecurity, as there are
claims that it might have been performed by someone who had physical and
direct access to a computer on the Aramco network. 24 Following the attack,
the company isolated its electronic systems from the outside world to prevent
the situation from happening again.
Five years later, in August 2017, Aramco faced another attack
performed with a new malware version—namely Shamoon 2.0. 25 In this case,
the attack aimed at erasing data and sabotaging the company’s functions.
Furthermore, all investigators acknowledged that the attack was meant
to trigger an explosion and cause the loss of lives. According to experts,
19. Dahlia Nehme, “Saudi Aramco: The Oil Colossus,” Reuters (website), November 3, 2019, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-ipo-factbox-idUSKBN1XD03T.
20. “Saudi Arabia Oil,” Worldometer (website), https://www.worldometers.info/oil/saudi-arabia-oil/.
21. Marwa Rashad, “Saudi Aramco Sees Increase in Attempted Cyber Attacks,” Reuters (website),
February 6, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-aramco-security/saudi-aramco-sees-increase
-in-attempted-cyber-attacks-idUSL8N2A6703.
22. Reuters Staff, “ ‘Shamoon’ Virus Most Destructive Yet for Private Sector, Panetta Says,” Reuters
(website), October 11, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-pentagon-shimoon/shamoon-virus
-most-destructive-yet-for-private-sector-panetta-says-idUSBRE89B04Y20121012.
23. Sahar Alshathry, “Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco,” International Journal of Management & Information
Technology 11, no. 5 (2017): 3037, https://doi.org/10.24297/ijmit.v11i5.5613.
24.

Rashad, “Saudi Aramco Sees Increase.”

25. Salem Alelyani and Harish Kumar, “Overview of Cyberattack on Saudi Institutions,” Journal of
Information Security and Cybercrimes Research 1, no. 1 (2018): 1–9.
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the strike’s goal was to keep Saudi Arabia from diversifying its economy
and creating new employment opportunities for the young people of the
country. 26 The strike raised concerns regarding the global safety of energy
facilities. Furthermore, the incident represented a powerful and unique
example of this emerging threat, as the hackers could cause signif icant
physical damage.
The most recent physica l attack on the A ramco facilities
on September 14, 2019, was a knife in the heart of the Saudi economy.
It targeted Abqaiq and Khurais, the two strategic Aramco facilities
responsible for processing most of the Saudi crude oil. The strike was executed
with 10 drones aimed at the facilities. The incident provoked an increase
in oil prices and caused significant damage and a shortage of more than
5 percent of global oil supply. 27 Despite Yemeni Houthis claiming
responsibility for the attack, Saudi Arabia, along with Western powers,
accused Tehran. 28 A 2020 UN report ruled out the possibility that the drones
could have been launched from Yemeni territory. 29
The economic damage caused by the 2019 drone strike was significant,
followed by an upsurge in oil prices. The Saudi petrochemical industry
recovered due to its oil reserves and met the requirement for oil exports
with a slight delay. Moreover, the drone attack prompted Aramco to reconsider
its comprehensive security measures.
Strikes against the energy industry continue to raise concerns in the
international community. Saudi Arabia has long been considered a great
stabilizer of the oil market. However, recent incidents have revealed the
inner vulnerability of systems and structures, evidenced by the inexpensive
access to technology relative to the extent of the damage they caused.
Although the country reacted immediately, its apparent vulnerability
may discourage purchasers from relying on Saudi oil to a certain extent.
Furthermore, there is no conclusive reason to believe comparable attacks
26. Nicole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly Goal. Experts Fear
Another Try,” New York Times (website), March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi
-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html.
27. “Aramco Attack: Worst Disruption Ever Sends Oil Prices Soaring,” Al Jazeera (website),
September 16, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/9/16/aramco-attack-worst-disruption-ever
-sends-oil-prices-soaring.
28. Bill Chappell, “Saudi Arabia Says Iran ‘Unquestionably Sponsored’ Attack On Oil Facilities,”
NPR (website), September 18, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/18/761985624/saudi-arabia-says
-iran-unquestionably-sponsored-attack-on-oil-facilities.
29. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (New York: UN Security Council, April 28, 2020),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_326_E.pdf.
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will not recur in the future, as terrorists have shown interest in developing
new techniques and technologies between attacks. Shortly after the latest
strike, and not coincidentally, the United States, European countries,
the UN, and the International Energy Agency sent experts to Saudi
Arabia to investigate the attack. Thus, they showed a common interest
in obtaining additional information and developing joint preventive measures
for the future. 30

Ras Lanuf and As Sidra, Libya
In 2011, a NATO-led coalition initiated a military intervention in Libya.
However, the Alliance’s involvement was insufficient, and the country is still
suffering, unable to recover after the civil war. Libya’s rich natural resources
make its economy strictly dependent on gas and oil sales. This branch makes
up 94.4 percent of Libya’s total income from export. 31 In particular, Ras Lanuf
and As Sidra, located in the Gulf of Sirte, are the two most substantial oil
terminals, with a combined export capacity of around 600,000 barrels per day.
Numerous groups have targeted both locations to acquire control of Libya’s
largest economic branch. 32 Terrorists understand that the region’s economy
is strictly dependent on energy production. Therefore, this sector constitutes
a significant target of their activities and provides a chance to attain political
inf luence. Moreover, attacking pipelines and other energy facilities allows
them to gain additional income to fund their operations.
One of the most signif icant attacks occurred in January 2016,
when four oil storage tanks at the Ras Lanuf terminal were set on f ire.
Moreover, the assaulters targeted the pipeline, the biggest one on the Libyan
coast, leading to the As Sidra terminal. The Islamic State executed the
attack. The aftermath of the strike was considerably worse than the previous
ones. Military actions have targeted both terminals since 2011, as affected
facilities were equipped with the infrastructure necessary for oil refinement and

30. Michelle Nichols and Humeyra Pamuk, “Saudi Arabia Consults Allies on Oil Attack, Awaits Result
of Investigation: Official,” Reuters (website), September 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi
-aramco-attacks-un-idUSKBN1WA1T9.
31. Lukas Tichy, “The Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy in North Africa,” Energy Strategy Reviews 24
(2019): 254–60, https://doi:10.1016/j.esr.2019.04.001.
32. Mahmoud Barakat, “Libya Resumes Oil Exports at Sidra, Ras Lanuf Ports,” Anadolu Agency (website),
September 16, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/oil/libya-resumes-oil-exports-at-sidra-ras-lanuf
-ports/33615.
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export. Also, terminals remained closed for a longer period. Overall, Daesh’s
energy-related attacks have continued. 33
The financial loss was immense. The attack caused a significant shortage
in oil production, which fell to nearly 325,000 barrels per day in 2016,
which was previously about 1.7 million barrels per day. It directly affected
gas and oil exports, decreasing to 260,000 barrels per day in 2016 alone. 34
The terminals remained closed for a longer period. In May 2019, for example,
Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack on the Zella oilfield, belonging
to the Zueitina Oil Company, which did not result in significant physical
damages to the infrastructure but constituted another significant demonstration
of the actual threat of terrorist organizations on the Libyan energy sector. 35
Regardless of the internal situation in Libya, Western countries,
including the EU, whose energy security is dependent on imports from Libya
for about 3.4 percent of oil and 2 percent of gas, have also been affected. 36
Moreover, being a country rich in natural resources, Libya remains essential
for the European market. Any incident concerning oil security in Libya
affects NATO countries, given the country’s immense reserves. NATO,
particularly France, the United States, and Italy, were actively engaged in the
country’s transformations, surfacing during the Arab Spring, to secure their
interests regarding the energy sector. 37

In Salah, Krechba Oil Fields, Algeria
Algeria, a vital NATO partner, joined the Mediterranean Dialogue in 2000
and can help reduce NATO’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Salah Gas,
a joint venture formed by Sonatrach, BP, and Equinor, began gas production
in the three northern f ields of Krechba, Teguentour, and Reg in 2004.
In 2016, the other four southern gas fields of Gour Mahmoud, In Salah,
Garet el Befinat, and Hassi Moumene were included.
33. “Islamic State Militants Attack Lybia’s Ras Lanuf Oil Terminal,” Africa News (website),
January 21, 2016, https://www.africanews.com/2016/01/21/islamic-state-militants-attack-lybia-s-ras-lanuf
-oil-terminal/.
34.

Tichý, “Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy,” 258.

35. Ayman al-Warfalli, Ahmed Elumami, and Ahmed Eljechtimi, “Three Killed in Suspected Islamic
State Attack outside Libyan Oilfield,” Reuters (website), May 18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-libya-oil-attack-idUSKCN1SO0CP.
36. “Trade – Libya: EU Trade Relations with Libya: Facts, Figures and Latest Developments,”
European Commission (website), n.d., https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and
-region/countries-and-regions/libya_en.
37. Milad M. Elharathi, “Humanitarian Intervention: Morals versus Realism: The Use of Force
in the Defence of Human Rights in Libya,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 18, no. 1 (2014): 76,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504954.
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In March 2016, the Krechba oil f ield was attacked by an explosive
detonated from a long distance. Consequently, it had to be closed for safety
reasons. 38 Targeting the Sonatrach facilities could have immense consequences
as it is Africa’s largest oil and natural gas company, making Algeria the seventh
largest natural gas exporter in the world. Any threats to block production
could result in a shortage of supply and a signif icant increase in prices.
For this reason, Algeria, one of Europe’s leading gas suppliers, represents
a critical point in NATO’s strategy to combat terrorism and cyber threats. 39

Figure 8-2. The share of Algerian gas in total gas imports by EU countries
(Original chart by author)

Ashkelon, Israel
Israel has been a crucial NATO partner for more than 20 years and
an active member of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. The Trans-Israel
pipeline, also known as Eilat-Ashkelon or the Europe-Asia Pipeline,
was constructed to transport Iran-originated crude oil from Israel to Europe.
The pipeline operator, the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company (EAPC,
also known as Europe Asia Pipeline Company), has main infrastructures
in the cities of Eilat, Beersheva, and Ashkelon. The Ashkelon infrastructure
is the largest and belongs to the EAPC. Additionally, Ashkelon serves
as the base for various other independent oil storage tanks operated by different
international companies.
38. Associated Press, “Gas Facility in Algeria Is Attacked with Rockets,” New York Times (website),
March 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/africa/algeria-bp-statoil-gas-facility-attack.html.
39. James Thorpe, “NATO and Algeria Strengthen Counter-terror Partnership,” International Security
Journal (website), May 27, 2021, https://internationalsecurityjournal.com/nato-and-algeria-partnership/.
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On May 11, 2021, Hamas attacked the coastal city of Ashkelon,
and, as a result, the Israeli oil ref inery and pipelines, including the
Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, were destroyed. On May 12, after the assault,
which resulted in a fire of the Trans-Israel pipeline, the US public energy
corporation Chevron shut down its platform on the Israeli shore.40

Delta Oil Region, Nigeria
Nigeria is currently an LNG supplier to several NATO countries.
In addition, Abuja has strong ties with Moscow, which the Alliance
should monitor. The Niger Delta region is oil-rich and, at the same time,
concentrates most of the oil production. Therefore, this region is crucial
for the energy security of NATO countries, as both Europe and the
United States are experiencing an increase in demand for imported energy.
However, the instability that has characterized the territory since the
beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in the blocking of a quarter
of Nigeria’s supplies.41
In 2016, the Chevron CV X.N platform in the Niger Delta region
became the target of an attack. According to Chevron, the largest oil
exporter in Africa, the attack was executed on May 4, and the Niger Delta
Avengers (NDA) militant group immediately claimed responsibility for the
incident. In the days following the attack on the platform, the group continued
destructive activities and attacked other significant facilities, such as gas lines
and crucial installations. The NDA operation transformed into a three-month
series of attacks. The motivation behind the aggression was purely economic,
as the group released a statement demanding a more considerable share
of crude oil sales.42
Similar to other groups that emerge in politically unstable countries,
the NDA was created in February 2016 following political tensions in the
country after the 2015 presidential election. Besides the fight for the profit
from oil exports, NDA claims to fight for the people of the Delta region

40. Elza Turner and Eklavya Gupte, “Rocket Hits Crude Oil Storage Tank at Trans-Israel Pipeline:
Reports,” S&A Global (website), May 12, 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights
/latest-news/oil/051221-rocket-hits-crude-oil-storage-tank-at-trans-israel-pipeline-reports.
41. Jamie Shea, “Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role,” NATO Review (website), September 1, 2006,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2006/09/01/energy-security-nato-s-potential-role/index.html.
42. Tife Owolabi, “Militants Attack Chevron Platform in Nigeria’s Oil-rich Niger Delta,” Reuters (website),
May 5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-delta-idUSKCN0XW1PL.
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suffering due to “divisive and exclusive” politics. Simultaneously, the group
aspires to form an independent Niger Delta Republic.43
Indeed, since the discovery of the oil fields in 1950, the Delta region
has struggled with violence and instability. The country’s development and
viability depend on natural resources, whereas control over them belongs
to the government and oil multinationals. Thereby, entire communities
are disregarded due to the lack of social and infrastructural development,
while Nigeria is facing numerous violent clashes and the emergence
of militant groups like NDA.44 Oil terrorism has harmful consequences
for the suppliers and affects the country’s internal situation at the same
time. For example, terrorist attacks on Nigerian pipelines in 2016 resulted
in a 36 percent decrease in oil production, resulting in a 50 percent reduction
in government revenue.45

Terrorism in the Energy Sector
as the Instrument of Geopolitical Pressure
Currently, Africa and the Middle East contain the highest number
of terrorist organizations. Several different groups and their aff iliates,
which are lethal not the countries in which they operate and to others,
including all NATO member states. The concentration of extremists in the
region is strongly related to the ongoing armed conf licts, unstable situation
in failed states (such as Yemen, Somalia, and Syria), and the competition
of terrorist groups for land, money, and arms and drug traff icking.
All these circumstances allow terrorists to carry out activities and plan
future attacks, often jeopardizing energy stability. Thus, NATO countries
and their troops must consider the harmful activities of terrorist groups,
including their attempts to destroy key energy centers, which have become
one of their main targets.
Based on recent terrorist incidents in Africa and the Middle East strongly
related to energy security, it is essential to know which terrorist groups carry
out operations that could affect NATO allies, armed forces, and energy
43. Resurgence of Militancy in the Niger Delta: Update on the Niger Delta Avengers (Askoro
Abuja, NG: Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta, June 2016),
https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/PIND-Briefing-Niger-Delta-Avengers-June-2016.pdf.
44. Mercy Erhi Makpor, “The Niger Delta Avengers: An Assessment of the Causes, Agitation, Major
Challenges for OMNCs and Suggestions for Tackling Insurgency in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,”
International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies 4, no. 10 (2017): 16–26.
45.

“Terrorist Attacks and Political Violence.”
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supplies. There are at least a dozen significant terrorist groups—with cells
and affiliates in nearby countries—that should be mentioned. The largest
organizations that operate with the intention of destroying or exploiting
energy resources will be emphasized in the following sections.

Daesh
Daesh has long been considered the wealthiest terrorist organization
in the world. Between 2014–15, oil production in controlled areas constituted
its most important, if not primary, source of revenue. This terrorist organization
controlled 8 out of 114 oil production sites in Iraq, such as the Ajil field,
the oil wells in the Hamrin Mountains, the Qayara and Najma f ields,
and the Baiji refinery. In Syria, out of 75 sites in total, there were 34 spots
located in the eastern governorates of Dayr al-Zawr, Hassaka, and Raqqa
under its supervision.46 When it comes to Daesh’s approach to the energy
issue, three components can be distinguished.
1. Efficient development of oil and gas fields in Syria and Iraq.
2. Increasing oil and gas production to secure financing for the
organization.
3. Seizure of new oil and gas fields and destruction of critical
infrastructure in the countries Daesh considers hostile to weaken
the economy in those countries.47
The Daesh Shura Council identif ied oil and gas as key survival
instruments.48 In 2014, Daesh controlled over 60 percent of Syria’s and
nearly 10 percent of Iraq’s oil production. According to the World Bank
Group, the organization was produced up to 86,000 barrels per day in the
f irst half of 2014 and 56,000 barrel’s per day in the year’s second half.
However, the production level dropped significantly to 35,000 barrels per
day in 2015 and 16,000 barrels per day in 2016. This noticeable production

46. Quy-Toan Do et al., How Much Oil Is the Islamic State Group Producing?: Evidence from
Remote Sensing, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 8231 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28617.
47. Jessica Lewis McFate, The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an Adaptive Enemy,
Middle East Security Report, no. 27 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 2015),
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/isis-defense-iraq-and-syria-countering-adaptive-enemy.
48.

Tichý and Eichler, “Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector.”
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decrease, ref lected in the overall revenue decline, has been accompanied
since 2015 by territorial and financial losses for the organization.49
Moreover, compared with previous production trends, Daesh could not
exploit the seized fields efficiently to use their full production potential.
Nevertheless, Daesh’s appropriation and utilization of any energy facility are
to be treated as a severe threat regardless of whether the terrorists can use
the production potential. The oil production was directly managed by Daesh,
while the oil distribution network in the area under its supervision was not
its immediate concern. 50 Oil sold to independent distributors was purchased
either by small local refineries or other intermediaries transferring it further.
According to the official reports, Daesh may have charged from $15 to $45
per barrel, depending on oil quality and local market conditions.
Before the establishment of the Global Coalition against Daesh,
testimony to the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural resources
estimated the organization could have earned between $1 and $1.5 million
US dollars on oil sales.51 Moreover, despite the lack of knowledge on the exact
numbers regarding production or revenue, it is estimated that between 2014–15,
weekly revenue generated from oil sales amounted to several million US dollars.
Although the fight against Daesh claimed to be victorious, the organization
still exists and continues operations in the Middle East and Africa. It constantly
exercises physical control over smaller regions, including those producing
crude oil and natural gas. Moreover, Daesh continues to launch attacks
against critical infrastructure. The latest assault on a Syrian gas pipeline
occurred on September 17, 2021. 52 Taking the above information
into consideration, terrorist organizations can take over critical infrastructure
and prof it from it, making the risk of the occurrence of such situations
possible in the future.

49. “Islamic State Territory Down 60 Percent and Revenue Down 80 Percent on Caliphate’s Third
Anniversary, IHS Says,” IHS Markit (website), June 29, 2017, https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer
/release_only/slug/aerospace-defense-security-islamic-state-territory-down-60-percent-and-revenue-down-80.
50. “How Much Oil Is the Islamic State Group Producing?: Evidence from Remote Sensing,” World Bank
Group (website), n.d., https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28617.
51. Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: Hearing to Examine Terrorism
and the Global Oil Markets, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Peter Harrell, adjunct senior fellow, Center
for a New American Security), https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/peter-harrell-before
-the-senate-committee-on-energy-and-natural-resources.
52. Daniel Onyango,” ISIS Claims Responsibility for Pipeline Attack and Power Blackout in Syria,”
Pipeline Business (website), September 21, 2021, https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/isis-claims
-responsibility-pipeline-attack-and-power-blackout-syria.
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Boko Haram
Boko Haram frequently carries out terrorist activities in the energy sector,
especially in Nigeria. In 2017, Nigerian President Muhammad Buhari’s
administration began exploring the northeastern region of Nigeria and the
Lake Chad Basin. 53 The discovery of new sources of natural resources would
have allowed the country to diversify its supplies. The pressing menace
of Boko Haram’s entrenched presence in the territory did not initially deter
the state from attempting to create a new source of revenue and boost the
economy of a region whose poverty is also attributable to terrorists’ activities.54
However, Boko Haram’s attack on a convoy escorting surveyors in the
northeastern state of Borno hindered these plans. The attack resulted
in dozens of killings, including Civilian Joint Task Force members supporting
armed forces in combating the terrorist group. Moreover, four oil workers
were kidnapped, and at least one was killed, while Boko Haram appeared to
be asking for ransom for the remaining three. Consequently, E. Ibe Kachikwu,
the Nigerian minister of state for petroleum resources, immediately halted the
exploration until security clearance was granted. 55 Nevertheless, it has been
made clear that the Nigerian government remains eager to conduct future
exploration activities in the Borno state.
Boko Haram has never ceased targeting energy infrastructure.
In January 2021, it blew up Maiduguri’s power tower, plunging the capital
city of the Borno state into darkness. In February 2021, it launched explosives
toward the same city, killing at least 10 people and injuring about 50. 56
The constant presence of Boko Haram makes it impossible to explore the
northern areas for raw materials exploitation. The establishment of new
energy infrastructure in areas under its control may lead to the interception
of extracted oil, providing the group with an additional source of income.
Furthermore, there are more terrorist groups in the Sahel region and Nigeria

53. “Nigeria: du pétrole bientôt exploité sur les terres de Boko Haram?,” France TV Info (website),
July 27, 2017, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/politique-africaine/nigeria-du-petrole-bientot
-exploite-sur-les-terres-de-boko-haram_3057249.
54. John Campbell, “Boko Haram Blocks Oil Exploration in Northeast Nigeria,” Council on Foreign
Relations (website), August 1, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-blocks-oil-exploration
-northeast-nigeria.
55. Ludovica Iaccino, “Boko Haram’s Fatal Ambush Destroys Hope of Boost to Nigeria’s Economy with
Borno Oil,” International Business Times (website), July 28, 2017, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/boko-harams
-fatal-ambush-destroys-hope-boost-nigerias-economy-borno-oil-1632401.
56. Blessing Tunoh, “Boko Haram Blows Up Power Tower, Throws Maiduguri into Darkness Again,”
Channels TV (website), March 27, 2021, https://www.channelstv.com/2021/03/27/boko-haram-bombs
-power-tower-throws-maiduguri-into-darkness-again/.
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itself that can be directly engaged in attacking energy infrastructure in the
Middle East and North Africa region. 57
Nigeria remains the biggest energy producer in Africa, having
immense natural-gas reserves. In 2018, it was the f ifth largest exporter
of LNG in the world, producing up to 2 million barrels per day. 58
Additionally, Nigeria remains the largest economy and most populous country
in Africa and within OPEC, making the country a truly impactful actor
in the regional security scenario.59 However, Nigeria’s extraction and production
capacity has been affected by the presence of terrorist organizations in its
territory. It was estimated that, in 2014, an average of 75,000 to 150,000 barrels
of crude oil were stolen each day in the Delta region, causing tremendous
economic damage since the Nigerian economy is highly dependent on oil and
gas export. 60
Taking into consideration the area of Boko Haram’s activities, which are
concentrated mainly in northeastern Nigeria, this terrorist organization has
not yet posed a regular threat to the state energy sector, given that Nigeria’s
oil and gas fields are located mostly in the south. Nevertheless, the state’s
revenue from natural resources could provide for a more effective f ight
against rebels, as it would make it possible to boost investment in developing
military and anti-terrorist capabilities. On the other hand, an economy that
relies on natural resources in energy production and export for 70 percent
of state revenue is a victim of f luctuations in oil prices. Indeed, the poor
economic situation translates into increased uncertainty on the political scene,
which could serve as a crucial factor in the further destabilization
of the country.
There are well-grounded concerns regarding the future of the oil industry
in the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram will regularly attack critical
infrastructure (such as oil pipelines and production sites) and try to seize

57. Alan Lis and Aleksander Ksawery Olech, “The Activity of Jihadist Terrorist Organizations
in the Region of Sahel,” Institute of New Europe (website), June 21, 2021, https://ine.org.pl/en/the-activity
-of-jihadist-terrorist-organizations-in-the-region-of-sahel.
58. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 68th ed. (London: BP, 2019), https://www.bp.com/contenta
/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019
-full-report.pdf.
59. “Energy and Security – Nigeria,” Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law (website),
n.d., https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security-project/nigeria/.
60. “Threats and Opportunities for Energy Sector in West Africa,” International Peace Institute (website),
September 9, 2014, https://www.ipinst.org/2014/09/threats-and-opportunities-for-energy-sector-in-west-africa.
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it to sell oil and generate a steady source of income. 61 For this reason,
countries around Lake Chad should strengthen their internal anti-terrorism
policies to protect citizens, secure critical energy installations, and cooperate
on a transnational level to fight terrorists.

Niger Delta Avengers
The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which emerged in 2020, is another
group that directly threatens and accounts for most of the attacks on the
Nigerian energy sector. Their actions, including the oil installation bombing
in the Niger Delta, demonstrate opposition to the government’s negligence
toward the region. Moreover, they objected to its alliance with foreign energy
multinationals, who are accused of extracting and exploiting indigenous
natural resources while failing to improve the social and economic conditions
of Nigerian citizens. 62 Activities of the NDA pushed the president of Nigeria
to initiate an amnesty program for the group members to maintain peace
in the southern regions. Although the program has been in force since 2009,
it failed to dissuade the NDA from launching widespread attacks in 2016,
thus plunging the country into recession.
In the summer of 2016, the NDA threatened to declare the
independence of the southern oil-rich region as an extreme act of defiance
against the Nigerian government. The groups indicated that the region’s
richness in natural resources did not translate into an increase in the
standard of living of its citizens. Between February and August 2016,
the NDA reported at least 14 attacks on oil fields and terminals in the states
of Delta (9 attacks), Bayelsa (three attacks), and Akwa Ibom (two attacks),
reducing the country’s production to merely 1.4/1.5 million barrels per day. 63
Such a situation was particularly challenging for Nigeria, as the attacks took
place concurrently with the drop in the value of the Naira, the Nigerian
currency. Immediately after the 2016 attacks, Nigeria lost its primacy
as Africa’s largest oil exporter, surpassed by Angola. This scenario
corresponds precisely with the purpose of the terrorist strategy designed and
61. J. Tochukwu Omenma, “Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas
Connection,” Politics and Religion 13, no. 1 (2020): 180–213, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048319000166.
62. Michael Fitzpatrick, “France Creates Agency to Fight Foreign Fake News Aiming to Undermine
the State,” RFI (website), June 5, 2021, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20160526-nigeria-sont-vengeurs-delta
-niger-rebelles-mend-installations-petrolieres.
63. “Nigeria: les Vengeurs du Delta du Niger menacent de déclarer l’indépendance de la région pétrolifère,”
Jeune Afrique (website), October 19, 2016, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/350315/politique/nigeria-rebelles
-menacent-de-declarer-lindependance-delta-niger/; and Eklavya Gupte, “Niger Delta Militants Threaten
to Resume Attacks on Nigeria’s Oil Installations,” SP Global (website), June 28, 2021, https://www.spglobal
.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062821-niger-delta-militants-threaten-to-resume-attacks
-on-nigerias-oil-installations.
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implemented by the NDA: to destabilize and weaken the Nigerian economy
to such an extent that the country’s central government could no longer
be ignore its claims. The 2016 attack was swiftly followed by negotiations
between the Buhari government and the terrorist group and a ceasef ire
in August, which implied the threat was relatively contained.
However, in June 2021, the rebels announced a resumption of attacks
as part of Operation Humble, aimed at “humbling” the Nigerian economy,
driving it into a prolonged recession. 64
There is also another danger in the country that needs to be highlighted.
In 2020, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
launched attacks on gas and oil pipelines in the Bayelsa state. 65 This small
rebel group continues operations of a movement that emerged around 2004
and whose activity was based on attempts to stop oil production in the Niger
Delta region and environmental devastation, including polluting gas f laring
and oil spills, deforestation, and desertification. Their methods included
kidnappings of oil workers for ransom, armed attacks on production facilities,
pipeline destruction, and theft of oil that was later sold on the black market. 66
The MEND activity demonstrates the increase of terrorist threats in Nigeria
and the possible involvement of other rebel groups in the energy sector.

al-Qaeda
Energy infrastructure components, such as oil pipelines, are easily
accessible and constitute a target that can cause significant economic damage
if attacked. As early as 2002, al-Qaeda began exploring the possibility
of attacks on natural resources when it attacked the French-f lagged Limburg
tanker carrying 397,000 barrels of oil off the coast of Yemen. In April 2008,
after the attack on a Japanese tanker that took place in the same place,
oil price soared to a record $117 per barrel. Meanwhile, when al-Qaeda
attempted to attack the Abqaiq refinery in Saudi Arabia in February 2006,
the attempt caused oil prices to rise by $2 per barrel. 67
Attacks in Algeria have been less frequent since the civil war ended
in 2002, but groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
64. Gupte, “Niger Delta Militants.”
65. Rayyan Alhassan, “Niger Delta Militants who Bombed Oil Pipelines in Bayelsa Make 5 Demands
to Nigerian Government,” Daily Nigerian (website), November 27, 2020, https://dailynigerian.com/niger
-delta-militants-bombed/.
66. “Nigeria’s Shadowy Oil Rebels,” BBC News (website), April 20, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/africa/4732210.stm.
67. “Saudis Foil Oil Facility Attack,” BBC News (website), February 24, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/middle_east/4747488.stm.
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fighters allied with Daesh remain active. In 2006 and 2007, AQIM militants
bombed a gas pipeline, which was temporarily taken out of service as a result. 68
Other related attacks involved the bombing of coaches carrying oil workers.
Algerian oil and gas infrastructure has been heavily safeguarded
by the national army, especially since the 2013 attack on the In Amanas gas
plant operated by BP and Statoil, during which 40 workers were killed. 69
At that time, Algeria could not transport energy supplies and lost almost all
international contracts. Moreover, it demonstrated the strength of terrorist
organizations that may not threaten national security and affect all recipients
of supplies, including many NATO countries.70 In 2016, another attack
on an Algerian gas power plant caused no loss of life or damage.
However, as a precautionary measure, the facility was temporarily shut down,
which negatively affected the importing countries and national interests.
As global demand grows, the Algerian energy sector’s vulnerability
to all threats may increase, which will be ref lected in costs.
Furthermore, non-state armed groups (such as AQIM) will continue
to evolve, innovate, and prove their ability to circumvent security measures
by conducting asymmetric attacks. The number of terrorist groups in the
Sahel region, either aff iliated with al-Qaeda or Daesh, is growing.
In this case, the risk of new strikes on energy facilities is relatively higher.

State Terror and the Use of Terrorist Groups
in the Energy Sector
Oil and natural gas could also become state governments’ political tools,
especially when they are inf luenced by organizations recognized as terrorists.
One such example is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In 2008, the IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that “the
enemies know that we could easily block the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely.” 71
Hormuz is one of the most important places for transporting natural
68. Giroux, “Targeting Energy Infrastructure.”
69. Joachim Dagenborg and Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria’s In Amenas Gas Plant Returning to Normal
after Attack,” Reuters (website), September 1, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-statoil-bp-algeria
-idUSKBN0GW2N820140901.
70. Tomasz Kijewski, “Atak terrorystyczny na kompleks gazowy Tiguentourine w In Amenas w Algierii
w styczniu 2013 r. jako przykład nowych zagrożeń dla energetycznej infrastruktury krytycznej i bezpieczeństwa
wewnętrznego państwa,” Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 9, no. 13 (2013): 202–23.
71. Keith Crane et al., “Oil Revenues, Rogue States, and Terrorist Groups,” in Imported Oil and U.S. National
Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009): 43–58, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs
/MG838.html.
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resources worldwide. If Iran did block the strait, oil prices worldwide would
rise significantly. Although Jafari’s statement was delivered 13 years ago,
it is still very relevant.
Indeed, terrorism on energy supplies affects the security of strategic
chokepoints. Four of the routes particularly at risk are located in the
Middle East—the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf,
the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea,
the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline connected to the Red Sea of the
Mediterranean, and the Turkish straits linking the Mediterranean and
the Black Sea. These vital energy trade corridors have been repeatedly
targeted by terrorist organizations, especially in the context of the numerous
conf licts in the region. In 2013, for example, al-Qaeda–affiliated groups
damaged two ships using grenades in the Suez Canal. Similarly, in 2014,
Daesh attacked and sabotaged the primary Iraq-Türkiye export line from Kirkuk
to Ceyhan.72 Almost all territories close to the most significant chokepoints
were the aim of attack from terrorist organizations. The possible additional
terror from transit states could heavily affect the situation in the energy
supply market.

Recommendations
Energy security has been a crucial strategic factor since the early
twentieth century. In an era increasingly dominated by hybrid warfare,
it has become one of the main challenges for NATO and the European Union.
Terrorist attacks conducted by extremist groups against energy infrastructure
can have disastrous consequences. To combat the growing threat to the
energy security environment, countries must adopt a multifaceted approach.
NATO and EU countries should undertake joint efforts aimed to diversify
their energy sources, develop national infrastructure, and invest in alternative
energy sources so they are not compelled to rely heavily on oil and gas supplied
from unstable regions.
Oil and gas importing countries could allocate funds to help support
the native communities affected by the oil and gas production in Sudan,
Nigeria, or Algeria. These funds could help provide military training,
police funding, community patrols, and strengthen critical infrastructure.
For instance, in Iraq, the United States helped fund 14,000 security guards,
72. Robin Mills, “Risky Routes: Energy Transit in the Middle East,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis
Paper, no. 17 (Doha: Brookings Institution, April 2016), 1–37, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2016/07/en-energy-transit-security-mills-2.pdf.
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who were placed at critical locations along major pipelines. The United States
also supplied monitoring equipment, including electronic motion sensors.73
The French Republic also uses its soldiers to protect Africa’s key transit
routes and energy facilities.74
NATO should concentrate on securing the world’s most important
chokepoints to ensure the continued f low of volumes of natural resources.
Moreover, the cooperation between NATO countries, which are recipients
of energy, and their main extractors and exporters should be strengthened.
NATO’s involvement could take various forms—from military presence
for counterterrorism to education. NATO can also assist with education
and training for countries struggling with terrorism and attacks on energy
infrastructure. Securing the supply chain in the most sensitive regions is also
in the interest of NATO countries. It is a NATO duty to develop security
measures to protect the Alliance from physical terrorist attacks and terrorist
cyberspace intrusions that threaten energy supplies.
In addition, the future growth in gas demand should be directed
toward Africa, which will witness a 40 percent growth in production
between 2018–30. In contrast, production is expected to decline in the
EU (-8 percent).75 Helping to diversify European energy supplies has been
part of the US response, alongside NATO defense and diplomatic efforts.
For this reason, to diversify and secure energy supplies, NATO should
strengthen counterterrorist cooperation with African and Middle Eastern
countries. The next step is to develop an effective anti-terrorist strategy
to secure energy supplies in Africa and the Middle East to ensure successful
energy delivery, verification of dangers, and tools to eliminate the threats
to energy consumers and suppliers.

Conclusion
Terrorism, cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, attacks on oil tankers and
pipeline installations, and attacks and killings of people associated with the
73. “New Technology Can Help Fight Pipeline Sabotage,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security
(website), March 31, 2004, www.iags.org/n033104t1.htm.
74. Aleksander Olech, International Military Involvement of the French Republic (Warsaw: Institute
of New Europe, 2021), https://ine.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/International-Military-Involvement
-of-the-French-Republic.pdf.
75. Rim Berahab, Global Trends in the Energy Sector and Their Implication on Energy Security in NATO’s
Southern Neighbourhood (Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute,September 8, 2020), 5, https://media.realinstitutoelcano
.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ari103-2020-berahab-global-trends-energy-sector-and-implication
-on-energy-security-in-natos-southern-neighbourhood.pdf.
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energy companies represent a shift in the nature of war. It is not necessarily
the state’s territory that is threatened by military aggression, but critical
infrastructures, such as oil, gas, and pipeline installations. Such activities may
significantly impact the NATO member states importing natural resources
from the Middle Eastern and African countries. The actions mentioned
above might temporarily halt the f low of crude oil and liquefied natural gas.
In the future, one can expect an increased cyber and kinetic attacks.
Special attention should be given to places strategically crucial
for energy supply, such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb Strait,
which have become targets of terrorist organizations. In 2018, several
Saudi tankers crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were attacked by the Yemeni
Houthi f ighters, resulting in the suspension of supplies. Any blockage
in the f low of goods brings enormous f inancial losses for numerous
countries and organizations.
In 2018, as many as 6.2 million barrels per day of refined crude oil were
transported through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, to Europe, the United States,
and Asia, accounting for approximately 9 percent of all oil transported by
sea.76 Meanwhile, in 2020, about 18 million barrels of crude oil and LNG
passed through the Strait of Hormuz daily. With the exploitation of resources
in new maritime areas and tankers traversing uncertain waters, external support
from NATO will remain essential in securing supplies located in unstable
regions. At the same time, transport from Nigeria has been regularly
interrupted for many years, damaging for deliveries from the Gulf of Guinea.
Under the aggressive energy policy pursued by Russia, NATO has a limited
range of maneuver and must concentrate on supplies from other sources.
From 2015–21, African and Middle Eastern countries, led by Saudi Arabia,
were in the top 10 countries supplying oil to NATO members.
In 2020, Nigeria, one of A frica’s important oil producers,
championed oil importation, striking more than 466,000 barrels per day,
followed by Morocco with 240,000 barrels per day. Petroleum imports
accounted for 17 to 20 percent of imports in Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt,
and Ghana in 2019. This ratio tends to increase as the oil price rises.
We expect current account def icits to come under pressure and widen
in oil-importing countries. Africa can turn the Russia-Ukraine war oil price

76. Justine Barden, “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,”
US Energy Information Administration (website), August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=41073.
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chaos into an opportunity for competitive oil producers (such as Niger, Algeria,
Libya, and Angola) to cash in with more crude oil exports.77
The energy sector is a vital part of critical infrastructure, and its
vulnerabilities must be taken into account. Without a stable energy supply,
health and welfare are threatened, and a country’s economy cannot function.
Critical infrastructure is as complex as it is vulnerable, and terrorist groups
have been able to carry out attacks on its most fragile structural components
in the oil and gas sector. These attacks have often generated significant
losses in human lives, the economy, and national security. Prediction studies
based on game-theory methodology have demonstrated that strategies aimed
at improving the robustness of critical infrastructures may be an instrumental
protection solution.78 Interestingly, terrorism in the energy sector does not
seem to target oil and natural gas exclusively. More recently, serious concerns
have been rising in Europe. These concerns include the terrorist threat to the
Desertec renewable energy project for the Middle East North Africa region,
which is expected to become one of Europe’s crucial energy sources.79
Terrorist attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure harm the suppliers
and the country’s internal situation by reducing government revenue.
Such incidents have an immediate impact on local economies, which
in the long term can lead to social unrest and potentially result in more
people willing to join the ranks of hostile groups carrying out attacks.
Furthermore, for any organization involved in oil production, gas, or any
other industry directly linked to energy supply, disruptions can directly impact
the demand for their products and services and the ability to deliver them.
Subsequently, this can affect local inf lation, cost of living, employment rates,
and over time the development of terrorism. The need for NATO countries’
involvement may become essential, but most critical infrastructures may
have already been seized or destroyed. NATO members may participate
in many foreign missions in the Middle East and Africa under the
EU or UN mandate and carry out their military and nonmilitary operations.
If countries such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia lose capacity
to export energy resources and Russia sustains an aggressive energy policy,

77. Padili Mikomangwa, “Russia Oil Chaos Should Push Africa to Be Energy Self-reliant,” Exchange (website),
March 9, 2022, https://theexchange.africa/africa/russia-oil-chaos-should-push-africa-to-be-energy-self-reliant.
78. Xijun Yao et al., “Assessment of Terrorism Risk to Critical Infrastructures: The Case of a
Power-Supply Substation,” Applied Sciences 10, no. 20 (2020): 7162, https://doi.org/10.3390/app10207162.
79. Karen Smith Stegen, Patrick Gilmartin, and Janetta Carlucci, “Terrorists versus the Sun:
Desertec in North Africa as a Case Study for Assessing Risks to Energy Infrastructure,” Risk Management 14,
no. 1 (February 2012): 3–26.
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there will be a breakdown in the market, and NATO will lose capacity
to operate fully.
In the future, terrorists may attack not only regions that are rich
in natural resources but also transport infrastructure. To undermine
NATO countries and their allies carrying out missions in the Middle East
and Africa, terrorists will seek to cut off energy sources. Moreover, by taking
control of the sale of energy resources, they will be able to finance terrorist
activities, manipulate the market through overpricing, and cut off certain
consumers from resources. The provision of training and logistics support
and a gradual move toward cooperation with countries with a smaller share
of the energy market but a large potential is crucial for NATO members.
The main objective is to sustain military activity and ensure the development
of countries that rely on imports. Therefore, eliminating terrorist attacks
in the energy sector should provide the basis for developing anti-terrorist
strategies and increasing the Alliance’s resilience.

186

Chapter 8

Terrorist Threats to the Energy Sector in Africa and the Middle East

Select Bibliography
Alelyani, Salem, and Harish Kumar. “Overview of Cyberattack
on Saudi Institutions.” Journal of Information Security and Cybercrimes
Research 1, no. 1 (2018).
Berahab, Rim. Global Trends in the Energy Sector and Their Implication
on Energy Security in NATO’s Southern Neighborhood. Madrid: Elcano
Royal Institute, September 8, 2020. https://media.realinstitutoelcano
.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ari103-2020-berahab-global-trends
-energy-sector-and-implication-on-energy-security-in-natos-southern
-neighbourhood.pdf.
Lee, Chia-yi. “Why Do Terrorists Target the Energy Industry? A Review
of Kidnapping, Violence and Attacks against Energy Infrastructure.”
Energy Research & Social Science 87 (2022).
Shea, Jamie. “Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role.” NATO Review
(website). September 1, 2006. https://w w w.nato.int/docu/review
/articles/2006/09/01/energy-security-nato-s-potential-role/index.html.
Stegen, Karen Smith, Patrick Gilmartin, and Janetta Carlucci.
“Terrorists versus the Sun: Desertec in North Africa as a Case Study
for Assessing Risks to Energy Infrastructure.” Risk Management 14,
no. 1 (February 2012).
Tichý, Lukáš. “The Islamic State Oil and Gas Strategy in North
Africa.” Energy Strategy Reviews 24 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1016/j
.esr.2019.04.001.

187

—9—
Climate Change as a Defining Factor
in Allied Military and Counterterrorism Operations
Sabrina Schulz and Marcus Mohlin
©2022 Sabrina Schulz and Marcus Mohlin

ABSTR ACT: This chapter addresses the challenges posed by the
direct and indirect impacts of climate change on Allied military and
counterterrorism operations and the implications of a transition away
from fossil fuels for NATO Armed Forces. It explores three dimensions
of how climate change impacts military and counterterrorism operations.
The focus is on Article 3 (operations), crisis management, cooperative
security, and humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The evidence is produced
from the existing body of research on climate and security. The findings
help NATO military and policy practitioners identify climate risks and
design strategies to meaningfully respond to them.1
Keywords: climate change, climate security, climate resilience, renewable
energy, decarbonization

Introduction
Consensus in academic research and in the security community has
emerged over the fact that climate change will affect national, international,
and human security in various ways. An increasing body of literature covers
the geopolitical, geo-economic and security and social ramifications of the
direct and indirect impacts of climate change, including the risks for critical
infrastructure. As NATO’s 2030 Factsheet, dated June 2021, conf irms,
“[c]limate change is the def ining challenge of our time. The security
1. The authors would like to extend a thank you to Ms. Linnea Berkhahn-Lindholm and Mr. Edvard Björk,
interns at Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, who helped research and draft parts of the chapter.
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implications of climate change are being felt in NATO’s neighborhood,
be it in the Sahel,Middle East and North Africa, or the Arctic,
and within NATO Allied territory. By understanding this challenge and
adapting and mitigating, where possible, NATO will be better positioned
to fulfill its three core tasks.” 2
Climate change is often described as a “threat multiplier” and destabilizing
factor that increases the risk of conf lict with direct and indirect impacts
on security, critical infrastructure, and military operations. 3 Despite this
vulnerability, there are still few studies on the impacts of climate change
on military infrastructure and operations. 4 An increase in military
operations is expected in regions where climate impacts add to an
already fragile context. These operations include counterterrorism and
humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, which will have
consequences for military planning, operations, and the role of the Armed
Forces. 5 As NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan ( June 2021)
confirms, “[c]limate change is one of the defining challenges of our times.
It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security in the Euro-Atlantic
area and the Alliance’s broader neighborhood.”6 The term “threat multiplier”
applies both to Article 3 (national security and civil preparedness) and
Article 5 (collective defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty. This chapter focuses
on Article 3 challenges.
The risks and threats of climate change have been made clear
by science. According to the most recent Sixth Assessment Report: Climate
Change 2022 (AR6) by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
“[c]limate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health.
Any further delay in concerted anticipatory global action on adaptation
and mitigation will miss a brief and rapidly closing window of opportunity

2. “Factsheet: NATO 2030” (Brussels: NATO, June 2021), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014
/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf.
3. Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris and Derek S. Reveron, “Climate Change and Environmental Security,”
in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security, ed. Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1–2, https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28069.
4. “Department of Defense (DoD) Climate Risk Analysis” (Washington, DC: DoD, Office of
the Undersecretary for Policy, 2021), 8, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1
/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISK-ANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF.
5. Kate Cox et al., A Changing Climate: Exploring the Implications of Climate Change for UK Defence
and Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 8–11, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/research_reports/RRA400/RRA487-1/RAND_RRA487-1.pdf.
6. “NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan,” NATO (website), June 14, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm.

190

Chapter 9 Climate Change as a Defining Factor in Allied Military and Counterterrorism Operations

to secure a livable and sustainable future for all.” Many of these threats
referred to by the IPCC apply to human security.7
Based on the IPCC’s report, various climate impacts also directly
relate to military security, infrastructure security, and operations,
including counterterrorism operations. Accordingly, science clarifies that
“[k]ey infrastructure systems including sanitation, water, health, transport,
communications and energy will be increasingly vulnerable if design standards
do not account for changing climate conditions.” 8 This vulnerability also
applies to military infrastructure and NATO’s seven baseline requirements.
Climate impacts will make infrastructure more vulnerable to attacks
by non-state armed groups and terrorists. Adapting military infrastructure
and operations to climate risks will be decisive in maintaining the operability
and readiness of the armed forces.
This chapter goes beyond the direct impacts of climate change and
examines its indirect and cascading effects in an operational and a strategic
sense. The authors argue that Allied security and operations are affected
by the impacts of climate change along three dimensions.

Three Dimensions of Climate Change
Impacting Allied Security and Operations
The f irst dimension of how climate change affects military security
and operations, including counterterrorism operations, concerns the
direct impacts of climate change (for example, changing weather patterns
and the increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events).
Changing weather patterns, rising air and water temperatures, rising sea
levels, hurricanes, increased precipitation, f looding, and drought and
related levels of dust will require new approaches to ensure the resilience
of military and civilian critical infrastructure and maintain the operability
and readiness of the armed forces. This problem also applies to situations
where non-state armed groups and terrorists may try to take advantage
of weather-related instability and chaos. Weather impacts on military
operations (WIMO) will affect armed forces beyond infrastructure and require
new approaches in doctrine, training, equipment, and organization.

7. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2022 Special Report: New Threats to Human Security
in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity (New York: UNDP, 2022), https://www.un-ilibrary.org
/content/books/9789210014007/read.
8. “Climate Change 2022: Impacts Adaptations and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers”
in IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 12–13.
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The second dimension of the impacts of climate change on Allied security
and operations covers the indirect impacts and the cascading second- and
third-order effects of climate change. This dimension is, first, about conf lict
in regions of the world most affected by climate change. For example,
because of sea level rise or drought-related harvest failures, people in the
affected regions might be displaced and forced to migrate. Migration and the
increase of climate refugees, who migrate to new locations due to the effects
of climate change in their home region, can add to instability in already fragile
geographies. Further, climate impacts social unrest due to food insecurity and
hunger when agricultural land is no longer arable. The failure of governments
to address these challenges can lead to political instability and violent conf lict,
especially when large parts of the population lose their income and property.
The emerging governance vacuum can also make it easier for armed criminals
and extremist groups, including terrorists, to radicalize parts of society and
recruit fighters.
An additional cascading effect of climate change is the long-term
impacts on the natural physical environment. For example, when ice shields
in the Arctic melt at an accelerated pace, access to resources at the seabed
becomes possible, which can trigger conf lict over access rights. In addition,
new sea routes that emerge as the sea ice melts create new opportunities
for terrorist activities, trafficking, and other criminal activities, as policing
these areas is nearly impossible. These examples illustrates that climate
change will add further complexities to national security, including defense
against terrorism.
The third dimension of the impacts of climate change on Allied security
and operations concerns the possible future requirements when Allied forces
“go green.” This phase starts when NATO troops transition from traditional
fossil fuels to alternatives to reduce their carbon footprint and strengthen
their strategic and tactical independence from fossil fuels. Such a requirement
to decarbonize—likely driven by markets and government regulation—
will affect Allied forces and operations in terms of logistics and
capabilities. This foreseeable shift will cause implications for tactical
and operational capabilities.
Another strategic implication of climate change impacting the military
is the shift away from fossil fuels toward renewable sources of energy (RES).
This transition has implications for the economic model of fossil-fuel exporting
states, as state revenues will be at risk when the global demand for fossil
fuels decreases. The destabilization of governments in the wake of a possible
economic crisis can have significant ramifications for regional geostrategic
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balance and Allied security. At the same time, the demand for new raw materials
(such as selenium, gallium, and polysilicon for solar-PV modules or cobalt
and lithium for lithium-ion batteries) to produce infrastructure for RES and
batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) raises strategic challenges as access to these
markets for raw materials needs to be secured. It entails a shift from one set
of resources to another, inevitably leading to competition over controlling the
new geographies where the raw materials are located. The energy security
chapter in this handbook deals with these challenges in depth.
This chapter, instead, dedicates a case study to the strategic entanglements
and security threats created by the dependence on imported fossil fuels,
in this case, natural gas from Russia. The Russian war of aggression
on Ukraine in 2022 showed that only a swift transition from fossil fuels
to RES in Europe could reduce the energy security risks emerging from the
dependence on Russian gas.

From Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier to a Threat Response
The notion of climate change as a threat multiplier is not new.
It has been recognized in literature and political discourse since the early
2000s. Only now is the strategic community starting to study the implications
for Allied armed forces in depth and develop concepts to prepare for and
adapt to the new security environment. In 2007, the European Council
called on High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Javier Solana to consider the issue. His report concluded that climate change
should be seen as “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends,
tensions and instability.” 9 In March 2008, the UK’s National Security
Strategy referred to climate change as “potentially the greatest threat
to global stability and security, and therefore to national security.” 10
Moreover in an October 2009 speech, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen emphasized that “the security implications of climate change
need to be better integrated into national security and defense strategies.” 11
Today, the United States and the UK armed forces are among those Allies
with the most advanced concepts and doctrines when it comes to dealing
with the security implications of climate change.
9. Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and the European
Commission to the European Council (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2008),
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/50106.
10. UK Ministry of Defence, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an
Interdependent World (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2008).
11. “The National Security Implications of a Changing Climate,” White House (website), May 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default /f iles/docs/ National_ Securit y_Implications
_of_Changing_Climate_Final_051915.pdf.
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During the last decade, climate security became a fringe topic
among the defense, foreign, and development policy communities.
International institutions largely failed to act on climate change.
Foreign and security policymakers were instead focused on such issues as
events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region following the
Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, the advance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014,
Brexit, and Donald J. Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election.
It was only in 2019 that climate change returned to the global security
agenda when the Dominican Republic Presidency of the UN Security Council
organized a full-day debate on the UN Security Council, with over 80 member
states speaking. As UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Rosemary
A. Di Carlo made clear, “[m]ost important, for all of us, is the recognition that
deeds must follow words. Major armies and businesses have long recognized
the need to prepare for climate-related risks, rightfully assessing climate
change as a threat multiplier. We cannot lag behind.” 12
As the IPCC’s 2022 report confirms, “[w]idespread, pervasive impacts
to ecosystems, people, settlements, and infrastructure have resulted
from observed increases in the frequency and intensity of climate and
weather extremes, including hot extremes on land and in the ocean,
heavy precipitation events, drought and f ire weather.” 13 Climate change
is already affecting every region of the Earth. However, its impacts are
experienced differently depending on the exposure of humans, infrastructure,
and arable land to new climactic conditions and the ability of a region
to adapt. While urban areas are particularly exposed to heat waves, f looding,
and rising sea levels, their ability to adapt is usually weak. The situation
is worse in many developing countries that tend to be the most affected
by climate impacts but have the least resources to cope with the effects.
The most recent scientific data suggests that the climate system can
potentially run out of control. For example, the planet’s poles are exposed
to increasing temperatures, which can lead to knock-on effects in the
climate system. As sea ice melts with its high albedo effect, it exposes the
darker surface of the water, which will absorb heat much more quickly than
ice contributing to warmer ocean temperatures and the further destabilization
of the ice sheets. The West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets are melting
at an accelerating rate. Future generations might, therefore, already be committed
to sea-level rises of around 10 meters, though that would happen over several
12. “Momentum Builds for UN Security Council Action on ‘Multitude’ of Climate-related Threats,”
Planetary Security Initiative (website), January 21, 2019, https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news
/momentum-builds-un-security-council-action-multitude-climate-related-threats.
13. “Climate Change 2022: Impacts Adaptations and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers,” 11.
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hundred years. As the rate of melting sea ice accelerates, this process may
be sped up. In March 2021, scientists registered record high temperatures
in Antarctica of more than 70 degrees Fahrenheit (40 degrees Celsius) warmer
than average, which is unprecedented. Simultaneously, the Arctic was more
than 50 degrees Fahrenheit (30 degrees Celsius) warmer than average.14
A case study on the Arctic in section 3 of this chapter will elaborate on the
security implications of this development.
Thus, climate change is no longer solely an environmental challenge.
On the contrary, climate change has become a high-priority security risk
for many countries, including those in NATO. Consequently, NATO,
as well as some countries, are developing strategies and concepts on how
to integrate climate change into operations. The concluding section of
this chapter on “threat response” will summarize the recommendations
across the three dimensions mentioned above and brief ly present NATO’s
Climate Change and Security Action Plan.

Direct Impacts of Climate Change on the Resilience
of Military Forces and on Critical Infrastructure
The following section deals with the direct impacts of climate change
(such as extreme temperatures and the increasing frequency of extreme
weather events that have affected, and will increasingly affect, the resilience
of military and civilian critical infrastructure and the performance
of the armed forces, including in counterterrorism operations and defense
against terrorism. Climate change will not wait until we are ready for its
impacts. Therefore, new required measures will be described in more detail
in the next section. Syncing the policies of NATO member states and their
respective armed forces with the Alliance’s seven baseline requirements
will make each country’s military more resilient and able to operate
in a climate-altered world.
Sections 1 and 3 in this handbook cover the role of critical infrastructure
(CI) and critical energy infrastructure (CEI) in depth and demonstrate
that protecting CI and CEI is a core national security task. A breakdown
or malfunction of CI would create long-term supply bottlenecks, the disruption
of public safety, and potentially the inability of armed forces to operate.
Critical infrastructure and CEI are vital for the functioning of a state and
an economy and have, therefore, always been a potential target for adversaries.
14. Caitlin Kaiser and Angela Fritz, “Extraordinary Antarctica Heatwave, 70 Degrees above Normal,
Would Likely Set a World Record,” CNN (website), March 28, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03
/28/weather/antarctica-world-record-high-temperature-anomaly-climate/index.html.
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They play a key role in contemporary warfare and when dealing with terrorist
threats.15 This chapter addresses the implications of climate impacts for CI and
CEI. Many of the insights generated apply to the vulnerability of infrastructure
to terrorist attacks.
As the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) recognizes in its 2021
Climate Change and Sustainability Strategy, climate change has an impact
on armed forces as it will “affect the way we protect, operate and fight—
from the warming of our oceans through to the increased requirement
for humanitarian and disaster relief.” 16 It clearly acknowledges that
“the way we conduct defense and the tasks we are called on to carry out
will be forced to change as we adapt to new environmental conditions.” 17
Thus, the UK military is aligning itself with the most recent scientific findings
by the IPCC.

Weather Impacts on Military Operations
and Climate-altered Operations
Scientific findings require armed forces operating in a climate-altered
world to increase their resilience and adapt to climate change. Weather impacts
on military operations (WIMO) affect mission performance, and climate
change–induced extreme weather events will increase in frequency and
severity in the future. Many of these challenges apply to theaters characterized
by terrorist threats or in counterterrorism operations. For example,
with extreme weather events such as f looding, Allied forces’ ability
to use existing infrastructure on the ground and mobility could be severely
limited. Other areas likely to be affected are intelligence gathering,
surveillance, target acquisition, and tactical reconnaissance due to the increase
of relative humidity and cloudiness in the atmosphere. Many satellites
depend on visual wavelengths, but the ability to detect objects under the
cloud cover decreases naturally in dense cloudiness. Air and naval assets are
particularly weather sensitive. For example, high wind speed or high wave
height impair the ability to operate from certain types of platforms.
15. Arnold C. Dupuy, “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” NATO Review (website),
January 13, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of
-hybrid-warfare/index.html; and Heiki Jakson et al., Energy in Irregular Warfare, 2017 Energy in Conflict
Series (Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, 2017), https://enseccoe.org/data
/public/uploads/2017/05/irregular_warfare_176x250mm_20170526.pdf, 12–13.
16. “Ministry of Defence Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach (Accessible Version),”
UK Ministry of Defence (website), March 30, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry
-of-defence-climate-change-and-sustainability-strategic-approach/ministry-of-defence-climate-change-and
-sustainability-strategic-approach-accessible-version.
17.

“Ministry of Defence Climate Change.”
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The resilience of armed forces will have to be defined in a new way,
go beyond definitions around civilian preparedness, and include the entire
range of measures armed forces must introduce to adapt to a new operating
environment. NATO’s seven baseline requirements for national resilience
are key guidelines for a new definition of resilience against the background
of the challenges posed by climate change and its impacts:18


Assured continuity of government and critical government
services



Resilient energy supplies



Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement
of people



Resilient food and water resources



Ability to deal with mass casualties



Resilient civil communication systems



Resilient civil transportation systems

These baseline requirements for national resilience make changes
in the following areas necessary: concepts and doctrine, training,
personnel, infrastructure, equipment, information, organization, logistics,
and interoperability.
Concepts and doctrine must include guidelines on mainstreaming
climate change in decision-making processes and minimizing climate
risk to military infrastructure and operations. Climate risk must become
an integral to concepts and doctrine to enable armed forces to operate in
a climate-altered world. For instance, concepts and doctrines will have
to def ine how the military can best support the government when
responding to extreme weather events in the context of counterterrorism
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.
With an increasing occurrence of weather extremes, demands on already
exhausted forces to assist civilian authorities and emergency services
with manpower, niche capabilities, and vehicles will rise.

18. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” NATO (website), September 20, 2022,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

197

Schulz and Mohlin

As the next section in this chapter will show, there is also a link
between climate impacts and violent conf lict in fragile contexts and
low-income and developing countries. The connection between environmental
factors and armed conf lict will increasingly have to be considered
when planning future peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
For example, climate impacts such as drought can enable criminal activities
like illegal logging, which might require a focus on constabulary operations.19
As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine shows, food can easily
become the most important commodity that needs to be protected
along sea lines, especially when crop failures increase worldwide due
to climate change. Therefore, securing supply chains for food and other
vital goods will require more attention, changed assumptions about the
reach and sustainability of defense capabilities, and a shift in the focus
of national interest and doctrines. 20
Training is vital to prepare for a world impacted by natural disaster and
extreme weather events. The armed forces must understand how future combat
and noncombat operations will be affected by climate change. Training must
continually evolve to prepare servicemembers for climate impacts and enable
them to operate in extreme conditions. 21 The same applies to medical and
first-aid training, engineering, search and rescue, and evacuation skills.
At the same time, military training can become more challenging as severe
weather events may impact the timing and location of training activities.
Moreover, challenging and prolonged operations due to climate impacts
constitute a risk to physical security, which also needs to be addressed in a
training context. 22
Personnel may need to work in altered environmental conditions and
climate-degraded areas more often, which may affect physical and mental
health. 23 For example, higher temperatures due to climate change can affect
the transmission, spread, and geographical reach of vector-borne infectious
diseases. The growing spread and geographical reach of infectious diseases,
in turn, can put increased pressure on personnel, decrease the armed forces’
19. Clive Murgatroyd, “Defence in a Changed Climate,” RUSI Journal 153, no. 5 (November 25, 2008):
30–31, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071840802521895.
20. Murgatroyd, “Defence in a Changed Climate,” 30.
21. Department of the Army (DA), United States Army: Climate Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, February 2022), 14–16,
https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/about/2022_army_climate_strategy.pdf.
22.

Cox et al., Changing Climate, 10.

23. Cox et al., Changing Climate, 10–11.
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operational ability, and increase the need for individual medical assistance,
protective equipment, and vaccinations. Increased rainfall could expose service
personnel to risks from waterborne diseases.
Infrastructure will be increasingly vulnerable to climate-related events
(such as f looding, wildfires, storms, and hurricanes). The operational use
of physical, digital, and communication infrastructure, vital for successful
mission preparedness and readiness, will be increasingly at risk.
The infrastructure of military bases, in particular, has to be adapted to climate
impacts and become more resilient. Thus, investments in climate-resilient
infrastructure will be essential for the success of military operations. 24
Civilian infrastructure that supplies military operations can also
indirectly put military operations at risk. Resilient infrastructure and supply
chains, including for energy, which can withstand extreme weather events
and the ability to operate in a climate-altered world will therefore be vital. 25
When climate impacts affect military installations, local communities that
depend economically on these facilities may also experience knock-on effects. 26
Equipment must be f it for an evolving operating environment,
including in more extreme weather and HA/DR operations against the
background of degraded infrastructure. Higher temperatures, increased
wind speed, wave height, and cloudiness will increasingly affect equipment
performance and may impair militar y operations. 27 For example,
high temperatures during military operations in Afghanistan reduced
the capacity of helicopters for airlift and the ability to transport essential
equipment and supplies. Similar equipment failures are possible in
theaters with exposure to dust, storms, and f looding and need to be
addressed. 28 Investment in resilient equipment will be key in the future.
Additionally, a potential expansion of security operations to fight terrorism
while also supporting HA /DR operations might increase the need
for engineering equipment, medical care, and helicopters or boats in the
case of f looding.

24.

“DoD Climate Risk Analysis.”

25. DoD, DoD Draft Climate Adaptation Plan, Report Submitted to National Climate
Task Force and Federal Chief Sustainability Off icer ( Washington, DC: Off ice of the
Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition and Sustainment, September 1, 2021), 12–13, https://www.sustainability
.gov/pdfs/dod-2021-cap.pdf.
26.

Cox et al., Changing Climate, 11–12.

27.

DoD Draft Climate Adaptation Plan, 9–10.

28.

Cox et al., Changing Climate, 13.
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Information, specifically more accurate, defense-specific meteorological
forecasting, will be needed to understand better the impacts of climate
change on military operations, personnel, equipment, and geographic regions.
Data are also increasingly important to assess the risk of conf lict or the need
for HA/DR operations as a direct or indirect result of climate impacts.
NATO members can then take action to prevent, stabilize, or contain a crisis.
Data from hydrographic, geographical, and meteorological services could
help forecast extreme weather events and their impacts, including for military
theaters of operation.
Organization will probably have to be adjusted as new military
activities and roles are def ined as a response to climate impacts.
A potential additional role for the armed forces could be increased support
in HA/DR operations, though a clear division of labor with civilian forces
would be necessary. Additional civil preparedness and resilience tasks would
impact the conduct of military operations, so dedicated climate emergency
forces throughout NATO could become an option.
Logistics and the maintenance of climate-resilient supply chains
are vital functions and require resilient infrastructure and equipment.
Weather extremes and rising temperatures will increase the need for reliable
supply chains for critical goods, including water, medicine, and fuel.
To increase resilience in theater, lowering energy use and optimizing logistical
support requirements will be key. 29 Additionally, building resilient logistics
requires a stress test of supply chains. Emergency plans are necessary to protect
critical supply chains and components. 30
Interoperabilit y refers to the abilit y to act coherently and
effectively to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.
Climate-related emergencies requiring military support rely on a coordinated
response by various military and civilian actors. At the same time,
if Allies are affected by natural disasters and climate impacts, their
abilit y to contribute to existing or emerging A lliance activities
and operations might be affected. 31
Climate change requires Allies to adapt missions, operations, and
infrastructure and leverage all relevant information, methodologies,
technologies, and approaches in close collaboration with multiple civilian
and military actors. NATO’s role could be to develop and agree to standards
29. DoD Draft Climate Adaptation Plan, 16–17.
30. Cox et al., Changing Climate, 13.
31.

Cox et al., Changing Climate, 15–16.
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and technologies that enhance resilience, improve interoperability,
and enable knowledge-sharing. Resilience requires civil preparedness and
military capacity. There has been an increase in recent years of ownership
of CI by the private sector. Thus, greater cooperation between public and
private actors will be needed to maintain operability during disasters.
To conclude, NATO’s seven baseline requirements for resilience,
energy supplies, and transportation provide an excellent framework
for developing a meaningful and effective response to the challenges
of climate change for the armed forces, particularly counterterrorism
operations. The armed forces must maintain the ability to operate
in a climate-altered world, likely characterized by frequent HA /DR
operations and widespread constabulary operations in support of international
and national mandates, requiring new doctrines/concepts, training,
capable personnel, resilient infrastructure, appropriate equipment, information
on meteorological conditions, new organizational structures, reliable logistics,
and interoperability with partners and Allies. 32 This goal requires a new
framework and methodologies to optimize and adapt the lines of effort
to mitigate and manage the risks of climate change and to create resilient
armed forces. 33

Case Studies on the Direct Impacts
of Climate Change on the Resilience of Military Forces
and Critical Infrastructure
The following examples illustrate how resilience needs to be improved
across various types of civilian and military infrastructure to withstand the
effects of climate change on civil preparedness and military capacity.

Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy, which struck the United States in October 2012,
was one of the most expensive storms on record, and its intensity has become
part of a “new normal.” To date, infrastructure has been designed based
on the assumption that a future climate would be much the same as today.

32. Murgatroyd, “Defence in a Changed Climate,” 30–31.
33.

Murgatroyd, “Defence in a Changed Climate,” 32–33.
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This assumption no longer holds as “climate bands are becoming outdated,
leaving infrastructure operating outside of its tolerance levels.” 34
Consequently, CI assets are facing direct physical threats with significant
cascading effects for those relying on their services. According to a study by the
McKinsey Global Institute, “[a] failure to adapt by not taking climate change
into account in the design, construction, and maintenance of infrastructure
assets will not only cause costs to owners and operators but will leave entire
communities exposed and vulnerable. Adaptation can deliver a strong return
both by reducing costs from climate-related damage to the infrastructure
itself and by avoiding signif icant knock-on effects in wider society.” 35
Thus, investing in new and retrofitting existing infrastructure will be essential
building block sin enhancing CI resilience. The vulnerability of CI to attacks
by irregular forces and terrorists increases in situations where severe weather
events create chaos, which adversaries can easily exploit.

Hurricane Florence
In 2018, Hurricane Florence caused catastrophic damage to the
Carolinas and exemplified the wider operational risks of natural disasters.
The storm heavily impacted many military installations, and beyond
the cost of climate-related damages, it delayed the certif ication of the
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit for overseas deployment. 36 The time
required for repair degraded the military’s combat power for some time.
This problem demonstrates that more frequent extreme weather events might
make it too expensive and impractical to maintain military installations
and infrastructure in certain areas (such as on vulnerable coastlines).
At the very least, their resilience needs to be increased to maintain operational
readiness. 37 Consequently, climate resilience and contingency plans need to be
developed for every military installation to prevent major damage and enable
the continuity of operations in case of extreme weather events.

34. Jonathan Woetzel et al., “Will Infrastructure Bend or Break Under Climate Issues?,”
McKinsey Global Institute (website), August 19, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions
/sustainability/our-insights/will-infrastructure-bend-or-break-under-climate-stress.
35.

Woetzel et al., “Will Infrastructure Bend or Break under Climate Issues?,” 9.

36. Bruce A. Stein et al., Climate Adaptation for DoD Natural Resource Managers: A Guide
to Incorporating Climate Consideration into Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans (Reston, VA:
National Wildlife Federation, May 17, 2019), 9.
37.

Cox et al., Changing Climate, 9.
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Hurricane Michael
Hurricane Michael exemplifies the need to prepare for climate impacts
on military training. After the hurricane, Tyndall Air Force base lost the
premier simulator for the F-22, and the training facility was unusable
for several months. As recovery efforts began, the F-22 f leet redistributed
Tyndall personnel, aircraft, and equipment to other locations. The hurricane
affected the training of F-22 pilots, which exemplifies the need to prepare
for climate impacts to military training. Damages to the base amounted
to billions of dollars. During the rebuild, the design wind speed was
based on the Florida building code for a high-velocity hurricane zone.
The extent of the damage caused and the decision in favor of a more resilient
base reconstruction show the importance of preparing for climate impacts
on military infrastructure. 38

2011 Earthquake and Tsunami
The 2011 earthquake and tsunami east of Honshu Island exemplified
the need for interoperability and concept considerations. The earthquake
created a tsunami that devastated Japan’s eastern coast. Although this natural
disaster was not linked to climate change, similar impacts could also occur
due to climate-related extreme weather events. In addition, the case study
demonstrated the vulnerabilities created by nuclear power as a high-risk
energy source and the need to consider a renewables-based energy system
from a security, public safety, and resilience point of view.
An estimated 1.4 million households lost access to water,
and 1.25 million homes were cut off from electricity. The number of displaced
citizens amounted to over 500,000. 39 The destruction of communications
infrastructure inhibited an accurate estimation of the extent of the damage.
Other infrastructure was severely damaged, which, together with cold weather
and snow, paralyzed transportation, and relief efforts. The reactor cooling
systems at several units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant failed,
resulting in several explosions and evacuations. The earthquake and the
tsunami killed almost 16,000 people and injured over 5,000. Japan estimated
the reconstruction cost to be around $300 billion.40 US armed forces played
an important role and cooperated with other US government agencies,
38.

DoD Draft Climate Adaptation Plan, 11.

39. “Millions without Food, Water, Power in Japan,” NBC News (website), March 1, 2011,
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna42044293.
40. Yasufumi Saito, “Japan’s Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster Unleashed a $300 Billion Effort to Rebuild
a Hinterland,” Wall Street Journal (website), March 10, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-tsunami
-and-nuclear-disaster-unleashed-a-300-billion-effort-to-rebuild-a-hinterland-11615377375.
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particularly the State Department and the Department of Energy.
At the peak of the operation, approximately 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft,
and 24 Navy vessels were deployed.41
This disaster response effort illustrated the array of capabilities the
military can bring to complex disasters. As discussed earlier, more frequent
weather extremes will force the armed forces to operate in disaster-stricken
areas. Japan is a key ally of the United States, with considerable capabilities
of its own, which made it easy for the United States to take a supporting
role. Existing concepts were not tailored to supporting a technologically
advanced ally, as most HA/DR operations take place in developing countries
and create some problems given different operating cultures. This disaster
demonstrated the need for resilient energy supply, how to deal with the
uncontrolled movement of people, resilient water resources, resilient civil
communications systems, and resilient transportation systems, which are
part of NATO’s seven baseline requirements. The operation also highlighted
the ability to cooperate with a non-NATO ally during crises, which creates
a greater need for concept development and interoperability.42

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier:
Indirect Impacts of Climate Change Impacting (Human) Security
This section deals with the far-reaching indirect impacts or secondand third-order effects of climate change that severely undermine human
security, particularly the Global South. NATO armed forces must be
prepared for HA/DR, counterterrorism, and peace and stability operations
in regions in its immediate vicinity where climate impacts shape the
physical, operational, and wider strategic and political environment.
The geographical occurrence of most impacts of climate change will
primarily concentrate on the Global South. In response, the focus of academic
research and policy debates on the so-called climate-security nexus has
mostly been on fragile contexts and low-income and developing countries.
Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
illustrate the complex interlinkages between climate change and threats and
risks to human and military security. Accordingly, “as of December 2020,
10 out of 21 ongoing United Nations (UN) peace operations were located
in countries ranked as most exposed to climate change. Six of the 10 biggest

41. Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts
in the Asia-Pacific Region (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 86–88, https://www.rand.org/pubs
/research_reports/RR146.html.
42.

Moroney et al., Lessons, 86–88, 97–98.
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UN peace operations (by total international personnel) were in countries
ranked most exposed to climate change.”43
Thus, the challenges and recommendations for HA/DR operations
in the previous section mainly apply to these regions of the world.
This short section illustrates the logic of violence and conf lict in these climateexposed regions. According to the 2022 United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) Special Report on Human Security, “[v]olatility in weather patterns,
shocks to food supply and distribution, and land and resource scarcity—
typically interacting with horizontal inequalities and contestation of political
power—have all been linked to heightened conf lict risks.”44 This point implies
that the climate-conf lict nexus applies in particular to countries depending
on rain-fed agriculture and with low economic diversification.45
With their large share of employment in the agricultural sector,
Ghana and Ethiopia illustrate how climate variability has reduced income
and increased food insecurity.46 Research studies illustrate how climate
impacts such as the destruction of crops as a consequence of extreme weather
events—drought and desertif ication of farmland as well as f looding—
lead to higher food prices and food insecurity.47 Food insecurity, in turn,
can lead to increased displacement and migration from rural regions to cities.
As pressure on natural resources, basic infrastructure, housing and the job
market at the destination rises, the risk of community-based violence and
conf lict increases, too, because migrants compete with the local population
over access to scarce resources.48
Increasing parts of the population may also become more vulnerable
to radicalization through extremist groups. Local armed and criminal groups,
including extremists and terrorists, may make strategic and tactical use
of these circumstances. For instance, they may attempt to gain more control
over natural resources and arable land to exploit these, or they may expand
their recruitment pools as the population struggles with hunger and loss
43. Florian Krampe, “Why United Nations Peace Operation Cannot Ignore Climate Change,”
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (website), February 22, 2021,
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/why-united-nations-peace-operations-cannot
-ignore-climate-change.
44.

UNDP, 2022 Special Report, 54.

45.

UNDP, 2022 Special Report, 55.

46.

UNDP, 2022 Special Report, 52.

47. Krampe, “United Nations Peace Operation.”
48. Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conf lict,”
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (August 2007): 656–73, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs
/pii/S0962629807000601?via%3Dihub.
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of livelihood.49 As a recent UNDP report on the interplay between climate
change and violent extremism states, “fragile and natural-resource constrained
contexts can provide fertile ground for violent extremist groups to f lourish
and extend their reach, particularly, where governance and institutions are
weak and may not be able to respond, the COVID-19 pandemic serving also
to highlight gaps in response.” 50
Importantly, the inability of governments to address climate impacts
adequately (such as food and water security) can undermine a government’s
legitimacy and lead to governance vacuums that these groups can easily
exploit. For the same reason, climate impacts can undermine peace and
stability operations and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) efforts in post-conf lict situations, which can reignite a conf lict and
generate power vacuums. 51
It is not climate change triggering conf lict, but the “interlinkage
with structural development challenges, socioeconomic-political conditions
and horizontal inequalities with attendant power imbalances that tends
to trigger conf lict,” as the UNDP Special Report on Human Security points
out. 52 This logic is well illustrated by the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali, where climate impacts have affected
natural resource-based livelihoods and severely undermined human security
in a context of conf lict and weak governance. These complex interactions
between climate change, weak governance, low levels of economic development,
and inequality hinder MINUSMA’s efforts to support peace and stability
in Mali.53 The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission addresses
climate-related security risks (such as natural resource-related conf licts).
These efforts, however, are limited by an absence of prioritization,
limited capacity within the mission, and coordination challenges between the
mission and the UN Country Team. 54
49. Florian Krampe and Pernilla Nordqvist, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict: Sparse Evidence
from South Asia and South East Asia,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 2018, no. 4 (September, 2018),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/sipriinsight1804.pdf.
50. Catherine Wong and Nika Saeedi, The Climate Security Nexus and the Prevention of Violent Extremism:
Working at the Intersection of Major Development Challenges, United Nations Develoment Programme (UNDP)
Policy Brief (New York: UNDP, October 12, 2020).
51.

Nordqvist and Krampe, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict.”

52.

UNDP, 2022 Special Report, 14, 24.

53. Farah Hegazi, Florian Krampe, and Elizabeth Smith, “Climate-related Security Risks and Peacebuilding
in Mali,” SIPRI (website), April 2021, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-policy-papers/climate
-related-security-risks-and-peacebuilding-mali.
54.
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Mali is fertile ground for the rise of terrorist groups as they can
exploit the security vacuum, the plight of the civilian population,
and the fragilit y of neighboring countries for their purposes.
The Sahel is characterized by irregular migration, frequently organized
by illegal trafficking rackets promising a safe journey to Europe via Algeria,
Tunisia, and Morocco. The cause of migration includes conf lict (Mali),
political oppression (Eritrea), terrorism (Nigeria), hunger, and extreme
poverty across the Sahel. Climate and environmental impacts exacerbate the
situation and lead to internal climate displacement and climate migration
to other countries. 55
Another example of the destabilizing effects of climate change
is the Lake Chad Basin region, as mentioned in the chapter on energy.
The security crisis in the region is characterized by competition over scarce
water resources and increased human migration. Continuous terrorist and
violent extremist attacks and ethnic, religious, and farmer-herder conf licts
drive migration. 56 It affects the riparian countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger,
and Nigeria. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established
in 2012 to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist insurgencies in the basin.
Its difficulties in stabilizing the region are not least due to the fact that
“terrorists and other violent extremist groups continue to adapt to conditions
and exploit vulnerabilities to increase the spread of violence in the Lake Chad
Basin.”57 Thus, climate change constitutes an enabling element that terrorists
can exploit to their advantage. Terrorist attacks on farms contribute to the
existing food insecurity and exacerbate the security situation. 58
Climate impacts also contribute to the destabilization of other
regions on the African continent, including southwest neighborhoods
of NATO, comprising West Africa and the adjacent sea areas (and island
states) of the Gulf of Guinea and Macaronesia (the marine biogeography
of archipelagos from the Azores via the Madeira Group, the Savage Islands,

55. Serigne Bamba Gaye, Connections between Jihadist Groups and Smuggling and Illegal Trafficking
Rings in the Sahel (Dakar-Fann, SN: Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan
Africa, 2018), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14176.pdf; and Kira Vinke, “Sturmnomaden –
Wie der Klimawandel Uns Menschen die Heimat Raubt,” Bayerische StaatsBibliothek, January 1, 2022.
56. Osei Baffour Frimpong, Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin:
Key Issues and Way Forward (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, July 2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org
/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Climate%20Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20
the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20and%20Way%20Forward_0.pdf.
57. Frimpong, Climate Change and Violent Extremism, 4.
58.
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the Canary Islands to Cape Verde). 59 The region exemplifies the cascading
effect of climate change, including extremely high risks of drought
(particularly across Sierra Leone, Guinea, other coastal areas, and Nigeria),
extreme temperatures, f looding, wildfires (particularly in southern Nigeria
and Mali), and storm surge in coastal areas. 60 Against the background
of accumulating and aggravating security risks in the region, including
illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU); excessive fishing; transatlantic
trafficking of animals and plants, drugs, guns, and humans; and migration
from Africa to the Canaries and also across the Atlantic. 61
Thus, NATO will increasingly have to deal with political instability
in regions in its vicinity characterized by the direct or indirect impacts
of climate change. These situations may require HA/DR operations
or multilateral peace and security operations with a UN mandate in the
future, and NATO armed forces have to be equipped for these challenges.

Case Study on Emerging Security Risks and Threats
at NATO’s Northern Border: Climate Impacts in the Arctic
A different case where the impacts of climate change bring about new
security risks and threats is the Arctic. Ice shields are melting at an accelerated
pace, opening new unsecured sea routes and creating opportunities for
trafficking and other criminal activities, as policing these areas is nearly
impossible. In addition, thawing permafrost poses a direct physical threat
to military and civilian infrastructure in the Arctic region, including military
bases. 62 Infrastructure damage will undermine transport—mainly ice roads,
railroad systems, ports, and airf ields—communications, logistics, and
other essential services, and cost millions of dollars. Moreover, access
to resources at the seabed becomes possible, which may lead to a contestation
of rights of access.
The opening of new shipping lanes and the construction of seaports in the
Arctic region do not increase geopolitical tension. However, in the absence
59. R. Andreas Kraemer and Ashley McIlvain Moran, “Emerging Theatres: West Africa and
Macaronesia,” in NCWES: Sustainable Peace & Security in a Changing Climate: Recommendations
for NATO 2030. A Report for the NATO Secretary General from the North-Atlantic Civil-Society Working-Group
on Environment and Security, ed. Ronald A. Kingham and Olivao Lazard (Brussels: Environment and
Development Resource Center, 2021), 34–38.
60. Kraemer and Moran, “Emerging Theatres,” 34–38.
61. Kraemer and Moran, “Emerging Theatres,” 34.
62. Olivia Wynne Houck, “Infrastructure in the Arctic: The Arctic Institute Infrastructure Series,”
Arctic Institute (website), March 22, 2022, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/infrastructure-arctic-the
-arctic-institute-infrastructure-series/.
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of clear and enforceable regulations under international law, particularly the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), issues such
as the rite of passage are not yet resolved. Since policing the new sea routes
will be challenging, transnational criminal activities (such as trafficking)
will likely increase.
However, new geopolitical tensions can arise from increased military
presence and China-Russia cooperation in projects for the Northern Sea Route
(NSR). 63 Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine might further contribute
to an accelerating militarization of the region.
A military target of choice in the Arctic region could be underwater
cables, with their crucial economic signif icance and function for Allied
defense and security. In January 2022, a f iber-optic cable enabling
communications between the Norwegian mainland and the Svalbard
archipelago was cut. The cable supports the Svalbard Satellite Station,
one of two ground stations collecting data from polar-orbiting satellites.
While the cause for the disruption is unclear, it demonstrates the vulnerability
of cables and other infrastructure undersea. The loss of a single cable could
have a disproportionate impact on a country’s information warfare capabilities,
thereby posing an asymmetric threat. 64

Going Green:
Effects on Operations in Transition Away from Fossil Fuels
This section covers the increasing pressure on armed forces to “go green”
against the background of NATO member governments to decarbonize
their economies. Many issues covered in this section are elements
of NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan. They align with the
NATO 2030 agenda that commits Allies to reduce GHG emissions from
military activities and installations significantly. NATO is also assessing the
feasibility of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. NATO will ref lect these
issues in its new strategic concept. As the NATO 2030 Factsheet confirms,
“[g]reening militaries offers real win-wins, by decreasing dependence on fossil
fuel supplies, to improve operational effectiveness.”65
Such a transition away from fossil fuels will have significant impacts
at the operational level. Armed forces must ensure resilient energy
63. Houck, “Infrastructure in the Arctic.”
64. Alan Cunningham, “Underneath the Ice: Undersea Cables, the Arctic Circle, and International
Security,” Arctic Institute (website), March 29, 2022, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/underneath
-ice-undersea-cables-arctic-circle-international-security/.
65.
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supplies and reliable fuel logistics while lowering their energy use
to maintain an operational effect. Against the background of these challenges,
joint planning and implementation of an energy transition among NATO
Allies and partners would constitute a major advantage. At the same time,
the risks and opportunities of an energy transition in the armed forces must
be carefully analyzed.
Given the efforts of NATO members to decarbonize their economies,
the pressure on armed forces to “go green” is increasing, and regulation may
follow. So far, most militaries have not been involved in wider efforts to cut
greenhouse gas emissions and achieve climate neutrality, but this is likely
to change soon. 66 An energy transition away from fossil fuels in the military
will significantly impact tactical and operational capabilities. Thus, it is crucial
to understand the risks and opportunities of such a transition.
The energy transition’s possible impacts must also be considered
in defense planning. Capability planners must assess the potential effects
on operational effectiveness. When analyzing the IPCC’s scenarios
from a defense perspective, it becomes clear the short-term risks of the
transition will decrease, and opportunities will increase in the medium and
long term. 67 The main challenge for Allied forces during this transition will
be maintaining tactical and operational impact. NATO must acknowledge
the vulnerabilities of new energy systems toward armed attack and make
them more resilient to maintain both national security and the operability
of armed forces. 68

Energy Resilience in Military Operations
Energy resilience is the ability to anticipate, prepare for, adapt,
withstand, respond to, and rapidly recover from energy disruption. 69
Greater energy resilience with more energy produced on-site during
military operations would make missions more self-sufficient and resilient.
Much less fuel will have to be transported to the zones of military operations
in the future as the reliance on renewable energy, in particular electricity,
66. “A Beginner’s Guide to Climate Neutrality,” United Nations Climate Change (website),
February 26, 2021, https://unfccc.int/blog/a-beginner-s-guide-to-climate-neutrality.
67. Murgatroyd, “Defence in a Changed Climate,” 32.
68. Arnold Dupuy et al., “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” NATO Review (website),
January 13, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of
-hybrid-warfare/index.html.
69. Alex Beehler and J. E. Jack Surash, “Cutting the Cord to Test Energy Resilience,” US Army (website),
April 13, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/234514/cutting_the_cord_to_tst_energy_resilience.
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will increase.70 The potential advantage is that the energy demands
of forward operating bases, HR/DR operations, and equipment can be met
more easily and contribute to higher tactical and operational self-sufficiency
and resilience.71
Military installations must have secure and reliable access to energy and
water to achieve mission objectives. With rare exceptions, installations today
rely on commercial utilities for energy and water. A number of vulnerabilities,
both man-made and natural, are associated with dependence on electric grids,
gas pipelines, and water systems, which can jeopardize operational and tactical
capabilities. Moreover, military installations and their infrastructure and
suppliers are known targets for terrorists.72
Sources and distribution of electricity supply and logistics and
charging capacities also constitute bottlenecks in military operations.73
The reliance on uninterrupted power supplies might lead to new
solutions (such as on-site renewable energy generation, large-scale energy
storage, and smart microgrids). Microgrids can operate independently
from the regular grid and are, in theory, less vulnerable to terrorist
attacks or cyberattacks. However, appropriate cybersecurity protection
is currently lacking, ruling out solar PV for microgrids. It is clear,
however, that relying on locally produced RES would reduce the need
for risky and costly fuel convoys and rear logistics whose vulnerability
can be exploited by adversaries and result in many casualties.
Reducing dependence on fossil fuels and electrical grids can make
military operations more resilient and needs to become an integral part
of defense planning.74

Energy Logistics and Smart Energy
Fuel logistics and security have been a concern in military operations
throughout history.75 Logistical challenges with energy supplies have
negatively affected military operations, as illustrated by General Patton’s
70. DA, Climate Strategy, 6-7.
71.

DA, Climate Strategy, 13.

72. Beehler and Surash, “Cutting the Cord.”
73. Joakim Nyman et al., “Planning and Analysis of Charging Infrastructure,” RISE (website), n.d.,
https://www.ri.se/en/what-we-do/expertises/planning-and-analysis-of-charging-infrastructure.
74. Constantine Samaras, William J. Nuttall, and Morgan Bazilian, “Energy and the Military:
Convergence of Security, Economic, and Environmental Decision-making,” Energy Strategy
Reviews 26 (November 19, 2019): 3–6, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211
467X19301026?via%3Dihub.
75.

Samaras, Nuttall, and Bazilian, “Energy and the Military,” 3.

211

Schulz and Mohlin

US 3rd Army running out of fuel during World War II. Patton’s Army had
pushed across France in a remarkable demonstration of maneuverability,
but it was stopped just before the critical West Wall defenses guarding
the German border due to a fuel shortage. There is no known
example of fuel shortages due to inadequate stocks in France. The problem
was fuel distribution.76
The security of fuel supplies also heavily affected NATO’s operation
in Afghanistan. The fuel was delivered mainly by fuel convoys through
Pakistan. After the Ṣalālah incident in which 28 Pakistani soldiers
were killed, the border was closed, and supply lines had to shift to the
Northern Distribution Network, a rail link from Latvia to Uzbekistan,
where the fuel was off loaded on trucks and transported across the border
to Afghanistan. This change in distribution lines demonstrates the
vulnerabilities and difficulties of fuel logistics in military operations.77
The vulnerability of rear logistics can be exploited by enemy fighters
and terrorist forces and result in many casualties. In 2007, on average,
there was one casualty for every 24 fuel convoys in Afghanistan.
Reducing energy requirements through innovative technologies represents
a significant opportunity to reduce the strategic vulnerability associated
with fuel supplies.78
NATO exercise Capable Logistician (CL), in 2019, tested innovative
solutions to reduce fossil fuel consumption and wastage in military installations
and demonstrated the benef its of smart energy in military operations.
This exercise showed how innovative energ y technologies based
on RES could improve operational effectiveness. The exercise drew on several
scenarios requiring a smart energy response (such as power cuts, pollution
of primary water sources, and diesel contamination). During the exercise,
a smart microgrid, constructed to supply energ y to camp tents,
connected RES to diesel generators that would power up when renewable power
was unavailable. The exercise showed how the management and planning
of energy f lows can be improved in a highly effective manner.79
76. G. W. Berragan, “Higher Command and Staff Course Staff Ride Paper: Who Should Bear Primary
Responsibility for the Culmination of Patton’s US Third Army on the Moselle in 1944? Are There
Lessons for Contemporary Campaign Planning?,” Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (October 19, 2007): 161, 165,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702430308405084.
77. Samaras, Nuttall, and Bazilian, “Energy and the Military,” 5.
78.
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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_166827.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=NATO%20tested%20
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A test deployment of portable solar-power generation systems
at several US Marine forward operating bases in Afghanistan during 2010
also reduced the need for diesel generators by more than 90 percent. 80
Diesel generators can operate during harsh conditions without compromising
an operation; however, they can also hinder military operations due to the
need for fuel supply lines. Hybrid solutions with increased renewable energy
generation at forward operating bases can reduce the need to rely on fuel convoys
to ensure energy supply. 81 They can decrease reliance on diesel generators
and lower the number of fuel convoys, a common target for adversaries.
Decreasing the reliance on convoys can also free up personnel accompanying
and protecting the convoys and therefore increase the operational effect. 82

Joint Implementation
It is not clear yet what the most viable long-term options for the
“green transition” of the armed forces could be. Russia’s war of aggression
in Ukraine brought home the fact that a transition away from imported
fossil fuels toward RES is urgent. While the short-term transition
to alternative fuels, in particular synthetic liquid fuels, is considered
technically feasible, it is challenging from a financial and logistical point
of view. Therefore, it requires large-scale planning and joint
implementation. Allies and relevant partner nations should unanimously
decide how to reduce energy use and substitute fossil fuels with RES.
Interoperability is key during the transition. Ideally, infrastructure,
new energy sources, and fuel could be used by all NATO members and
partners. A shared view on the need for a transition from fossil fuels,
a coordinated approach, joint planning, implementation, and the
development of intra-alliance standards and common processes is required. 83
Decisions on future sources of power and electricity in the Alliance will likely
become politicized as different countries have different energy transition
strategies. This decision also applies to a common technology for vehicles
(for example, electric vehicles versus fuel cells). 84
80. Spencer Ackerman, “Afghanistan’s Green Marines Cut Fuel Use by 90 Percent,” Wired (website),
January 13, 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/.
81.
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84. Jutta Lauf, Wsewolod Rusow, and Reiner Zimmermann, “Nitrogen Based Propellants as Substitute
for Carbon Containing Fuels,” in Energy Highlights, no. 16 (Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre
of Excellence, 2021), 5–6, https://www.enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021/11/d1_energy-highlights
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Compatibility between Civilian and Military Solutions
In addition to the need for more resilient energy supplies and
joint implementation of the relevant solutions, armed forces also need
to ensure the operability and readiness of traditional fossil fuel-based
technologies. The transition to RES in the armed forces will likely be much
slower than the civilian sphere and will rely on fossil-fuel technologies
(such as the internal combustion engine) for much longer. It will be crucial
that the armed forces maintain the necessary degree of technical competence
among engineers, technicians, and mechanics to maintain operational
capability. At the same time, the relevant staff needs to be trained to service
new types of operational vehicles as different competencies and resources
are required.

Case Study on Offshore Wind Power
The expected increase in offshore wind power development requires
sound management of the risks offshore wind farms pose to military
operations. Offshore wind farms reduce the capacity of radar systems and
affect air traffic control and weather forecasting, which impacts national
security and defense missions. Offshore wind farms may also adversely
impact the quality of data obtained from primary surveillance radars (PSR).
Maintaining PSR’s capability is vital to obtain a recognized air picture;
impaired capacit y might reduce the possible range and the time
to identify and act on potential aggression, which risks undermining security
and military operations at sea and in the air. 85 Thus, the adverse side effects
of offshore wind farms on the radar for military and civilian aviation have
to be mitigated, so they do not constitute a risk to national security. 86

85. Air Defence and Offshore Wind: Working Together towards Net Zero (Air Media Centre/HQ Air
Command/UK Ministry of Defense, Autumn 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1021252/Air_defence_and_offshore_wind.pdf.
86. Marju Kõrts, “Role of Wind Farms for National Grids: Challenges, Risks, and Chances
for Energy Security,” in Energy Highlights (Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, 2020),
4–6, https://enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021/04/role-of-windfarms-for-national-grids-2020
-marju-korts.pdf.
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Case Study on Renewable Energy Sources
on Forward and Rear Operating Bases
Recent studies on the practicality of RES for expeditionary military
operations showed that solar photovoltaic (PV) energy and wind power,
on rare occasions, are the most promising renewable energies for use by armed
forces. Implementing solar PV on forward-operating bases could reduce
the reliance on fossil fuels. The technology has become modular, mobile,
transportable, and deployable for remote operations. From a tactical perspective,
solar PV provides military advantages as it helps armed forces become more
energy self-suff icient, so remote operations could become independent
of resupply. It reduces the logistical footprint due to its transportability and
simple operational maintenance. It also has a low thermal signature and
is much quieter than diesel generators. However, due to the need for direct
solar radiation, these systems cannot be camouf laged. To produce renewable
power for a bigger rear-operating base, a signif icant area of land would
be required if the base is not connected to national electric grids.
This requirement makes it challenging to create an independent hybrid
electrical grid to meet the demand for bigger rear-operating bases.
Onshore wind power in the form of small wind turbines could also
be a technology of choice since installation is technically manageable
and maintenance is minimal. However, due to its intermittency, onshore
wind requires energy storage systems. In addition, onshore wind farms are
highly visible and could interfere with communication signals and sensors,
reducing their functionality in an operational application. 87
The main problem of RES is their intermittent quality, so wind and solar
PV cannot be used independently. However, when combined with conventional
generators, they add great value in forward-operating bases, which can work
as a backup or energy storage. In rear-operating bases, the energy demand
of a base is higher and more capacity needs to be installed. Hybrid solutions
with RES are suitable for smaller bases and could provide the Armed Forces
with more resilient energy supplies and greater operational effect. 88
Solar PV and wind power are scalable, can be easily transported,
and do not need a lot of infrastructure, so their increasing use by deployed
military forces should be tested further. NATO and its partners should
87. Guilia Signorelli, “Military Aspects of Energy Security with an Emphasis on Interdependencies
between the Civil Energy Sector as a Supplier and Military as a Consumer,” in Energy Highlights
(Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence), 23, https://enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021
/10/d1_military-aspects-of-energy-security.pdf.
88. Signorelli, “Military Aspects of Energy Security,” 23.
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be proactive in implementing new energy technology, so NATO can fully
exploit the advantages. 89

Case Study on Nord Stream 2: Security Risks and Threats Emerging
from Dependence on Imported Fossil Fuels
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine acutely exposed the dependence
of key NATO countries on imports of fossil fuels—oil, gas, and coal—
from Russia. For years, warnings by experts about the political
ramifications of this dependence were ignored.90 Instead, a new pipeline,
Nord Stream 2, running parallel to Nord Stream, was built from 2018 onward
to import high-emission natural gas from northwestern Russia to the northeast
of Germany via the Baltic Sea. Just like Nord Stream 1, it circumvented
transit countries in Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine. Had Nord Stream 2
become operational, it would have allowed Russia to bypass existing
pipelines through Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Ukraine altogether,
cutting off government income from transmission charges and enabling
Moscow to “turn off the tap” at a whim. Moreover, the pipeline would have
increased the disproportionate dependence on Russia as a gas supplier and
on fossil fuels at a time when domestic renewable energy constituted
an affordable alternative to imported gas.
A miscalculation on the part of political decisionmakers relates
to the risks emerging from the long-term lock-in created by European
(and, in particular, German) dependence on imported fossil gas.
Nord Stream 2 undermined the commitment of the European Union
to a “net zero” economy by the year 2050, and, in particular, Germany’s
more ambitious commitment to become carbon neutral by 2045.
Despite these risks, calls by the United States, Allies from CEE,
and environmental activists to stop the construction of Nord Stream 2 were
ignored by consecutive German governments.
Environmental groups took to the courts because of the violation
of a range of laws and regulations during the construction process. In late 2021,
the German Federal Network Agency for electricity, gas, telecommunications,
post, and railway (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA) announced that
Nord Stream 2 AG, the pipeline operator headquartered in Switzerland,
had not yet met the regulatory conditions for the certif ication process.
According to BNetzA, the operator had to have a legal presence in Germany
for the German authorities to exercise oversight. Moreover, according
89.

Signorelli, “Military Aspects of Energy Security,” 29–30.

90. Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security: Re-measuring the World (Munich: Taylor and Francis, 2007).
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to European Union law, the pipeline operators need to be independent of the
fuel suppliers and grant nondiscriminatory access, which was not the case
with Gazprom. In the EU’s regulation of network industries (such as
electricity and gas), unbundling refers to the separation of the activities
potentially subject to competition, such as the production and supply of energy,
from those where competition is impossible or not a l lowed.
Transmission and distribution of electricity and gas are regulated
monopolies in the EU. Unbundling is meant to prevent a situation where
competitive and monopolistic activities are performed by the same company.
The two different types of activities cannot be “bundled.” 91 Therefore, the
necessary unbundling would have had to happen before a license could
be granted. A legal clearance by the European Commission would have
been necessary, too. These legal requirements were largely ignored
by key German government decisionmakers, at least until late 2021.
Nord Stream 2 was built on the assumption that the European demand
for natural gas would increase during the transition to a renewables-based
energy system. In this context, gas was portrayed as a “bridging fuel” that
helps mitigate the effects of f luctuating renewables. Before Russia’s war
of aggression in Ukraine, the question of whether there was a need to increase
natural gas supplies was a contentious issue. Germany, at least at the time,
had significant gas import capacities with Russia, Norway, and the Netherlands.
However, the Netherlands decided to stop its gas production as the main
suppliers for the foreseeable future.
From a climate point of view, it needs to be emphasized that the fuel
transported via Nord Stream 2 would have been a source of an additional
100 million tons of carbon dioxide per year. Environmental groups
and scientists using satellite-based remote sensing also pointed out that,
at the sites of production in Russia, there are significant amounts of the
potent greenhouse gas methane emitted into the atmosphere, suggesting
natural gas is not more climate-friendly than coal as an energy source.92
The case of Nord Stream 2 proves that reliance on fossil energy imports
creates political and economic dependencies, thereby significantly restricting
the political room for maneuver. Renewable sources of energy, on the contrary,
can be produced in-country and shared with neighboring countries and Allies.
91. “Unbundling in the European Electricity and Gas Sectors,” Florence School of Regulation (website),
July 20, 2020, https://fsr.eui.eu/unbundling-in-the-european-electricity-and-gas-sectors/.
92.
“Methane Emissions from the Energy Sector Are 70% Higher than Official Figures,”
International Energy Agency (website), February 23, 2022, https://www.iea.org/news/methane-emissions
-from-the-energy-sector-are-70-higher-than-official-figures.
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Renewable energy sources are also the main instruments to fight the mounting
risks and threats of climate change.

Threat Response:
Climate Change and Security Action Plan
Climate change will have severe ramif ications for the planning
and execution of all future Allied operations. NATO’s response to the
risks and threats from climate impacts must cover the three dimensions
described in this chapter: the impacts of extreme weather events
on military infrastructure and operations; the indirect impacts and the
cascading effects of climate change, especially in fragile contexts that can
lead to conf lict and an increase of terrorist activity; and the implications
of armed forces “going green” and switching to renewable energy.
Many of the recommendations in this chapter relate to the priorities identified
in NATO’s Climate Change and Security Action Plan, especially when
it comes to the need to adapt to Europe’s committed-to climate change.
Adaptation needs identif ied in the action plan cover resilience,
civil preparedness, defense planning, capability delivery, assets and
installations, standards, innovation, training, exercises, and disaster response.
A r med forces must ma inta in t hei r abi l it y to operate
in a climate-altered world. When addressing the impacts of extreme
weather events on military infrastructure and operations, NATO’s seven
baseline requirements for resilience, energy supply, and transportation
provide an excellent framework for developing a meaningful and effective
response. Specific changes are necessary for concepts and doctrine, training,
personnel, infrastructure, equipment, information, organization, logistics,
and interoperability. To improve CI resilience against climate impacts,
NATO must invest in new infrastructure and retrofit existing infrastructure.
Every military installation will require climate resilience and contingency
plans to enable operational continuity in case of extreme weather events.
Significant challenges will arise for all operations in fragile contexts
and regions disproportionately affected by climate impacts. The need
for improvements along the seven baseline requirements is particularly critical
in these situations. At the same time, the swift implementation of NATO’s
Climate Change and Security Action Plan will be key to making armed
forces resilient in the face of climate impacts and maintaining operational
effectiveness, including in HA/DR and counterterrorism operations.
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The priority in the action plan to contribute to the mitigation
of climate change, which includes mapping NATO’s own GHG emissions
and energ y-eff icient and sustainable technologies, is value-added.
It also has implications for the conduct of military operations. As this chapter
has shown, joint planning and the joint implementation of an energy transition
among NATO Allies and partners will be vital. A cooperative effort will
improve the chances of implementing on-site renewable energy generation,
large-scale energy storage, and smart microgrids in the theater effectively
and efficiently. It will make NATO armed forces and critical infrastructure
more resilient and able to adapt effectively to a climate-altered and
carbon-constrained world while reducing the military carbon footprint.
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ABSTRACT: The resilience of logistics and transport chains is imperative
for an effective defense against classic or hybrid terrorist threats
from previously known terrorist groups or malicious actors whose
actions are difficult to attribute. Modern communications and
digitization technologies are major logistics issues because practice
has shown that current major military conflicts can be waged in the
cyber realm, without formal declarations of war and can have disastrous
military, political, and economic effects, with major disruption of supply
chains at a global level. However, the Alliance must have the best
logistical means to deal with any type of threat and must be able to scale
up and expand its supply chain in line with international developments.
The case studies in this chapter on coordinating logistics threats
to cybersecurity and transport illuminate areas where NATO can
be enriched through further training.
Keywords: logistics, supply chain, resilience, terrorism, cybersecurity

Introduction
There is an indissoluble link between criminal groups and terrorist
networks that leads to a blurring of a clear line between national responsibility
and the international response. From this perspective, there is an overlap
between illicit trafficking patterns and proliferation activities versus illegal
immigration routes and extended international crime centers. Thereby the
prerogatives of sovereignty and border control policies act against the global
nature of the terrorist threat. Undergoverned or even ungoverned areas
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from NATO’s geographical boundaries from North Africa to the Balkans pose
risks of infiltration by terrorist groups into Europe, many of them adapting
their logistics to suit different legislative frameworks.
This chapter will provide logistics and supply chain def initions,
examine the organizations handling logistics and supply chain in and
for NATO and their eff iciency, explain current case studies of areas
where the security of the Alliance is being threatened through attacks
on logistics and supply, and provide recommendations.
It is necessary to make a major distinction between the supply chain
as a whole and the logistics itself, starting with the fact that the supply
chain is responsible for overall sourcing, processing, and delivery to end
users. Logistics is specifically focused on moving and storing goods between
the various components of the supply chain. Given the above statements,
logistics is a subsection of the supply chain and a part of the end-to-end supply
chain process. Although the full efficiency of activities in modern society
is dependent on supply chain and logistics f lexibility, NATO’s approach
is to streamline national resources to meet the Alliance’s common needs.

Logistics and Supply Chain in the NATO Context
Logistics is the science of planning, organizing, moving, and maintaining
the forces at the Alliance’s disposal. Without functional logistics, no operation
is possible, as logistics is a key element of the success and achievement
of the Alliance’s extensive objectives. NATO def ines logistics as a
“science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of
forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations
logistics deals with include: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel;
(2) transport of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance,
operation, and disposition of facilities; (4) acquisition or furnishing of services;
and (5) medical and health service support.” 1
From an evolutionary point of view, logistics has risen over time through
the perspective of the experience of the Alliance and the change in the
geopolitical situation. NATO logistics were limited to the North Atlantic
area during the Cold War, with a planned linear defense based on national
support elements of Western Europe. Communication lines within Europe

1. NATO, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 2013),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Other_Pubs/aap6.pdf.
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extended into the Channel and North Sea ports area. 2 Planning required that
reinforcements and supplies be picked up at sea from the United States and
Canada in the same ports and transported by air to European bases to use
prepositioned equipment. Moving equipment like tanks across continents and
through diverse terrain is a complex technical and political issue, completely
different from airlifting supplies in the fastest way possible.
NATO followed the principle that logistics was a national responsibility
before the 1990s. Consequently, its only focus “was the establishment of
compliance with overall logistics requirements between members.” 3 NATO’s
plans and actions were governed until the end of the Cold War based on this
principle when it was largely accepted that the global situation had undergone
a fundamental change that had underpinned this principle. This experience has
changed the security environment and triggered a series of specific logistical
challenges in the Partnership for Peace (Pf P) and other cooperation programs
with Central and Eastern Europe and other international organizations,
where peace support operations in the Balkans generate a series of specific
logistical challenges.

Complexity of the Supply Chain
The capabilities of the Alliance are sustainable when each of the
components of the communication lines is functional. The weakest link
endangers the efficiency of the entire system.
To improve the security of the Alliance’s current lines of communication
(LOCs) and transport routes, NATO must assess threats and establish efficient
and cost-effective LOCs when needed.4 Security of shipments is a main
priority, as is the political approval to pass through a country that may have
nothing to do with the conf lict. Specifically, the exposure of each link will
be considered here in the event of a conf lict or in case the agents of inf luence
of the aggressor state could act through proxy against the integrity of the
communication lines.
The supply process can be considered as a system of systems aggregated
activity where supplying the military with everything from food to equipment
is a part of each NATO operation. It is a complex process, creating new
2. NATO Logistics Committee, NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, November 2012),
https://www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logistics_hndbk_2012-en.pdf.
3. “Logistics,” NATO (website), June 21, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_61741.htm.
4. “Civilian Expert Helps NATO Establish Communication Lines,” NATO (website), January 27, 2012,
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/news_83812.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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LOCs far more complex than finding roads, airports, rail networks, or ports
to dock ships.
A major challenge in terms of supply chain security is its dependence on
the private sector, which raises a number of risks for various reasons, ranging
from a company’s operational limitations to the related interest given
by political affiliation or confusing geostrategic interest, which the owner
of a logistics node may have. The owners or the main shareholders of the
companies may take actions contrary to their direct economic interests due
to their relationship of subordination or dependency with states that have
geostrategic visions contrary to the values of
 the Alliance. This vulnerability
can spread with cascading affects and has the potential to affect severely
sectors not directly related to the supply chain segment. Although the example
is not unique, we can cite the energy crisis that has affected Europe due to
the major dependence on fossil resources from Russia. Moreover, dependence
on mineral resources, physical production capacity, and energy resources
belonging to states or blocs with geopolitical interests opposite to democratic
values generates the possibility of affecting military mobility or altering
operations at the Alliance level due to multiple disruptions along the supply
chain or within intermediate logistics operations.
A comprehensive perspective here that distinguishes between the
shortest and most efficient logistics chain and the politically possible one can
be considered in the case of the Russia-Ukraine war. In the area of the
eastern f lank of the Alliance, in the case of countries that joined NATO
after 1990, there are disparities in the development of the transport
network due to the former policies of the Warsaw Pact which supported
railway transport first with road transport having an auxiliary function.
Consequently, the distribution of the road network is not eff icient,
and its density is four to f ive times lower than in Western Europe.
The discrepancy is even more pronounced in the case of the newly acceded
states in Eastern Europe.
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Supply Chain and Collective Logistics
To understand the complexity of logistics at a NATO level, it would be
necessary to approach each decision-making and operational layer in detail
to identify ways to streamline the activity. A more effective approach is to
study the issue as a system of dynamically interacting systems governed by
individual principles, visions, and policies subject to a major common goal.
Some defining elements and directions need to be considered in this approach.
NATO logistics can be understood by basic functions not limited
to supply, maintenance, movement and transport, oil support, infrastructure
engineering, and medical support. Multinational logistics reduces costs,
streamlines processes, and increases the eff iciency of logistics support
at any time.
The important parts of the specific elements that give the dimension of
systemic complexity are listed below:


Sharing the provision and use of logistic capabilities between
nations is one of the key logistics principles driving all related
support in NATO.



There must be a f lexible ability to move forces in an efficient
manner in and between operational theaters. The complete
spectrum of NATO roles and missions also needs advanced
logistical support.
 The Logistics Committee is the main committee that supports
the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee
as the global coordinating authority for the full range of
logistical functions within NATO.



The general list of agencies, policy commissions, and
organizations involved in NATO’s logistics activities
includes the:


Logistics Committee (LC)



Petroleum Committee (PC)



Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services
in NATO (COMEDS)
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Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC)



Committee for Standardization



NATO Supply and Procurement Agency (NSPA)


Fuel Management, which includes the Central
European Pipeline System (CEPS) Programme



Strategic Transport and Storage, which includes the
NATO Airlift Management (NAM) Programme



Systems Procurement and Life Cycle Management



Logistics Services and Project Management



Support to Operations and Exercises



Bi-SC Medical Advisory Group (Bi-SC MEDAG)



Bi-SC Movement and Transportation Forum (Bi-SC
M&T Forum)5

According to NATO, the “Bi-SC Movement and Transportation
Forum (Bi-SC M&T Forum) was formed in 1996 and is the senior forum
for coordinating Alliance-wide concerns for movement and transportation
policy planning between Strategic Commanders, NATO members and
designated agencies. Movement and transport matters of relevance to
the forum are those that derive from the NATO commander’s movement
and transport responsibility and from concepts and policies developed
by NATO Headquarters.”6
To address the complexity and provide an effective framework for resolving
subsequent issues arising from the need for continuous adaptation to ongoing
geostrategic challenges (such as the Russia-Ukraine conf lict), NATO Logistics
Vision and Objectives 2015–24 set a framework in which NATO addresses the
gaps in logistics capability. Following the first phase of the Russia-Ukraine
conf lict, at the 2014 Wales Summit, in response to Russia’s challenges and
the strategic implications, the heads of state and government agreed on the
5.

NATO, Logistics Handbook.

6.

NATO, Logistics Handbook.
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Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The plan also addresses the risks and threats
posed by the Middle East and North Africa. Through the RAP, the leaders
of the Alliance agreed to reverse the downward trend in defense budgets and
increase them over the next decade. NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives
(V&O) have been revised in line with developments from the 2010 Strategic
Concept, Political Guidance 2015, and the Readiness Action Plan.
The current strategic logistics guidance consisting of the revised vision
statement provides effective logistical support and broadens the Logistics
Vision to give NATO commanders the greatest f lexibility in current and future
missions promoting the pursuit of collective logistics within the Alliance.
An important aspect of the revised vision is that it seeks to include broader civil
responsibilities by taking a more comprehensive approach and is not limited
to the Joint force commander. The Logistics Committee serves as the
overarching coordinating authority across the spectrum of logistics functions
within NATO and the main committee supporting the North Atlantic Council
and the Military Committee.7

Supply Efficiency and Operational Consolidation
NATO has no direct access to the necessary supply-chain capabilities and
logistics, even in its primary military defense responsibility. NATO’s assets
and capabilities belong to its member states, with few exceptions, most notably
for political consultation and command and control. One of most important
parts of its integrated military structure is the NATO Defense Planning
Process (NDPP).
Through the NDPP, the main pillars of its integrated military structure,
nations coordinate and distribute their capabilities at the Alliance level.
The Transfer of Authority (ToA) mechanism allows national forces to fall
under the control of NATO’s Supreme Commander if needed. NATO’s most
recent operational experience and the development of a comprehensive approach
to operations have expanded the NDPP to include selected nonmilitary
capabilities, primarily in logistics, stabilization, and reconstruction.
No provisions have been implemented due to concerns of possible transfer
of these capabilities under NATO command should a situation warrant.
Civilian capabilities will always remain under national control if provided
by national organizations. National contributions to NATO requirements

7.

NATO, Logistics Handbook.
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require considerable effort and extend to counterterrorism assets. 8
While the political guidelines fail to establish important links between NATO
and the organizations responsible for implementing national policies and
asset control, it has been possible to establish a fundamental link
between NATO’s counterterrorism capabilities and the NDPP.
NATO’s decades of multidisciplinary experience in civil defense,
critical infrastructure protection, information sharing, air defense, airspace
and maritime security, nonproliferation and CBRN response, special
operations, and force protection bring consistency and consolidation to newly
developed policies.
During conf licts and subsequent periods of austerity, it is essential to
minimize the impact of adversary propaganda and disinformation spread.
This spread can equate to, or even outweigh, the effects of classical terrorist
attacks in affecting the logistics chains at the decision and operational levels.
Depending on the intensity, estimated duration, and importance of a conf lict,
the main aim is to raise awareness of surface transport’s benefits for long
distance. In this case, air transport provides for rapid deployment, while rail
or road transport offers a cost-effective method for prolonged sustainment
in the longer term to counteract fears imposed by economic contraction due
to war threats. Rail and road transport also bridges the gap between the
military perspective and commercial reality. Thus, beyond political reasoning,
it is about finding the most cost-effective and secure methods of military
transportation. One significant example of this is the closure of the surface
LOC via the Pakistan to Afghanistan surface into the north of Afghanistan,
resulting in escalating cost of airlift support to the International Security
Assistance Force.

Logistics and Supply Chain Threats Aspects
Threats Complexity and Their Interrelation
After the end of the Cold War, there was a tendency to reduce the military
presence in Europe, leading to several current potential logistical problems
that must be overcome now during the Ukraine conf lict. For example, there
is an increased need for semitrailers with a capacity of 70 tons, supplementing
the number of rail cars with a minimum capacity of 90 tons, increasing the
number of mobile rail ramps, modernizing and digitizing road infrastructure,
8. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3,” NATO (website), March 23, 2021, http://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natolive/topics_49158.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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developing military electronic cargo tracking systems, and improving data
interchange between transportation structures and military units.9
The real level of NATO armed forces capabilities in areas like military
mobility and logistics is shown by military training and exercises such
as Dragoon Ride, Sabre Strike or Atlantic Resolve in eastern f lank countries,
including Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
NATO and EU structures cooperation in security and defense led to the
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) establishment in 2017.
There was a need to create a “Military Schengen Zone” to streamline military
mobility in the EU, especially in its eastern areas.
The new NATO logistics vision ref lects top-down guidance by principles,
with the deployment of NATO forces potentially requiring rapid movement
of personnel in the current strategic environment. A large quantity
of equipment and material must be deployed across NATO territory,
considering the need for operational effectiveness versus considerations
of efficiencies.10
Threats can come from state and non-state actors in the form of
terrorist attacks, cyberattacks, or combined in the form of hybrid warfare,
with faint delineations between conventional and unconventional forms of
conf lict.11 Natural disasters and climate change can trigger f loods, fires,
and earthquakes or generate biohazards and pandemics (such as COVID-19)
with an unpredictable effect on global logistics. The security environment
was radically transformed due to the challenge of adapting and responding
to these threats.
There is a Strengthened Resilience Commitment reiterated in 2021 by
the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance: “We
are addressing threats and challenges to our resilience, from both state and
non-state actors, which take diverse forms and involve the use of a variety of
tactics and tools. These include conventional, non-conventional and hybrid
9. Wiktor Biernikowicz, The Military Transport Challenges in Light of the NATO “Freedom of Movement”
Policy on the Example of Poland (Prague: CLC, 2018), https://www.confer.cz/clc/2018/read/2571-the-military
-transport-challenges-in-light-of-the-nato-freedom-of-movement-policy-on-the-example-of-poland.pdf.
10.

NATO, Logistics Handbook.

11. Urmas Paet, “Europe Needs a Military Schengen,” European Defence Matters (2017), https://eda.europa
.eu/webzine/issue12/cover-story/europe-needs-a-military-schengen; and David M. Herszenhorn,
“Call for ‘Military Schengen’ to Get Troops Moving,” Politico (website), August 4, 2017,
https://www.politico.eu/article/call-for-military-border-schengen-to-get-troops-moving-nato-eu-defense
-ministers/.
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threats and activities; terrorist attacks; increasing and more sophisticated
malicious cyber activities; increasingly pervasive hostile information activities,
including disinformation, aimed at destabilizing our societies and
undermining our shared values; and attempts to interfere with our
democratic processes and good governance.” 12 There has been a growing
NATO commitment for at least five years “about the baseline requirements
on resilience from infrastructure, from energy, from telecoms, now logistics
and supply chain.” 13
How NATO can execute its commitment to resilience of logistics and
supply chain in the face of cyber threats is the subject of the next section.

Nonphysical and Advanced (Cyber) Threats to Logistical Chain
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre states that
“the Tallinn Manuals have served [for a decade] as an essential tool for policy
and legal experts on how international law applies to cyber operations,”
providing an academic analysis of international law applied to cyber
conf licts, which cyberterrorists, as well as nation-states, can perpetrate.14
Cyberterrorists are organized into groups that commit cyberattacks
for political, religious, ideological, or social reasons to promote fear
of targeted victims. Their actions are aimed at terrorists in real space,
and they can act as individuals or organized groups or work as proxies
for a nation-state interest.
Although strict adherence to these definitions is not mandatory for cyber
defense planning, knowledge about attacker typologies provides insight
into their motivation, resources, and determination. However, this can also
have some very practical implications.
Any kinetic action in any f ield can involve attacks in cyberspace,
although cyber warfare can exist mainly in virtual space. Escalation of conf licts
and the potential to be used for terrorist purposes, if cyber conf licts escalate,
inevitably attracts the targeting of railways, roads, airports, and sea and river
ports, as well as connecting infrastructure such as bridges and ferryboats.

12. “Strengthened Resilience Commitment,” NATO (website), June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps
/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm.
13. “Newsroom: Building Transatlantic Resilience: Why Critical Infrastructure Is a Matter of National
Security,” NATO (website), December 10, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180067.htm.
14. “Talinn Manual,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) (website), n.d.,
https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual.
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Railway cybersecurity challenges due to increased digitization create
a novel threat derived from the complexity of new systems like the European
Railway Traffic Management Systems (ERTMS), which have already improved
cross-border interoperability throughout Europe by creating a single standard
for railway signaling. The efficiency offered by ERTMS must be weighed
against the inherent risk of increased vulnerability due to the extensive
digitization that tends to focus the attackers’ attention. There is an increased
demand for a dedicated railway cybersecurity solution amid increasing threats.
Only solutions built with the railway’s protocols, technologies, and
systems can ensure reasonable safety, continuity, and reliable transport.
Railways often become primary targets for cyberattacks during major events
due to a country’s leadership and delegations using railway transport and the
media impact that increases with the disruption in event logistic.
Concerns about the cybersecurity of the railways have led to directives
such as the Transportation Security Administration’s December 2021 security
directives “to fortify cybersecurity across all US critical infrastructure,
including passenger railroads, rail transit agencies, and freight railroads.” 15
Similarly, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
(CENELEC), responsible for developing and def ining voluntar y
electrotechnical standards in Europe, created CLC/TS 50701 in 2021 to guide
all railway operators, system integrators, and product suppliers on managing
cybersecurity in the context of the EN 50126-1 RAMS lifecycle process.16
There is a close logical connection within the civilian domains that can
be constituted in real areas of disruption of the supply chain.
Aviation, a major logistics component, has been subjected to multiple types
of cyberattacks. There is a large variation between the types of attacks,
ranging from the 2015 DDoS attack on Polish airline LOT that left
1,400 passengers stranded at a Warsaw airport to the 2016 and 2017 Black
Energy malware and GoldenEye ransomware attacks at Boryspil airport

15. Transportation Security Administration, Enhancing Public Transportation and Passenger Railroad
Cybersecurity, Security Directive 1582-21-01 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security,
December 31, 2021), https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/sd-1582-21-01_signed.pdf.
16. “CLC/TS 50701: Railway Applications – Cybersecurity,” European Standards (website), 2021,
https://www.en-standard.eu/clc/ts-50701-2021-railway-applications-cybersecurity.
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in Kyev.17 In 2017, there were physical leaks of highly confidential data
at Heathrow Airport, and in 2018, a hacked mobile application exposed
the data of 20,000 Air Canada customers.18 The 2018 massive personal
data leak of over 400,000 customers of British Airways and the 2020 major
data breach on EasyJet of over 9 million customers’ leaked personal data are
other examples.19 In 2020, login portals (one reserved for employees, the other
for partners and service providers) at San Francisco International Airport
were compromised, and in 2020, the Prague airport foiled several attempted
attacks, to name a few. 20
While the direct effects of the attacks varied, the repercussions and
hard- to-predict ripples generated systemic effects. They caused the
destabilization of logistics systems over large areas, which impacted efficiency
and trust.
Given the specific nature of port interconnection as a hub for rail, land,
and air transport, the logistical risks posed by the impact of cybersecurity
incidents requires the introduction of regulations related to the maritime
industry. In March 2020, the US Coast Guard released Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-20, titled “Guidelines for Addressing Cyber
Risks at MTSA Regulated Facilities.” There are several organizations involved
in guidance for cyber defense–related to ports, including the European Union
17. Stephanie Prevost, “Ten Major Cyberattacks against the Airport Industry,” Stormshield (website),
August 16, 2021, https://www.stormshield.com/news/ten-major-cyberattacks-against-the-airport-industry;
AFP News Agency, “Hackers Target Polish Airline LOT, Ground 1,400 Passengers,” Security Week (website),
June 21, 2015, https://www.securityweek.com/hackers-target-polish-airline-lot-ground-1400-passengers;
Pavel Polityuk and Alessandra Prentice, “Ukraine Says to Review Cyber Defenses after Airport Targeted
from Russia,” Reuters (website), January 18, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity
-malware-idUSKCN0UW0R0; and Ellie Burns, “Chaos in Ukraine as Ransomware Cyber Attack Hits Airports,
Banks & Government,” Techmonitor (website), June 27, 2017, https://techmonitor.ai/technology/cybersecurity
/chaos-ukraine-ransomware-cyber-attack-hits-airports-banks-government.
18. Charlie Osborne, “Heathrow Airport Fined £120,000 over USB Data Breach Debacle,” ZDNet
(website), October 9, 2018, https://www.zdnet.com/article/heathrow-airport-fined-120000-over-usb-data
-breach-debacle; and Jeremy Kirk, “Air Canada: Attack Exposed 20,000 Mobile App Users’ Data,”
August 30, 2018, https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/air-canada-attack-exposed-data-on-20000-mobile
-app-users-a-11441.
19. John Bosnell, British Airways Suffers Data Breach Compromising Information on over 429,000 Customer
Cards (Genève, CH: ORX News, December 21, 2018), https://managingrisktogether.orx.org/sites/default
/files/public/downloads/2019/01/british-airways-suffers-data-breach-compromising-information-over-429
-000-customer-cards.pdf; and “EasyJet Hacked; Details of 9 Mn Customers Compromised,” CISO-MAG
(website), May 20, 2020, https://cisomag.eccouncil.org/easyjet-hacked-details-of-9-mn-customers-compromised.
20. John Leyden “San Francisco Airport Data Breach: Double Website Hack May Have Lifted Users’
Windows Login Credentials,” Daily Swig (website), April 14, 2020, https://portswigger.net/daily-swig
/san-francisco-airport-data-breach-double-website-hack-may-have-lifted-users-windows-login-credentials;
and Reuters Staff, “Prague Airport Says Thwarted Several Cyber Attacks; Hospitals Also Targeted,”
Reuters (website), April 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-cyber-idUSKBN2200GW.
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Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the International Association of Ports and
Harbors (IAPH), and the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET).
NVIC 01-20 requires assessment and documentation of computer systems
and network vulnerabilities in a facility security assessment (FSA) and
addresses all identified vulnerabilities in applicable sections of the facility
security plan (FSP). 21 As shown in figure 10-1, several possible cyber-maritime
attacks (GPS jamming, vessel spoofing, f looding, and the creation of a ghost
ship) can have systemic logistical effects as shown on Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS). Each type of attack can be classified according to the threat
to the information, such as jamming versus the availability of information,
the system and the attack vector (for example, message injection for AIS
spoofing), and the threat category (for example, f looding is also another kind
of message injection attack).

Figure 10-1. Types of alleged attacks
(Original by author)

21. “NVIC 01-20 Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA) Regulated Facilities,” US Department of Homeland Security/US Coast Guard Homeport (website),
March 3, 2020, https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=62174&Source=/Lists/Content
/DispForm.aspx?ID=62174.
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Cyberattacks on the transport system can block the industry due to a ripple
effect in the supply chain. As an entry-level scenario, a cyberattack against
maritime facilities could disrupt the customs approval process, facilitate
the import of illegal goods, or the proliferation of dangerous operations.
Threat actors may also have a bigger target if a cyber threat can proliferate
from a port to other interconnected systems like airports or railways.
Figure 2 shows interesting pattern involving a maritime cyber incident,
where Marine Traffic, a well-known maritime analytics real-time provider,
gives a synoptic picture of an incident that should impact the maritime area.
Although the incident is one with an impact only in the maritime field, it can
also confuse adjacent areas (such as aviation and other monitoring services)
affected by the altered reporting of maritime positioning data. It shows how
the information provided automatically by the maritime AIS system is altered,
either at the source via GPS spoofing or during the uninterrupted transmission
through unsecured AIS protocol or injection. The records date back to October
2021, as shown in figure 10-2, but the systematic errors persisted for months.
The attack targeted the positioning of ships and not aviation itself, and the
display on the maritime map above an airport is the only illustration of the
attack. They could have been positioned above other cities or highways as well.

Figure 10-2. Spoofed positions of maritime ships over Ankara Esenboga
Airport, October 25, 2021, 20:10 EET
Source: “Global Ship Tracking Intelligence,” MarineTraffic (website), n.d., https://www.
marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:33.062/centery:40.132/zoom:15.

234

Chapter 10

Terrorist Threats to Supply Chain and Logistical Resilience

Globally, cargo ships have an average transport capacity of 8,000
containers per voyage, with transportation systems operating at 53 billion
passengers annually. Before the global pandemic, more than 8.8 billion
passengers traveled through airports worldwide. The examples of transport
system management below provide a dimension of operational complexity:
22



Maritime: systems for managing the f leet, ships, and maritime
traffic



Airports: systems for managing the f leet, passengers, and air
traffic control



Roads and bridges: traffic signaling systems containing road
and lidar sensors which determine ranges through laser



Highway tunnels: lighting systems, heat, and ventilation
sensors



Railways: traffic-planning systems, power supply, maintenance,
and control of stations

To manage these complex systems, the number of IoT devices involved
is growing exponentially. Transport and logistics operators must protect
their access to operational technology (OT) systems and strengthen cyber
resilience to prevent disruptions and ensure safety and security. Any unplanned
interruption of operation in one of these environments can lead to supply-chain
blockages or severe disruption of the logistical relationships of the systems.
There is an accelerated trend for information technology (IT) to converge
rapidly with OT at any point in the transport chain. The decisive effect
of combining OT with IT data is exponential growth in process efficiency,
but with the inherent risks of cybersecurity. Unfortunately, most OT security
teams cannot provide satisfactory system security due to a lack of tools,
procedures, and knowledge.

Multinational Interaction Mechanisms
The current complex geopolitical situation, with variable and
omnidirectional risks corroborated with the principles of logistical distribution
at the level of the Alliance members, requires the introduction of multinational
22. “Global Ship Tracking Intelligence,” MarineTraffic (website), n.d., https://www.marinetraffic.com
/en/ais/home/centerx:33.062/centery:40.132/zoom:15.
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logistics. Although multinational logistics was included in the NATO Logistics
Handbook (2012), there was no agreement at the NATO level. There has been
a proposed concept of logistics support to operations through multinational
means, such as lead nation, role specialization, and multinational integrated
logistic support. Accordingly, there are “four types of multinational logistic
support options that may be implemented”: preplanned mutual supports
between national support elements, one nation formally undertaking support
as a logistic lead nation or specialist nation, one or more nations under the
operational control of the Joint force commander, or one or more nations
forming a multinational logistic/medical unit. 23
For a complete understanding of the logistical interaction mechanisms
within NATO, it is necessary to recall a few aspects, such as collective
responsibility for logistics, which imply that neither the member state
nor NATO itself can take full responsibility for an entire operation.
Cooperation and consideration of all aspects contributing to the operation’s
success is necessary. From this point of view, the notion of collective logistics
as “the collective approach undertaken by NATO and nations to plan, generate,
synchronize and prioritize national and NATO logistic capabilities, resources
and activities to deliver logistic support to NATO missions, operations and
exercises, by making use of common processes and organizational structures”
is defined. 24
Beyond the definitions that have widespread acceptance within the NATO
logistics community, respectively production (acquisition) logistics, in-service
logistics, and consumer (operational) logistics, it is very important to highlight
the overlaps of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD),
the NATO Support Organization (NSPO), and the Logistics Committee
as the main aspect of three life cycle domains and their lead bodies as shown
in figure 10-3.

23. NATO Standardization Office (NSO), Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic
Support, NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.9, ed. A, ver. 1 (Brussels: NSO, February 2013),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/787266
/archive_doctrine_nato_modes_of_multinational_log_spt_ajp_4_9.pdf. This publication was withdrawn
without direct replacement, as directed by the NSO in February 2019.
24.

NSO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, AJP-4, ed. B, ver. 1 (Brussels: NSO, December 2018).
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Figure 10-3. Life cycle domains and their lead bodies
(Original by author)

Complex Risks for Critical Logistic Infrastructure
The functionality and validity of logistics infrastructure play a vital
role in many developed countries to enable efficient and resilient logistics
chains. Even temporary damage to some elements of the chain can lead
to the decommissioning of entire transport branches. An example is the
altered functionality of the railway network near the German town of Rastatt
due to the construction of a new railway tunnel. As a result, the route
between Karlsruhe, Germany, and Basel, Switzerland, was closed for two
months for any type of rail transport with the immediate effect of the
unavailability of a critical logistics infrastructure. This closure affected
200 freight trains per day passing through this link between Germany,
the Netherlands, and Belgium and Switzerland and Italy. 25 This example
of the railway logistic closing decision was assumed with some predictability
of the short-term adverse effects. It is entirely different when complex risks
must be corroborated.
To ensure full coverage of the risks and to provide a systematized working
tool, subsequent risks (such as political, economic, social, technological,
legal, and environmental risks) will have to be considered under a political,
25. Nicky Gardner and Susanne Kries, “Major German Rail Route Closed,” Europe by Rail (website),
August 19, 2017, https://www.europebyrail.eu/major-german-rail-route-closed/.
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economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental risk (PESTLE)
acronym umbrella as shown in figure 10-4. Political risks can be separated
into macro- and micro-groups, where macro-political can severely affect the
logistical infrastructure due to armed conf licts, including but not limited
to full-scale wars, guerilla activities, and terrorism. All infrastructure
nodes and suppy-chain links (such as roads, bridges, tunnels, train stations,
railroads, seaports, or airports) are often strategically targeted or, at best,
collateral damage during conf licts like the Donetsk International Airport
in Ukraine in 2014. 26

Figure 10-4. PESTLE (critical logistic infrastructure)
(Original by author)

Terrorist attacks also target populated areas and political and economic
centers to maximize their psychological impact, as was done in the terrorist
attack in Brussels in 2016 with direct damage to the airport and the railway
transport system. 27 Also, maritime risks create macropolitical impact,
as illustrated by the acts of piracy at Cape Horn or the older incident of

26.

UNIAN, “Cyborgs vs. Kremlin,” Ukraine Today (website), 2015, http://cyborgs.uatoday.tv.

27. Sheena McKenzie, “Brussels Travel: Flights Suspended, Transit Limited,” CNN (website),
March 23, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/22/europe/brussels-explosions-transport-flights-metro
-suspended.
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the trucker Iyman Faris who planned to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge. 28
Micro-political risks include diplomatic crises and do not necessarily coincide
with moments of aggression but can lead to frequent roadblocks and border
closures that can disrupt logistics infrastructure. 29 Economic risks have a lower
impact on logistics infrastructure, as most infrastructure is usually publicly
owned and, therefore, well protected from bankruptcy.
The private elements of a logistics infrastructure can be quite vulnerable
to economic risks and can lead to major criticalities, depending on the level of
interdependence they have with the rest of the logistics chain. Social risks, by
definition, affect individuals or groups of individuals who are then transposed
at the level of social status. Individually, it is difficult for an individual to affect
the entire infrastructure, but union protests, real or caused by manipulation,
can directly affect the logistics infrastructure. Strikes by workers whose status
is at risk regularly affect the logistics infrastructure, with airport and railway
operations being repeatedly stopped by coordinated strikes.
One example is the coordinated general strike against the supply chain
that created a gas shortage in Paris in 2016. During the orchestrated strike,
the carriers blocked the road infrastructure serving important ports and
oil terminals for the French market. 30 There is an intrinsic vulnerability
between social risks and the hybrid aspects of possible foreign interference
and manipulation. The technological risks for the logistics infrastructure
can be further diversified into operational risks generated by using specific
infrastructure and risks related to the control and maintenance of logistics
infrastructures. Legal risks for critical logistics infrastructures include
diplomatic restrictions and bottlenecks, as outlined in the micro-political
risks above. They may be caused by a temporary or permanent blockade of
logistic infrastructure or an entire region for reasons of national policy.
There may also be rapid and unforeseen changes in legislation that could
seriously affect the logistics infrastructure as a whole. The refugee crisis
in Europe can be used as an eloquent example, as its consequences are
difficult to manage in the short and medium term, altering the functionality

28. Kelli Arena and Terry Frieden, “Ohio Trucker Joined al Qaeda Jihad,” June 20, 2003, CNN (website),
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/19/alqaeda.plea/.
29. Cecilia Emma Sottilotta, “Political Risk: Concepts, Definitions, Challenges,” Working Paper Series
SOG-WP6/2013 (Rome: LUISS School of Government, 2013).
30. Alissa J. Rubin, “Gas Runs Low in France as Protesters Block Refineries in Labor Battle,”
New York Times (website), May 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/world/europe/france-unions
-labor-law.html.
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of a common Schengen free-trade region. 31 Ecological risks are caused
by altering the natural environment and can significantly affect the logistics
infrastructure, including ecological catastrophes, low water levels, f loods,
earthquakes, typhoons, and hurricanes. As direct effects, temporary or even
permanent closures of roads, railways, bridges, waterways, and airports may
occur. The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland in 2013 grounded thousands
of airplanes across Europe for several days. 32

Major Logistical Vulnerabilities and Defense of Choke Points:
Suwalki Gap Case Study
One of the most exposed areas is the Suwalki Gap, also known as the
Suwalki Corridor, which separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad
on the Baltic Sea from the Belarusian border, as shown in f igure 10-5.
The latest military developments in the area have brought permanently
stationed Russian troops, advanced aircraft, and nuclear weapons. It is also
the only road and rail communication route from Central Europe to the Baltic
states—NATO’s most exposed members. 33

Figure 10-5. Suwalki Gap
Source: Deni, “NATO Must Prepare.”
31. Camilla Turner, “Eurotunnel Warns of Lengthy Delays Due to ‘Migrant Activity,’ ” Telegraph
(website), 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11762469/Eurotunnel-suspends-passenger
-services-because-of-migrant-activity-in-Calais.html.
32. Martin Randelhoff, “Eyjafjallajökull – die Auswirkungen in Europa und der ganzen Welt,”
Zukunft Mobilität (website), May 1, 2010, http://www.zukunft-mobilitaet.net/849/analyse/eyjafjallajoekullfazit-schaden-flugverkehr-global.
33. John R. Deni, “NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor,” Foreign Policy
(website), March 3, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/03/nato-must-prepare-to-defend-its-weakest
-point-the-suwalki-corridor/.
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From a logistical point of view, ground-based transportation
infrastructure in the region is not resilient enough because there are only
two roads and a rail line connecting Poland with the Baltic states. First, there
is one highway with two lanes each way and a second with only a single lane.
Western government officials, military leaders, and think-tank experts have
been aware of the problem since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.
Russia can choke the area to disconnect the Baltic countries’ land connection
with the rest of NATO.
The Kaliningrad exclave hosts numerous Russian combat forces,
including the Russian Baltic Fleet, advanced air defenses, and mobile
nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles. From a political-military point of view,
due to Russia’s particularly sensitive threat perception to its control of this
noncontiguous territory, there are risks of escalation due to misinterpreted
NATO’s actions.
Although it is not logically possible for Russia to move because it would
activate Article 5 of the Alliance, involving an attack on NATO territory
and triggering a NATO military response, experience with the invasion
of Ukraine in two stages (2014 and 2022) must be taken into account to avoid
surprises. NATO must be prepared for worst-case scenarios, not being able
to trust the Kremlin’s announced intent based on estimated strategic logic,
and focus on actual Russian military capabilities in the region.
During the last Zapad military exercises, Russian and Belarusian planners
practiced closing the Suwalki corridor by attacking from Belarus in the
direction of Kaliningrad. 34 This plan has particularly relevant consequences
after the outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War due to Moscow’s
inf lammatory reaction to the European cutoff of goods f lowing to Kaliningrad
Oblast as part of the new sanctions regime. NATO will have to strengthen
the logistics elements in the Suwalki Corridor area, taking into account the
unilateral abrogation by Russia of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
The result is not unexpected, as Russia’s behavior often sends specific signals
of undermining stability and security in Europe. 35
Through this political agreement, NATO has fulfilled its collective defense
missions to the states that were once part of the Warsaw Pact by “ensuring
the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement
34. Chris Bott, “ZAPAD 2021 Brief,” Proceedings 147, no. 9 (September 2021): 1,423, https://www.usni.org
/magazines/proceedings/2021/september/zapad-2021-brief.
35. John R. Deni, “The NATO-Russia Founding Act: A Dead Letter,” Carnegie Europe (website),
June 19, 2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/71385.
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rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” 36
This agreement forces Russia to “exercise similar restraint in its conventional
force deployments in Europe.” 37 The premises of a “current and foreseeable
security environment” were initially created, but the Russian side did not fully
respect the conditions. 38 The political and military events of the last decade
have experienced a gradual degradation of the assumptions of 25 years ago.
The British and Canadian ground forces should return to the mainland
on a brigade level with 4,000 troops in their relatively small contingents
in Estonia and Latvia. At the same time, the German ground forces should
expand to the size of a brigade in Lithuania. In order to prevent any threats,
in addition to the recent temporary increases in the US rotating presence,
the permanent presence of armored units, combat aviation, electronic warfare,
drones, engineers, and air defense units must be established. European countries
with an important military dimension in the Alliance, like France, Italy,
and Spain, must employ interoperable battalion-size units of approximately
800 troops each on permanent bases in Poland or Lithuania.

Logistical Challenges of Relocating NATO Capabilities
on the Eastern Flank: Russia - Ukraine War Case Study
The growing security needs of Alliance members due to the risks posed
by the Russian invasion of Ukraine have increased NATO’s readiness and
vigilance across Europe. The Alliance mechanisms effectively mobilized
the logistical effort during a week at the beginning of March 2022.
The mobilization of resources was eff icient, as shown in f igure 10-6,
with thousands of troops deployed to the central and southeastern parts
of the Alliance and more placed on standby.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a multinational force comprised
of up to 40,000 land, air, maritime, and special operations personnel that
NATO can deploy at short notice as needed. Since the end of February
2022, the Alliance has deployed forces to Romania, with France leading this
year’s highest-readiness element of the NRF. The Alliance transferred more
than 350 soldiers, supplies, and armored vehicles from France for five days
using 21 transport planes. The mission included a naval air group supporting
a surveillance and air defense system.
36. “Press Releases: Statement by the North Atlantic Council,” NATO (website), March 14, 1997,
https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-027e.htm.
37. Antony J. Blinken, “Speech: The Stakes of Russian Aggression for Ukraine and Beyond,” US Mission
to International Organizations in Geneva (website), January 20, 2022, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2022/01
/20/the-stakes-of-russian-aggression-for-ukraine-and-beyond/.
38.

Deni “NATO-Russia Founding Act.”
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Figure 10-6. Example of short-term actions using a variety of logistics
(Original by author)

US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet fighters from the Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier USS Harry S. Truman strengthened NATO’s presence along the eastern
f lank. The missions increased vigilance and training for the joint air patrols
of the Alliance and NATO enhanced Air Policing (eAP) efficiency.
The French Air and Space Force’s Rafale fighters integrated with NATO’s
Allied Air Command can be refueled by A-330 multi-role tanker transport
(MRTT) aircraft and can safeguard the skies above the eastern f lank.
They took off from their home base at Mont-de-Marsan, France, to f ly combat
air patrol missions. The A-330 MRTTs conduct refueling for three hours
two times daily. 39
From their home bases in the Netherlands, with air-to-air refueling,
the Dutch air forces extended their air policing mission along the eastern
f lank utilizing F-16s and F-35s to f ly enhanced vigilance activities.
Four Royal Netherlands Air Force F-35 f ighter jets landed at Graf
Ignatievo Air Base near Plovdiv, Bulgaria, to safeguard the skies with the
Bulgarian Air Force. Germany and the Netherlands plan to send Patriot
39. Diana Stancy Correll, “USS Truman Aircraft Join Buildup of NATO Air Policing Patrols
over Eastern Europe,” Navy Times (website), March 4, 2022, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your
-navy/2022/03/04/uss-truman-aircraft-join-buildup-of-nato-air-policing-patrols-over-eastern-europe;
and Stefano D’Urso, “We Updated Our ORBAT Map with All the Assets Deployed across Eastern Europe
for the Ukrainian Crisis,” Aviationist (website), March, 10, 2022, https://theaviationist.com/2022/03/10
/orbat-map-ukraine-update/.
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missile systems to Slovakia to protect and safeguard Allied airspace in the
region. According to NATO, we can cite multiple events and relocations
of troops using various worldwide logistical resources in March 2022
over a few days.40 Summarizing the case study, NATO has about 130 jets
on high alert, and there are more than 120 Allied ships at sea, from the
High North to the Mediterranean Sea.

Supply Chain Resilience
Interoperability Context and Operating Principles
It is very important to summarize the role of the Logistics Committee
(LC), which “meets as the senior advisory body on logistics in NATO
under the chairmanship of the Secretary General twice a year, in joint
civil and military sessions. It has two permanent co-chairmen, namely the
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning (ASG DPP),
and the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee (DCMC).
The Committee reports jointly to both the Council and the MC,
ref lecting the dependence of logistics on both civil and military factors.”41
It operates as a joint civil and military body with representatives
from the Security Committee, NATO’s Support Agency, Standardization
Agency, and other sectors participating. Member countries are represented
by senior civil and military representatives. The Logistics Committee carries
out its work through six subordinate bodies, of which the first two play the
principal role:


the Logistics Committee Executive Group



the Movement and Transportation Group



the Standing Group of Partner Logistic Experts



the Logistic Information Management Group



the Petroleum Committee

40. SHAPE Public Affairs Office, “News Archive: NATO Allies Send Reinforcements to the Eastern Flank,”
NATO (website), March 13, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/nato-allies-send-reinforcements
-to-the-eastern-flank.
41. “Logistics,” June 21, 2017.
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the Ammunition Transport Safety Group 42

There is a close cooperation between the Logistics Committee and the
Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) for coordinating support
of the Alliance’s overall defense effort using civil resources. There are
interrelated responsibilities between these two committees and their related
subcommittees to cooperate closely. The Logistics Committee also works
with the NSPA, NATO Standardization Office, and the Committee of the
Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO.43
The Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) has an important role
in crises and conf licts as “a static operational headquarters with multinational
personnel directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR).”44 The JSEC’s mission is a 360-degree approach to contribute
to enablement and help the Alliance to reinforce and sustain military forces
in the Euro-Atlantic area. The JSEC was established in 2018 and reached its
full operational capability in 2021. About 300 Allied soldiers and civilians
are assigned to JSEC activity.

Changes Triggered by Threats and Incidents
The overlapping areas between terrorist groups and criminal networks
have further reduced the differentiation between national responsibility
and international reaction. Illicit traff icking and proliferation activities
overlap with illegal immigration routes and international criminal hubs.
Inevitably, sovereign prerogatives and national border controls grow at odds
with the global nature of the terrorist threat.45 Undergoverned or poorly
governed spaces on the margins of NATO’s territory expose areas of Europe
to the risk of terrorist infiltration, and many adapt their logistics to fit the
different legislative frameworks.46 NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy recognized
in 2011 its importance and roles in maritime security due to an increase
in transnational criminal and terrorist activities. It included support for law
42.

“Logistics,” June 21, 2017.

43. “Logistics Committee,” NATO (website), August 3, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/topics_61715.htm.
44. Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC), NATO JSEC (website), n.d., https://jsec.nato.int.
45. Stefano Santamato and Marie-Theres Beumier, The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism:
Analysis, Assessments, and Actions, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Strategic Perspectives,
no. 13 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Research/INSS/National Defense University Press,
February 2013), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/161531/Strategic-Perspectives-13.pdf.
46. Jean-Louis Bruguière, What I Couldn’t Say: Interviews with Jean-Marie Pontaut, ed. Robert Laffont
(Paris: RAND Europe, 2009); and Erik J. G. van de Linde et al., Quick Scan of Post 9/11 National Counter
Terrorism Policymaking and Implementation in Selected European Countries (Leiden: RAND Europe, 2002),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1590.html.
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enforcement and the prevention of the transport and deployment of weapons
of mass destruction.47 A major challenge is the interconnection of supply chains
that attract additional mutually reinforcing threats. Successful approaches
have included classic situations where NATO assets and contributions
in patrolling the maritime environment are well known. Due to today’s
global financial challenges, smarter approaches are needed to boost capacity
and manage resources.
NATO’s contribution to the f ight against terrorism has been
considered outside of its mainstream activity for a long time. Following the
September 11 attacks, NATO’s response included the decision, taken at the
2002 Prague Summit, to “adapt” the Alliance to the challenge of terrorism
and make its assets and capabilities available to the fight against terrorism.
Civil emergency planning (CEP) was the discipline that supported the
Alliance’s counterterrorism efforts more than any other, with the exclusion
of NATO’s operational engagements.
CEP’s contribution to the CBRN response and consequence management
directly results from its civil defense role in mitigating the effects of possible
nuclear, biological or chemical warfare. Similarly, most of the planning
capacity and progress in critical infrastructure protection is due to CEP’s role
in supporting the logistics of the war effort and ensuring the normal activity
of civil society. NATO’s role in airspace management and maritime security
is linked to the Alliance’s main military defense mandate and can be considered.

Resilience Commitment and Logistics
Resilience, a society’s ability to withstand only partially predictable
shocks, necessarily combines civil society preparedness and military
capacity available at any given time. The principles of resilience included
in Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty “In order more effectively
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly,
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”
ref lects the individual commitment of every ally to maintaining and
strengthening NATO’s resilience. This commitment also reduces the
vulnerability of NATO as a whole.48

47. “Alliance Maritime Strategy – II. The Maritime Security Environment, Paragraph 6,” NATO (website),
March 18, 2011, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm.
48. “The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. – April 4, 1949,” NATO (website), last updated
April 10, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
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Beyond programmatic statements, several aspects of resilience are
inextricably linked to the interdependencies of the supply-chain elements.
Starting at the Warsaw summit in 2016 and reaffirmed in 2021, there are
“seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which member
states can measure their level of preparedness. These requirements ref lect
the core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the
population and civil support to the military, which must be maintained
under the most demanding circumstances. They are all connected,
which means “if one area is impacted, another may suffer as a result.”49
They consist of: assured continuity of government and critical government
services, resilient energy supplies internally and across borders, the ability
to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, and resilient food
and water resources; the ability to deal with mass casualties; resilient civil
communications systems; and resilient transport systems. These requirements
ensure “NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that
civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.” 50
Most of the seven requirements are either major dependencies on the supply
of goods or services in the supply chain, or, more dangerously, inf luence,
govern, or even block the supply chain. An important component of the
resilience of the supply chain and its logistics components is represented
by exercise-type activities such as Locked Shields, the largest and most
complex international live-fire exercise, organized by the NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia.
These exercises, run annually for over a decade, are conducted in real time
with participants from the civilian, military, and critical infrastructure areas
working under pressure simulating complex cyberattacks. 51

Pillars of Supply Chain Resilience
In order to be truly effective, “any action NATO will take in the field
of counter-terrorism will have to take into account the principle
of Nonduplication and Complementarity further elaborated by the policy’s
commitment to coordinate and leverage NATO resources with those
of other nations and international organizations.” 52 NATO is shifting its
focus to specific programs and areas in which it has unique assets that can
49. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness, and Article 3,” NATO (website), June 11, 2021, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
50.

“Resilience, Civil Preparedness, and Article 3.”

51. SHAPE Public Affairs Office, “Exercise Locked Shields 2022 Concludes,” NATO (website),
April 23, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/exercise-locked-shields-2022-concludes.
52.

Santamato and Beumier, New NATO Policy Guidelines.
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support Allied counterterrorism efforts. It provides a logical structure that
goes from def ining NATO’s purpose and role in combating terrorism
to priority areas of engagement. In order to develop advanced resilience
capabilities, approaches derived from standard logistics global expertise that
involve actions and features are described below.


Increasing the ability to absorb shocks by minimizing
the risk of disrupting the supply chain and other severe
impacts, for example, by flexibly switching from primary
to secondary supply routes, rebalancing the worldwide
supply, or switching suppliers.



Redesigning the global network and increasing flexibility
by using dual-source redundancy or approaches that
include nearshoring to reduce dependence on complex
global logistics and vertical integration to bring production
to critical components including semiconductors or other
in-house IT elements. How to balance flexibility, efficiency
and effectiveness when redesigning a global network can only
be done on the basis of comprehensive risk assessments.



New parameters for supply-chain buffers when the organization
needs to develop an effective multitier inventory strategy,
which tends to generate new stock targets in the high-volatility
nodes of the supply chain. The Alliance should assess the
capacity resetting or changing of utilization targets and
identify triggers that signal when to add capacity or activate
ready-to-use capacity based on usage trends.



Managing suppliers proactively by assessing the criticality
of suppliers and adjusting relationships with all of them
to ensure the availability of resources. This action gains
transparency in several areas of suppliers to assess upstream
risks properly. To manage vendor reliability correctly,
traditional KPIs (such as “on time, in full”) and other risky
KPIs (such as geographic distribution) can be monitored.
Suppliers may be asked to change the way information
is shared.

Reaction speed when disruption occurs is needed to manage normal
volatility, avoid interruptions, and increase resilience. NATO must apply
agile ways of working in different functions and regions where the logistics
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system operates. Any deviation must be managed transparently and
a forward-looking view of risks and opportunities must be developed
through simulation. The rapid response should support multi-enterprise
supply-chain management, end-to-end risk management, and planning
scenarios based on anticipation and simulation.

Conclusion and Further Developments
Ensuring the advanced logistics and resilience of the supply chain
within the Alliance is a complex one and cannot be addressed by a simplifying
algorithm. The functional interdependence between the logistics nodes
and the involved economic actors requires an increased capacity to adapt
to the economic, social, and political conditions in challenging times.
In the medium term, hybrid threats, advanced security, and the integrity
of the supply chain will have to be addressed in collaboration with legacy risk
and accelerated digital transformation. This process is especially pertinent
as the Alliance must expand its logistical capabilities as former neutral
countries join NATO. To address the complex and integrated approach
of convergent threats to NATO logistical infrastructures and their ripple
effects, NATO must develop the Integrated Maritime Logistics Concept. 53
An important direction of development is represented by the need
to accelerate the development of supply-chain virtualization in the context
of emerging threats and autonomous operations in conjunction with the
concrete needs of cybersecurity and cyber-resilience in logistics. To improve
the resilience of the supply chain at the Alliance’s level, NATO must consider
a series of interrelated elements to increase the ability to absorb shocks and
dysfunctions, develop alternative supply-chain buffers, reduce dependencies,
and redesign the global supply chain to build a more agile, resilient,
and responsive system.
Following analysis of exercises addressing these challenges,
multiple decision-making levels of the Alliance found that the lack
of sufficient workers persists, affecting efficiency in the short and medium
term. NATO must find solutions for increasing the number of human operators
or a correct balance bet ween systems with human assistance and
automatic ones.
53. “Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE),” in NATO-Accredited
Centres of Excellence: 2021 Catalogue (Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 2021),
https://www.cmdrcoe.org/fls/pubs/2021_COE_CATALOGUE.pdf, 21.
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The new threats have raised major concerns at the Alliance level
and prompted NATO leaders to ask the Secretary-General to lead
a forward-looking ref lection on the future of NATO, called NATO 2030.
As part of this effort, the Alliance seeks to strengthen its commitment with
civil society, the young generation, and the private sector. During 2021,
six NATO 2030 dialogues explored how the private sector can contribute
address major technology-based security risks and increase overall resilience. 54
Critical infrastructure and supply-chain security dialogues will help
NATO to understand the private-sector perspective on critical security and
defense infrastructure challenges. Technology is playing an increasingly
important role in military capabilities and operations, so supply chains need
to remain secure and resilient across the Alliance, especially as the importance
of private actors grows. 55

54. “NATO-Private Sector Dialogues Focus on NATO 2030 Initiative,” NATO (website), June 2, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_184601.htm.
55. “Critical Infrastructure and Security of Supply Chains,” GLOBSEC (website), April 21, 2021,
https://www.globsec.org/events/critical-infrastructure-and-security-of-supply-chains.
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